

F. A. VOIGT

THE
GREEK
SEDITION



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TO THE MEMORY OF
THOSE WHO FELL AT KONITSA

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PREFACE

WHEN I had finished this book, I had occasion to revisit Greece towards the end of January, 1949. The observations I was able to make during a period of six weeks gave me no reason to modify what I had written, save in a few minor respects to which I shall return later on. But as the winter—a winter of exceptional severity, which lasted far into the month of March—was replete with events of great, and perhaps decisive, consequence, I venture to add this *Preface*, and give a brief account of these events and of the situation as it appeared at the end of that month.

Three towns were raided and sacked by the Communists. The full details of the raids were not available when I left Greece, but their nature and extent may be gathered from the following accounts which I have based on the evidence of reliable eyewitnesses and on reports by the competent authorities.¹

On Saturday, the 11th of December, 1948, the Communists raided Karditsa, in Thessaly, a town of about 14,000 inhabitants,² from several points with a well-armed and well-disciplined force of far greater strength than the garrison. They soon penetrated to the centre of the town while isolated detachments of the garrison were still firing from separate houses. The fight was extremely fierce. Amid the almost continuous uproar of machine-gun and mortar

¹ All three towns were visited by members of the British Military Mission. Perhaps one may hope that their reports will be published.

² The figures relating to this and other Greek towns indicate the populations before the Second World War. The actual populations are generally bigger because of the influx of refugees from the villages.

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fire, the Communists kept on shouting: 'We are the Democratic Army! Fascists! Surrender, or we'll burn you alive!'

The garrison was running out of ammunition and had thrown its last hand-grenades. The Communists began to sing *Elasite* songs. The garrison sang the Greek National Anthem and other patriotic songs in reply.

During the night of the 11th, the Communists herded hundreds of the civilian inhabitants—men, women, and children—together and moved them to the mountains in groups under armed escort. Amongst the persons abducted in this manner were some of the leading citizens, including the director of the *Nomarch's* office, the director of the hospital, the owner of the newspaper *Thessaliki Phoni*, the owner of the flour mill, and many others, who were, it would seem, to be tried as 'traitors' by the *People's Courts* which assemble in the Communist strongholds.

One soldier of the garrison, a nephew of Major-General Petsópoulos, found himself completely surrounded in the house he alone was defending. He was summoned to surrender. He shouted: 'Come on, you Bulgarians!¹ I am a Greek, and shall never be taken alive.' He shot himself with his last round. Two of the garrison, a father and son, named Magalíos, were captured and executed after they had run out of ammunition. Another, Lolíos, whose brother, the owner of the newspaper, had been abducted, was burnt alive in the house he was defending.

The town was relieved on Monday, the 13th of December, but the Communists made off before they could be engaged by the relieving force.

¹ The Greek Communists are not, of course, Bulgarian, though they were in league with them during the war and are so still. But the word 'Bulgarian' has become a term of execration which the Greeks sometimes throw not only at the hereditary enemy, but also at those in league with him.

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The damage done in the course of the fighting was relatively small, but the damage done by the special 'sabotage units' of the Communists was extensive. The railway station, together with fourteen waggons and two locomotives, the flour mill, all public buildings, and about twenty shops and houses were destroyed by explosives and by fire. About four hundred houses were badly damaged. All shops, stores, depots, warehouses, banks, and so on, were thoroughly looted. The looted goods were packed on mules while the fighting was in progress and taken to the mountains by the Communists and by civilians who were forced to help them.

Eight hundred and thirty-eight men, women, and children in all were abducted, but many of these escaped from their captors during the weeks that followed and found their way back to Karditsa after enduring great hardships through hunger, exhaustion, and frostbite.

On the 11th of January, 1949, the Communists attacked Náooussa, in Macedonia, an industrial town of about 11,000 inhabitants. Their force consisted of three Brigades of the Tenth Division of the 'Democratic Army', or 1800 men in all. They, too, were well led, well disciplined, and well armed and equipped. They wore British and American uniforms. The garrison was composed of 530 Regulars, 42 Constabulary, and 30 Home Guards, or 602 men in all.

Communist 'sabotage units' entered the town secretly and began to blow up or fire the buildings. As the attack developed, a part of the garrison rallied in the square, while the rest continued to defend isolated posts. Of the men who had fired their last rounds and could find no way of escape, three committed suicide. Twelve of the Constabulary were taken prisoner by the Communists who tied them together in twos

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and drove them to the cemetery of Agios Athanasios. Five broke away from their captors and escaped. Seven were executed—the bodies were found later on in a ravine.

The Mayor of Náoussa, Nikolas Theophilou, was arrested and told that his life would be spared if he paid a sum of £200 in gold or \$5000. The sum was raised at once by voluntary contributions. When he handed it over to the Communist command, he was taken to *Truman Square* and executed.¹ The square had been so re-named last year at his own suggestion. This, so the Communists declared just before his execution, was the reason why he had to die the death of a 'traitor'.²

The manager of the Lanarás textile factory and donor of the State Hospital, Aristotelis Letis, and many other leading citizens, including five women, were also executed. Some of the bodies were subjected to mutilation.

The Communists began to withdraw towards nightfall on the 14th when the approach of the relieving force was signalled. This force was only able to establish a brief contact in which it lost 9 killed and 98 wounded. The Communists lost 30 killed and one wounded.

The destruction done by 'sabotage units' was very great. The textile works of Lanarás-Kirtsís, Estía, Tsitsi, and Bili, which together made Náoussa one of the most important centres of the textile industry in the Balkans, and the rope-factories Kokinos, Platsoukas, and Petridis, were destroyed by fire and looted. Most of the plant was damaged beyond repair. The Hospital, one of the finest in Greece, was blown up. The Power Station and all the main municipal buildings,

¹ This incident was related by General van Fleet, the head of the American Mission, in a broadcast (see *Messenger d'Athènes*, 24th of Feb., 1949).

² Mr Truman was personally informed of this incident.

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including the Labour Exchange and the library, were destroyed. All shops, large and small, and all storehouses were completely emptied by looters, 628 persons, young and old, 418 of them male and 210 female, were abducted. Many of these escaped during the weeks that followed.

On the 19th of January, the Communists attacked Karpenísi, a town of about 3000 inhabitants which had been completely destroyed by the Germans and partly rebuilt. The 'sabotage squads' entered the town secretly before dawn and threw incendiary bombs through the windows of the convalescent hospital which held many sick and wounded as well as some Communist prisoners. A panic started and the defence was disorganised from the beginning, although many officers and men of the small garrison fought with great individual heroism. Hundreds of persons, mindful of what had happened at Karditsa and Náoussa, hid in the sewers or fled into the forests, chiefly to save the women and children from abduction. Many perished of cold and exposure and many, when they returned, were suffering from frostbite.

The owner of a small shop, Ionnis Kekhlivaris, was at home with his wife and two daughters, Maria and Eleni, aged 16 and 17, when the Communists arrived. His wife and the two girls hid behind some stacks of wood in the cellar. In Karpenísi, as in Karditsa and Náoussa, the Communists had lists of persons whom they had marked for abduction. Not finding the two girls as they had expected, they arrested the father, took him to their own quarters, and told him that he would die the next morning if he did not inform them where his daughters were to be found. He refused to give the information, but, when the morning came, he was released. He returned to his home, overjoyed, but, when he

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arrived, he was dismayed to learn that his daughters had given themselves up to the Communists so that his life might be spared.

Khristos Pourgos, a refugee from Domani, where he had seen the Communists at their work, fled into the forest with his young wife, her baby, and three small children. The fugitives lost their way and plunged helplessly into the snow-drifts. They had no defence against the extreme cold. The mother and the baby were the first to perish. Two of the children died soon after. Pourgos, mad with grief and fear, took the surviving child in his arms and found his way back to Karpenísi. He was able to reach the house of some friends who concealed him in a warehouse where he remained, suffering from exposure and frostbite, until the relieving army arrived.

The Communists made some attempt to ingratiate themselves with the inhabitants. They expressed surprise that they were shunned by all. Some of their commanders said that they would soon form a Government with Sophianopoulos as Prime Minister, though they would make it a condition the Communists should hold the Ministries of Foreign and Home Affairs, and that elections should follow before the end of the present year.¹

In Karpenísi, all municipal buildings, the hospital, the school, the home for refugees, and many other buildings were blown up. Banks, shops, and stores were pillaged.

¹ Sophianopoulos is a well-known *Fellow Traveller*. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the predominantly Republican Government formed by the Republican *frondeur*, General Plastiras, in January, 1945. He was on good terms with EAM (the *National Liberation Front* which was controlled by the Communists) and was, rightly or wrongly, believed to enjoy the favour of the Kremlin. Before the war, the Greek Communist Party denounced him as a Fascist, an Imperialist, and an instrument of Greek capitalism (see the official history of the Party issued by the Central Committee: TO K.K.E. ANO TO 1918 ΕΩΣ ΤΟ 1941, Vol. 1, p. 451).

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One hundred and five civilians lost their lives. Seven hundred and seven men, women, and children were abducted, including all the boys and girls in the upper form of the High School ('Gymnasium'). About three hundred abducted persons escaped and were back in Karpenísi by the middle of March.

While the Communists were in the town a Greek aeroplane flew low overhead. They fired at it with rifles and automatic weapons. It is not clear whether it was hit or not. In any case, it made a forced, but apparently safe, landing. On the 23rd of January, the commander of the Communist forces, who went under the name of Boulasíki, summoned the leading citizens to the landing-ground and forced them to sign a statement that the two airmen, a Greek and an American, had died of injuries caused by the crash. The citizens saw the bodies but were not allowed to examine them. The body of the Greek was inside the aeroplane at the pilot's post and in uniform, the body of the American, also in uniform, was lying outside. Neither body showed injuries that were visible at a distance, so that the citizens could not tell how the two men had lost their lives. The aeroplane appeared to be undamaged. The bodies and the aeroplane were photographed by a press-photographer attached to the Communist forces.

No one, thereafter, was allowed to approach the landing-ground, but the body of the American was found, later on, by some schoolboys about 200 yards away. The uniform had been removed. The head had been scalped with a sharp instrument and other mutilations had been inflicted. The throat had been constricted by a piece of wire.

The body was identified as that of Lt.-Col. Seldon Edner by a member of the American Military Mission who arrived

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in Karpenísi when the town was liberated. The body of the Greek pilot was never seen again. The Communists had destroyed the aeroplane by fire.

The success with which the Communists had raided and sacked three towns caused consternation throughout Greece. It was evident that Greece, in her ninth year of war, could not endure a prolonged continuation of such disasters.

The intense cold, the blizzards, and the snow-drifts impeded the movements of convoys and mechanised columns along roads which were, for the most part, in wretched condition even in fair weather, and were often heavily mined. The highly mobile forces of the Communists who made sudden descents from their mountain fastness, relying mainly on sure-footed mules for their transport, had the advantage of speed and of surprise. Blizzards and low visibility impeded reconnaissance by the Royal Hellenic Air Force. It was impossible for the Greek army to provide adequate garrisons for every town. It was true that the Communists were unable to hold any town and the surrounding territory long enough to establish a 'Democratic Government' on Greek soil. But, sooner or later, their destructive blows must, if not parried in good time, compel the legitimate Government to consider some compromise which might include *Fellow Travellers*, like Sophianopoulos or Svolos, and a few Communists. That such a Government would enable the Communists to re-enter the civil service, the trade unions, and, in time the army, navy, and air force, was clear. It would have been the end of Greek independence.

This was well understood by Greek public opinion. Those who were most powerful in forming that opinion, that is to say, those who called themselves 'nationalists', had begun to

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demand a 'nationalist' dictatorship even before the attack on Karditsa.

The word 'nationalist' or *ἐθνικός*, today broadly characterises those Greeks who have, throughout the years of tribulation, shown an ardent, single-hearted, and active patriotism. They understood events in Greece from the beginning, that is to say, as far back as 1943 or even further, and long before they were fully understood by many of the more sophisticated observers who affected a political enlightenment chiefly derived from western Europe, and long before any but a few, very few, British observers understood them.¹ Their understanding of the 'nationalists' may have appeared crude, even 'primitive'—largely because the situation was, and still is, crude and 'primitive'. Their understanding may have, at times, expressed itself with a certain immoderation of language which would strike western observers unfavourably by comparison with the ingratiating manner and seemingly moderate purpose of the *Fellow Travellers*. But it was the language of truth. To say that these men are 'Fascists' or 'reactionaries' is altogether untrue. Had it not been for such as these Mussolini's army would not have suffered so shattering a defeat in Albania and Greece would have fallen to the Communists long ago.

More than a year ago, Mr Papandreou, who has a gift for pointed paradox, remarked that the war was a conflict between 'an omnipresent sedition and an omni-absent State'. Events during the past winter seemed to justify his remark. The popular demand for a dictatorship began to grow importunate when the military operations in the north,

¹ One of these few was Major Wallace, the representative of the Foreign Office who returned to Greece in July, 1944 and was killed a month later.

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upon which so many hopes had been founded, proved to be inconclusive. A dictatorship seemed the only means of putting an end to senseless faction and of prosecuting the war with the utmost vigour. This demand was not inspired by hostility to democratic institutions as such, for the truest defenders of Greek democracy are to be found amongst the most determined nationalists. It was inspired by the conviction that Greece was on the verge of the abyss and that nothing but the complete subordination of the whole moral and material resources of the country to a single purpose—the complete and final extirpation of an organised and treasonable sedition—could save the national independence of Greece and the liberties of her people.

The King was inundated with letters and telegrams from men all over Greece, especially from the villages, begging him to establish a dictatorship under his own authority. It was clear that a crisis far deeper than most of the innumerable crises which have been so familiar and so lamentable a feature of Greek political history, had arrived. It was also clear that it had to be solved with speed, resolution, and some degree of finality.

The crisis was solved and a dictatorship was averted, thanks chiefly to the cool realism of the King, to the forceful personality of the Queen, to the immense devotion which they both command amongst the Greek people, and to the patriotism of the political Parties which, for once, were able to place country above faction.

The new Government has hardly had time to show its worth. The mere abundance of legislative measures does not mean much. There is, in Greece, as elsewhere, a growing need for less, rather than more legislation, and for a drastic clearing of the bureaucratic jungle which is suffocating

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trade and industry. Greece is by temperament a land of free enterprise and private initiative.

But at least it can be said that Greece has a Government which is not, like some of its predecessors, paralysed by factious instability. The demand for a dictatorship has subsided. The people are more confident than they were that the war is being conducted with energy and singleness of purpose. They have much confidence in the new Commander-in-Chief, General Papagos, who, under General Metaxas, defeated the Italians in Albania: a great soldier, resolute and imperturbable, free from personal ambition, and aloof from every faction.

I can only endorse what I have written in the following pages with regard to the Monarchy. It has become not only a symbol of national unity, but also an active agent of national endeavour. Today the Throne commands the unquestioning loyalty of all except the direct and indirect promoters and supporters of the Sedition.

Critical observers were perturbed not only by the destructive and tragic nature of the raids on Karditsa, Náoussa, and Karpenísi, but by the efficiency with which they were carried out. Indiscriminate massacre of men, women, and children, which accompanied the raids on so many Greek villages, was limited to what the Communists call the 'arrest of traitors'¹—that is to say, the arrest and execution of persons specified in advance. The looting, called 'requisitioning',¹ was extensive, but it was also more systematic than heretofore. The produce was assigned to the commissariat of

¹ The terms 'arrest of traitors', 'requisitioning', and 'recruitment' occur in an 'Operational Order' issued by the High Command of the 'Republican Army' (usually called 'Democratic Army') marked 'secret' and dated the 5th of Feb., 1949. A copy of this order was found on the person of a Communist commander, Leftherias, who was killed in action (see *Messenger d'Athènes*, 21st of Feb., 1949).

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the 'Democratic Army' and was not wasted in satisfying individual rapacities. Children under fourteen were not abducted. The three afflicted towns are too far from the northern border to make it possible to transport small boys and girls in any number across that border. But boys of fourteen and over, and young men, were abducted—or 'recruited'¹ as the Communists call it for service in the 'Democratic Army' while girls and young women were abducted for work in the mess-room, field-kitchens and commissariat and for the use of the officers and men.

But on the 12th of February the Communists were totally defeated in an attempt to raid Flórina, a town of 11,000 inhabitants, near the Yugoslav border. They entered the outskirts of the town and were driven back and then shattered in a series of engagements fought amongst snow-bound mountains. Their losses were 783 killed and 350 prisoners, more, in all probability, than half their effectives. The Greek army lost 44 killed, 220 wounded, and 35 missing.

Soon after, the Greek army overtook and engaged the main Communist force which had raided Karditsa, and inflicted a severe defeat. The greater part of the Peloponnese had become a scene of pillage, arson, and terrorism perpetrated by small armed bands who made descents from mountain strongholds. The work of pacification was successfully carried out by Regulars and Constabulary with the assistance of the peasants. I have, in the following pages, indicated the importance of the secret Communist organisation known as the 'Self Defence' or *Aftódmyna*. It seems to have been completely destroyed in the Peloponnese which can, henceforth, be adequately garrisoned by Constabulary and Home Guards, leaving the Regulars to reinforce the army in the north. Every attempt to re-establish the *Aftódmyna* in Athens,

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the headquarters of this organisation, was defeated almost instantaneously by the police, who are amongst the most efficient in Europe.

Although the Communists were able to maintain the numerical strength of the 'Democratic Army' by forcible 'recruitment', their *cadre* of experienced and reliable men was diminishing. The officers of the 'Democratic Army' are by no means lacking in courage, but they can no longer be exposed to death wounds or capture without endangering the discipline and fighting efficiency of the entire force.

The 'Democratic Army' cannot renew its *cadre* without assistance from the northern neighbours. That is to say, the time is approaching, if it has not come, when Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria—and, of course, Russia—must decide whether they can depart from the principle hitherto observed, namely that assistance to the Greek Communist Party shall be confined to the supply of arms, ammunition, equipment, rear bases, training, and so on, and make assistance include the active participation on Greek territory of a *cadre* which, whatever it may appear to be, will not consist of Greeks, but of trained and experienced men from those northern countries, or even from Germany, France, and so on, perhaps in the form of an 'International Brigade' or 'Foreign Legion'.

It is hard to assess the consequences of the crisis within the Greek Communist Party resulting from the departure of General Markos, an event he had himself anticipated more than a year ago (as can be gathered from his letter which I have included in the appendix to this book). The sympathies of General Markos were certainly with Marshal Tito. So far there appears to be no evidence that the conflict between the Marshal and the Cominform has affected the military

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operations in Greece, though it may do so yet. Now, as before, those operations are subordinated to the principal purpose of the Cominform in the Balkans, namely the creation of a Macedonian State embracing the Bulgarian, Yugoslav, and Greek Macedonian territories, a purpose which will, if achieved, extinguish Greek independence, establish Russia on the Aegean and make her master of the southern approaches of the Straits, and transform the Balance of Power in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.

I must, in the light of recent enquiry, qualify in one respect what I have written about the abduction of children from three to fourteen years old. I can only endorse the opinion that these abductions constitute an atrocity of deep and far-reaching maleficence. For pious and patriotic parents, a more grievous affliction could not be imagined. But all parents are not patriotic and pious. Some have Communist sympathies. Some have been reduced to apathy by the cumulative effects of war, massacre, hunger, fear, and destruction. Some who belong to the small Slavophone minority are indifferent, or even hostile, to the Hellenic spirit.

In many mountain villages the inhabitants are entirely dependent on the Communists for information. They are cut off from the towns, there are no newspapers except the sheets, leaflets, and bulletins distributed by the Communists, and no wireless sets. The local patriots, the pillars of national resistance everywhere, have been exterminated. In such villages, which are in a state of extreme fear and misery, Communist propaganda has had some effect, and there are parents who have been made to believe, or at least suspect, that children, removed by the Greek civil or military

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authorities to the towns and islands for their own salvation, will indeed be at the mercy of savage 'Monarchofascists' or brutish 'American gangsters' as the Communists in their propaganda so persistently affirm. Some parents, therefore, part from their children without extreme grief, or at least without that inconsolable anguish for their children's future which afflicts most Greek parents who lose their children by abduction. To say this is not to defend abductions which find compliance on the part of the parents. They are made under false pretences and are indefensible. Nor can anything be said in defence or extenuation of the Governments which are in connivance with the Greek Communist Party—the Governments not only of the northern neighbours, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, but also of Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. Those Governments are receivers of stolen children.

I must add that, whereas the misery of the refugees, who number more than three-quarters of a million, or nearly one-tenth of the total population of Greece, is extreme because of the poverty of the land and of the State, and because of the overcrowding brought by the destruction of houses by the Germans, Italians, and Bulgarians, and, more recently, by the Communists, the children who are removed from the villages by the Greek authorities so that they may be saved from abduction, are well cared for by the State, and by a multitude of devoted voluntary workers, not only under the patronage but under the energetic and inspiring leadership of the Queen. The happiness of these children often finds touching expression in their talks and their letters.

They number about 14,700 and are aged from five to fourteen. They are settled in forty-eight 'colonies' in different parts of the Greek mainland and on the islands. There is no

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discrimination against Communist children, that is to say, children who, for the most part, have acquired the political convictions of their parents, for in Greece political convictions run in families or even in villages. Children, especially boys, mature at an early age, so that it is possible to find ardent Communists aged thirteen, or fourteen or even less.

The 'colony' established at Kastrí, near Athens, under the name of *Paul the Apostle's Paedopolis*, is typical of them all.

A careful vigilance is exercised by the teachers to prevent Communist children from being treated disrespectfully. No effort is made to confute their beliefs. The 'colony' is composed of small communities which correspond, as far as possible, with the villages from which the children come. Children of the same village remain together, they are taught the crafts—cobbling, basket work, weaving, embroidery, and so on—of their village and are fortified in their respect for its traditions, laws, and customs. The 'colony' itself is like a small model of the greater community of the Greek nation. The children are educated in simple patriotism, piety, and love of truth. Many of them have been eyewitnesses of armed clashes, of massacre, arson and pillage, and it is natural that their minds should be affected by vengeful passions of a political nature, the more so as the *vendetta*, or family blood-feud, which used to be endemic in Greece, revived after the massacres in December 1944 and persists to the present day. It is natural, indeed inevitable, that to many a Greek child Communism means quite simply, the murder of a father, the abduction of a mother or sister, and the burning of the village.

But all the children, whether they are nationalist or Communist, are caught up by the loyalty, the Christian

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charity, and the happiness that make up the spirit of their little world. This spirit has begun to triumph in all the 'colonies' and we may well believe that the Communist children, no less than the others, will make good when they return to their own villages.

A few quotations from letters, written by boys and girls of *Paedopolis* to their parents, will serve to illustrate their spirit and their preoccupations:

From Khloridis Aristidis:

'Dear Father and Mother ... If you want to know how we really are, I must tell you that we feel like birds singing in springtime. ... This afternoon our Queen came to see us. She asked us if we were happy and did we need anything. She caressed many children and kissed a little girl who recited a poem. ... Mother, please do not forget to feed my dear chickens and give the lamb its water.'

From Mandavanidou Triada:

'We are really well-off, here, Mother. We eat a lot. They give us meat and jam. ... They have given us shoes, skirts, and ribbons.'

From Vemvoudha Evangelis:

'My dear Daddy ... I am well, but am thinking of you. Who does the washing for you? Who mends your clothes? Who does your cooking? How do you manage all alone? You had only me, and now I have left you. May God give the world peace, so that I can return to you. ... Do not think that I have forgotten you now that I am away from home. I keep your letters under my pillow and sleep with them.'

From Khatzatoglou Irini:

'... and now, Mother, I am sure you are crying. That is not good for you and will make you grow thin. ... When you feel like crying, remember that your children will return. Think of the mothers whose children have been

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taken by the Andartes!¹ ... You must be patient, for we are well cared-for. We sleep quietly because we are not afraid. You know, Mother, there are no pistol-shots here and no bang-bang at night-time. Everything is so quiet!

From Zygeridhis Panos:

'Dear Auntie ... Thank you for the money, but I like the letter best. Our life here is the best expression of human life on earth. I have already had three pairs of shoes and I spoil them because I have a real football to kick. I am going to be a cobbler and I have begun to learn cobbling. I shall make many shoes when I grow up. ... Do not worry about us. It would be stupid, because nowhere in the world is there such peace as we have here.'

From Tartas Paskhalis

'... Has my cow had her calf? Or have they [the Andartes] taken it as well? You know I have a bed of my own here. We even have sheets. I do not have bad dreams any more, but some of the children still scream and wake me up, and then I begin to think. ... You know, Auntie, I eat what the King eats. ... We are taught many things which will be very useful when we return to our dear villages. The Boy Scouts come and teach us games and songs.'

The following letter was received by Fanoula Ioanidou, a little girl at 'Paedopolis', from Soufli, a Thracian village near the northern border:

'Dear Fanoula, I want you to write quickly and tell me if it is true that we can come too. I have decided to come if I can, and so has all my class. We are tired of staying here, Fanoula. Not a day passes without the Andartes firing at Soufli. That is why we are in fear every day, like a hare in a hole. We had exams, but we did not do well because we were in the cellars without a light all day and all night and could not study. That is why you are the happiest people in the world, for you have left Hell and are in Paradise!

¹ The traditional Greek term for insurgents or *guerrilleros*, in this case meaning the Communist bands.

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What you have done, we shall also do. This is not a life, but a Hell! We are all ill, and the little children have stomach trouble because of their daily fear and agony. That is why I will run away and come to you. ... I do not want to die of fear. Never be sorry that you left your mother. They [the Andartes] have killed your father, but now you are safe. The other mothers here know that where you have gone you have security and education. You are a thousand times happy because you see and learn things you would never have learnt here. Give my love to all the boys and girls of our village and write to me soon. Your dear friend Anagnostopoulou Arkhontoula.'

As I have tried to explain in the following pages, the Sedition strikes with disruptive violence at the community—the family, the village, the nation—and at the individual soul, the *ψυχή*, a word conveying to the Greek peasant a reality to which the urban world has become more and more oblivious.

Those who break the law enacted against treasonable sedition are punished under the law. This is necessity and it is justice. But it is not a solution to the greatest task that faces the Greek people, the greatest, that is to say, after the preservation of their national independence and their liberties. The surgical operation, as it were, must be performed. But therapeutic treatment must follow.

It has been necessary to segregate suspects for the same reason that suspects in Great Britain were segregated on the Isle of Man during the War. They are not interned in a camp behind barbed wire, but are sent to the island of Ikaría where they receive a small allowance in money and a ration and enjoy as much freedom as the large and beautiful island offers (except that they must report to the police every day). But, gathered together as they are, although able to

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associate with the islanders, they do not become part of an organic community, but tend to become confirmed in their Communism.

Greek prisons are more congested and less sanitary than English prisons, but they are also less monotonous. The prisoners can abandon themselves to the favourite pastime of the Greeks, political discussion, which almost invariably falls under Communist leadership, for the Communist prisoners are trained in their particular dialectic and have their own organisation, even within the prison walls. Few, if any, of them believe that they will serve long sentences, for they live in hope of rescue whether by raiding forces of the 'Democratic Army', or by the triumph of Communism (perhaps in a Third World War), or by an amnesty. The latter hope can hardly be dismissed as unreasonable, seeing that it has so often been fulfilled. Escape is not difficult, though it is dangerous. It is not often attempted, for life in prison is not much harder than life outside, at least not as long as there is hope of release. The prisons are, therefore, in the nature of Communist universities and Communist prisoners who have been discharged often qualify for responsible positions in the Party, in the 'Democratic Army', or in the *Aftódmyna*.

The spirit of treasonable sedition is, therefore, perpetuated on the island of Ikaría and in the prisons, so that it must, in some measure, survive the defeat of the sedition itself and preserve the germs of its resurrection.

In the modern bureaucratic absolutisms, like the Third Reich and the Soviet Union and other countries under Communist domination, such a problem hardly arises, for political dissidence, even if unaccompanied by subversive action against the State, is suppressed either by exterminating

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real or supposed dissidents or by despatching them to labour or concentration camps from which there may be no return. It cannot as yet be said that this problem is being solved in Greece, although the solution is of such importance to her future—and to the future of other countries, especially of those which are today under Communist domination and may, one day, be liberated.

But the treatment of the children in the 'colonies' and the re-education of the recruits on the island of Makrónisos are perhaps the beginnings of a solution, or do at least indicate certain principles on which the solution must, ultimately, be founded.

The Greek military authorities refused to accept recruits who by word or deed revealed their Communist convictions and sympathies, for such men might desert or impart information to the enemy—and, indeed, during the early part of 1947, desertions were not uncommon, though today they are almost unknown. Recruits who had fought in the ranks of ELAS¹ but had not committed crimes under the common law could not be penalised and, until the end of the year 1947, it was not an offence to be an active member of the Greek Communist Party because its treasonable and seditious character, although sufficiently evident, had not received legal recognition. To send Communist recruits to Ikaría would be to deprive the army of men who might become good soldiers—and, later on, good citizens. It was, therefore, decided to establish three camps on the island of Makrónisos, nearly two miles off the coast of Attica. The island is covered with scrub and heather. It lacks spring water and was inhabited only by a few herdsmen and their

¹ The armed forces, completely dominated by the Communists, within the organisation known as EAM.

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herds, who are there still. Early in 1947, the three camps were established for recruits of Communist convictions or tendencies.

The mere word 'camp', in association with any ostensibly re-educational process—or *Umschulung*—and sponsored by the State, has acquired sinister connotations through the concentration camps of the Third Reich and the labour camps of the Soviet Union, all of which have been represented as serving a re-educational end (it is an old habit of oppressors to represent their oppressions as beneficial to the oppressed). It is understandable that the enquiring visitor to Makrónisos should feel distrustful even if he does not assign the Kingdom of Greece to the same category of States as the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, as indeed he will not unless he is exceedingly ill-informed or disingenuous. If his enquiry is after the truth, his distrust will soon begin to disappear. It will have been dispelled altogether if he has extended his enquiry to the fate of those men who completed this course on the island and are today either in the forces or in civilian employment.

The re-education of the recruits at Makrónisos is based on the same principles as the education of the children at *Paedopolis* and the other 'colonies'. The three camps are three communities that strangely resemble Houses in an English public school. They are in amicable rivalry with one another—a rivalry displayed in games, especially football, singing, and so on (all three have excellent choirs).

Every true community is a home permeated by a common loyalty that is part of a wider loyalty. The recruits, when they arrive, are usually full of suspicion, the more so as Communist propaganda has consistently publicised Makrónisos as 'the island of death' or the 'Monarchofascist Dachau'.

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But they soon become aware that they have found a home, a new comradeship, and a common loyalty. They are astonished to discover that no stigma is attached to their Communist convictions, that they are not persecuted, that they are not even subjected to propaganda, and that they can engage in free discussion with their fellow recruits. As at *Paedopolis*, the simple loyalties, that are common to young and old in every organic and undegenerate society, are taught, not so much doctrinally, although the recruits receive religious instruction, as by practice and by implication, and by reverence for the relevant symbols. Hoisting and saluting the flag is a daily ritual, meals are blessed by the priest, and on Sundays and Holy Days all attend divine service.

The men are under the same military discipline as ordinary recruits. They send and receive letters freely and are, after a time, allowed to go home on leave. So far, none have failed to return. Their military training is accompanied by the practice of various crafts. They are taught to revere the ancient glories of their country—they have built a model of the Parthenon and, amongst the plays which they themselves perform twice weekly, the *Antigone* of Sophocles is a favourite. They have built their own theatre, hospital, mess-room, and canteen—where they can buy cigarettes, wine, and so on at low prices. They have also built two churches of stone. They maintain their own wireless station, their own printing press and their own newspaper.

The success of such a re-educational method—if something so natural and so simple can be called a method—is, of course, dependent upon the pervading spirit. If the pervading spirit were one of secular dogmatism or negative liberalism, if it were contentious or merely tolerant with the

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toleration of indifference, it could not prevail against a secular religion so strongly dogmatic, so contentious, and so positive as Communism. The education and re-education, for the first time (as far as I am aware), in Greece¹ is having such notable initial success, because against the spirit of true piety and patriotism no secular religion can prevail.

No advantage is taken of the circumstance that the recruits are under military discipline. Their political opinions are not provocatively challenged, nor are they thrust inward by moral or physical pressure, but are, as it were, drawn outward and absorbed by the spirit of this little community—and, therefore, of the greater community which is Greece.

It must be said that the originator of the plan to establish the three camps and the inspirer of those in charge, is a pedagogue of genius, Colonel Baïraktaris. But his genius, although exceptional in its scope, its vigour, and its imaginative quality, is not an isolated phenomenon. It is a reflex of the Greek national genius.

It is a favourite pastime of the men—and an essential part of the educational method—to discuss in front of the microphone the letters they write home and receive from home. Many of them pass through a kind of emotional crisis as they grow aware that their loyalty to the Communist idea cannot prevail against a higher and deeper loyalty. It is in the perplexity of such a crisis that they will sometimes put their thoughts in letters to parents or friends, or seek a way out in discussion with their fellow-soldiers. Recently, one of them went to the microphone and read out a letter which he was sending to his parents in a village. He wrote that he knew

¹ The 're-education' of the Germans in 'democracy' offers no serious comparison, for it is related neither to the deeper loyalties nor to eternal truth.

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now that he had done wrong in being a Communist and that he felt ashamed. His superior officer, who was present, at once interrupted, and, going to the microphone (to have done so was an irregularity on his part, for it is the rule that every man have his say freely), declared that he could not allow such a statement to pass uncontradicted. 'We all go wrong sometimes,' he said, 'but it is not everyone who has the courage to admit that he was wrong and to change his opinion accordingly. You must not be ashamed that you were a Communist. You should be proud because you have had the courage to change your views.' These words were received with irrepressible enthusiasm by all the multitude of recruits who were present.

The men are of all professions—shepherds, farmers, clerks, waiters, school-teachers, and so on. The school-teachers are the most numerous—they make up nearly half the total number, which, today, is about 7000.¹ It is they who appear to be in greatest need of re-education.

Not all the men respond. About one-tenth remain Communists. Of about one-fifth it is impossible to be certain. But about seven-tenths of the men become completely, and even ardently, loyal. Those who have been drafted to the front after they have completed their training have proved their loyalty in action. Many have been decorated. It is a strange and moving sight—which I have witnessed on two occasions—when a battalion of 'penitent Communists' (in no penitent mood, however) march through the streets of Athens, singing patriotic songs, amid the applause of the crowds that gather for the occasion, the King or the Minister of War taking the salute as they pass.

¹ About the same number of men, trained at Makrónisos, are now at the front.

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It is too early to judge whether the task of restoring the stricken and disrupted community, of reclaiming the lost individual, and of re-affirming the simple loyalties and eternal truths will be successful in the end. All that can be said is that the beginnings which have been made at *Paedopolis* and the other 'colonies' and on the island of Makrónisos are profoundly interesting, in some ways astonishing, and, so far, at least, auspicious.

The world has much to learn from Greece.

April 1949.

F. A. VOIGT

CHAPTER ONE

GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE

MISRULE is not only a particular misfortune for the misruled, it is also a misfortune of a general kind, for propaganda has such a power of misrepresentation that the worst government will be made to seem the best. That is why misrule will find many emulators, whereas good government arouses little interest or desire for emulation.

Political propaganda can make evil appear good and falsehood truth on behalf of those who make evil their good and falsehood their truth. Because modern scientific invention has prodigiously amplified the potency of propaganda, the belief that evil is good, that bad government is good government, and that the worst government is the best, has acquired an unprecedented power over the minds of men. Good government has become rare. Switzerland, because she has good government, arouses little interest or emulation in the world. For every word said in praise of her, innumerable words are said in praise of countries which, had they been governed, or rather mis-governed, in a past age as they are misgoverned today, would have brought upon themselves the execration of Christendom.

The Greek Government is not one that would ordinarily attract any particular attention either by its merits or its failings, neither of which are exceptional. Events have imposed upon it a task as exacting and as responsible as could fall to any dispensation. It has drawn upon itself the rancour of political sectarians everywhere. Against no

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other government has the real or simulated zealotry of political propagandists engendered such a volume of pitiless invective. The cause of all this enmity is not to be found in anything the Greek Government has done or has failed to do, but solely in the fact that it is the government of the only independent country between the Arctic and the Aegean and is, therefore, under attack—and would still be so, even if it were the wisest dispensation in the world.

Intrinsically, the Greek Government offers little interest, and if I dwell upon it, I do so rather to show what it is not than to show what it is, to indicate the irrelevance (though not the insignificance) of the attacks upon it, and to make it clear that the character and the progress of the Sedition which has been raging in Greece for more than five years are not determined by the merits or defects of the government in power. To dwell upon the irrelevant may seem superfluous, but there is hardly one politically contentious problem in the world today that is not overgrown with weeds of irrelevance. And to gain a clear perception of the relevant, it is often necessary to do much weeding.

In most of the plentiful literature about the troubled condition of Greece, far too much importance is attached to the character of the Greek political order in general and of the Government in particular as the causes of that condition. If the Government were to blunder excessively or to perpetrate some national betrayal (neither of which is to be expected, for the men who make up that Government are neither fools nor traitors), the Sedition might overwhelm the country. But there is, in my opinion, nothing which the present Government and its predecessors could have done to prevent this Sedition from maturing. I am aware that some Greek observers do not share this opinion, holding as they do

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that the Greek Government could have crushed the Sedition in its beginnings. But the causes of the Sedition far transcend the confines of Greece and the competence of her rulers. As long as the principal instigators and promoters of the Sedition had the support of the Great Powers, it was beyond the capacity of the Greek Government, which was itself dependent upon their good-will, to take the drastic action which alone could have crushed the Sedition in its beginnings.

Those responsible for British and American policy in south-eastern Europe misjudged the character of the *Partisans* in Yugoslavia and Albania. These two countries were not surrendered to the Communists, they were presented to the Communists by Great Britain. She forsook the men who were loyal to their legitimate rulers and to the original Allied cause. She supplied the Communists with arms, equipment, money and with all that was needed to make them the undisputed masters of their own countries. She raised her future enemies to power. She promoted a Russian hegemony in south-eastern Europe, without necessity, although the realities of the situation in south-eastern Europe were far from inscrutable and as far back as 1943 or even 1942 it was easy, on the evidence available even then, to foresee clearly what has happened since.¹

In Greece, there was at least an attempt to hold the balance between the loyalists and the Communists. Mr Churchill was better informed about Greece than about Yugoslavia. That the Partisans in Yugoslavia were of little or no military value in the war against Germany was not realised until it was too late. Doubts with regard to the military value of the irregular armed forces maintained by Great Britain in Greece were felt early in 1944. But as

¹ For a detailed analysis *v. my Pax Britannica*, Chs. iv and v.

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C. M. Woodhouse, who was the commander of the Allied Military Mission in Greece at the time, points out: if Great Britain had withdrawn her Mission from Greece when it had become evident that it could be of little service against the enemy, the Greek Communist Party would have been master of the country (the Mission had a diminishing power to restrain the contending factions and to hold the balance between them). The political militant organisation known as EAM, which professed to be a *Liberation Front* embracing all parties and forces willing to fight the common enemy, the military organisation known as ELAS, and the Greek Communist Party which was known as KKE were, in a last analysis, one organisation of which the KKE was the master. Mr Woodhouse, who is the principal authority on this subject, writes:

‘The spiritual identity of EAM and ELAS is not a matter of doubt. I shall only briefly illustrate it, to make clear the nature of what they had in common, since the common character which united them is the all-important fact about both. It is that both were created and controlled by the KKE: not dominated or influenced or penetrated, but entirely and exclusively controlled by the KKE.’¹

Mr Woodhouse endorses the opinion held by the critics of British policy in south-eastern Europe, namely that

‘for the leaders of EAM/ELAS (though not for many of their followers, whose enthusiasm was so easy to exploit), fighting the Germans was a secondary consideration, to be undertaken only for purposes subservient to the primary objective of winning political power.’²

Thanks to Great Britain, the Greek Communist Party nearly achieved this ‘primary objective’. But, thanks to

¹ *The Apple of Discord*, p. 60.

² *Ibid.*, p. 141.

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Great Britain, the Party was stopped just short of this 'objective' when, having established a terrorist dictatorship over the greater part of Greece, it was defeated by a small British force when it tried to seize the capital in December, 1944.¹

After December, 1944, Great Britain used her influence and authority to promote reconciliation between the contending factions in the belief that between extremes there is always a mean, that although nationalism and internationalism, freedom and un-freedom, religion and irreligion, loyalty and sedition may be incompatible in theory, yet in the world of practical affairs they can, if they show a little 'good-will' find a 'working compromise'.

On the 12th of February, 1945, an agreement was concluded at Varkiza between the representatives of the Greek Government and of EAM under the patronage of Great Britain. This agreement has been much discussed and severely criticised. It turned out to be little more than a truce, for the Communists circumvented its clauses by hiding arms and ammunition they were pledged to surrender and secretly prepared to renew their attempt to make themselves masters of Greece. On the other hand, it must be said that although the agreement could not have reconciled irreconcilables, it may have been as good a transaction as Great Britain was able to bring about in the circumstances, for the war with Germany was not yet over and it was hardly in her power, with the forces at her disposal (even if it had been her will), to give what was then a weak and precariously established Greek Government the support which would have been needed to carry out the radical suppression of the Greek Communist Party.

¹ *Ibid.*, Ch. v, also *Pax Britannica*, Ch. v.

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For Great Britain to engage in such a task would have meant to undertake a military campaign in exceedingly difficult territory against a foe who, by avoiding decisive action, could offer an indefinitely prolonged resistance. Such a campaign would have been opposed by a powerful public opinion, both at home and in the United States, which felt little sympathy for a Greek Government which was successfully, though falsely, represented as 'reactionary', or even 'Fascist', and much sympathy for the Greek Communist Party which had been represented no less falsely by the greater part of the British and American press, as a democratic movement of national liberation and social progress.

The agreement concluded at Varkiza gave the legitimate Government of Greece time to re-establish a certain authority, but it also saved the Greek Communist Party. The agreement failed, as it was bound to fail, in its ultimate purpose—to bring about the reconciliation of Communists and Loyalists. By Loyalists I mean all those Greeks, whether Royalist or Republican, who believe in, and are ready to serve, their country's honour and independence, who, even if they may oppose this or that Greek Government, give their allegiance to the Greek State and are willing to take part in the defence of their State and their country against internal and external enemies. The Loyalists, who make up the vast majority of the Greek nation, have the plain patriotism which is the mark of loyalty in all countries. The dividing line in Greece is not between *Right* and *Left*, between *reactionaries* and *progressives*, between Royalists and Republicans, but between patriots and ideologues, Loyalists and Communists.

Did Great Britain, on balance, do well or ill by the Greeks?

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She was largely responsible for the disaster that nearly overwhelmed them in December, 1944, and yet she saved them from that disaster. Although the agreement concluded at Varkiza may have been the best she could have done, nevertheless, by exercising constant pressure in favour of reconciliation, she continued indirectly to help the Communists. Under her pressure, the Kingdom of Greece came to resemble the Weimar Republic. Because that Republic was only a formal and not an organic democracy, because it did not believe in itself, because it had only the negative belief in freedom for all and toleration of all, it allowed freedom to the most formidable sedition ever known and tolerated a movement that grew until it became intolerable—intolerable to Germany, to Europe, and to the World. The attitude which exercises so powerful an ascendancy in Great Britain is a kind of sentimental materialism which is inimical to clear distinctions, and ultimately, to the distinction between right and wrong. This attitude was inflicted upon the Greeks by British policy and the British press. That they were able to resist it in some measure and to circumvent it upon occasion is the achievement of those nationalists whose service to their country will never be recorded, a service rendered with silent tenacity of purpose and suppressed bitterness and exasperation. Had it not been for these men and the patriotism and piety of her people, Greece would have perished.

The good Great Britain did to Greece might well have been undone by the harm, had not the United States intervened to give the help which Great Britain could give no longer. The United States originally entered the Mediterranean to take part in the campaign against the German-Italian coalition. Certain political and economic measures

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were needed to consolidate the victories won in battle and to save the stricken populations. It was considered necessary to establish a new political order in Italy. Trieste had to be defended against Yugoslavia. The Balkans had to be fed. France had to be dissuaded from reasserting her lost authority in Syria and the Lebanon. Power in the Mediterranean was not transferred, but extended from Great Britain to the United States. It became, and has remained, power conjointly exercised.

The two Atlantic Powers were interlocked in maintaining what were the old and permanent interests of Great Britain and the new and seemingly provisional interests of the United States. But the direct or indirect Russian threats to Persia, to Turkey and the Straits, to Greece, to Trieste, and to Italy, led to a consolidation of the Anglo-American partnership and imparted to the Mediterranean interests of the United States a permanent character, for it became clear that if the Russian menace remained unopposed, it would culminate in the exclusion of Anglo-American influence from the Mediterranean and from the Middle East.¹

Greece, for the first time, came within the scope of American foreign policy. When Great Britain was unable any longer to carry the financial burden of the help she was giving to Greece, that burden was taken over by the United States who thereby saved Greek independence, for without the presence of Great Britain and the United States in Greece, there is nothing that the Greeks could do to avert Communist, and, therefore, Russian, domination.

On balance, the Greek people find more reason for gratitude to Great Britain than for complaint. She was their

¹ For a well-informed account of American policy in the Mediterranean, see *The Mediterranean*, by William Reitzel (New York, 1948).

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original ally against the Germans and Italians, when she and Greece stood alone. It is true that she made terrible errors for which the Greek people paid a terrible price, but, when it came to the point, she—and the United States—averted the last consequences of these errors. While she was engaged in crushing the foreign invader she armed the internal enemy, one of the craftiest and cruellest the Greek people ever knew. But when that enemy revealed his true character and purpose she struck him down when he was about to consummate his conquest of Greece by the conquest of the capital in December, 1944. The gratitude of the Greek people to Great Britain and the United States is immense, and, because of the comradeship during the darkest periods of the war, and, paradoxically, because of the errors which made Great Britain appear as the erring fellow-creature she is (instead of the superhuman, almost godlike being she never was but often seemed), this gratitude is mixed with a kind of love. In Greece, where a stranger as such is a guest, there is a particular affection for the English guest, an affection made up of gratitude, of respect deepened by memory of tribulations endured together and tempered by knowledge of great errors made on both sides. The gratitude of the people to Great Britain and the United States is strongest amongst the peasantry who have withstood modern sophistication better than the townsmen and retain in fuller measure those simple, vanishing virtues of which gratitude is one.

Although Greece is not the worst-governed country in the world, no other Government has been the victim of so many well- and ill-intentioned advisers. Phil- and Mis-hellenes have outdone one another in offering advice which could not be carried out except by a radical economic, political,

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social, and moral revolution which could be of no benefit to anyone except Russia. If we consider the advice offered to Greece, usually in the form of censorious exhortation, by those who are in no way called upon or qualified to be advisers, it cannot fail to strike us as presumptuous. Greece is exhorted to show wisdom, moderation, and realism, to eradicate corruption, to reduce the contrast between rich and poor, to 'get rid of her politicians', to compound with the Communists, to abate her nationalism and accept a 'limitation of sovereignty', to enter a 'Balkan federation', and so on. In other words, the Greeks are to achieve a perfection never attained by any human society.

The Greek Government is far from being stiff-necked. It is easily, perhaps too easily, advised. It has sometimes sought advice, especially from Great Britain. It has sometimes had to accept advice under duress, for recommendations made by Great Britain or the United States cannot always be resisted with impunity. On balance, it would seem that the advice officially offered or urged by Great Britain or the United States when accepted by the Greek Government has done more good than harm, and that the advice offered, usually in the form of hectoring admonishment, by the press and by visiting politicians has only done harm, for it has placed the Greek Government under a constant, embarrassing, and misdirected moral pressure and has spread and fortified prevalent misrepresentations of that Government's character and policy. Had Greece accepted the advice profusely offered in leading articles of the British and American press, she would long ago have suffered extinction as an independent Power.

Greece has long been—and will long continue to be—the subject and object of international contention. It is impossible

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for her to live in enviable obscurity. And, as the part she must play on the world's stage is not favoured by political fashion, she cannot but invite the enmity of the vulgar and the censure of the malignant.

The secular religions of our day have induced men to expect perfection in this world and to condemn even such societies, governments, and institutions that have no more than those

‘... stains and blemishes ... which springing from the root of human frailty and corruption, not only are, but have been always more or less, yea and (for anything we know to the contrary) will be to the world's end complained of, what forms of government soever take place.’¹

A foreign country, its government, and its institutions, if little known and far away, if unskilled in official apologetics through penury and through lack of experience in the sophistications of modern publicity, but made unwillingly conspicuous by events and by an engineered unpopularity—such a country will give perfectionists the occasion, for which they always crave, to engage in that censoriousness which, although grievous and mortifying to a victim incapable of effective retaliation, is exceedingly gratifying to the censors:

‘... in the hearing of the multitudes, the faults especially of higher callings are ripped up with marvellous exceeding severity and sharpness of reproof; which being oftentimes done begetteth a good opinion of integrity, zeal, and holiness, to such constant reprovers of sin, as by likelihood would never be so much offended at that which is evil, unless themselves were singularly good.’²

The zealots of the secular religion known as Communism are the heritors of the Anabaptists. But by reason of failure

¹ Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Pref. Ch. iii.

² *Ibid.*

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in Christian men to perceive the true purpose of their machinations, they have achieved a prodigious worldly power and have been able, as Anabaptists were never able, to extend their dominion over a large part of the globe. And having established what they represent as the Kingdom of Light (and persuade themselves to be such) they judge all earthly realms by the state of perfection which they claim on behalf of their Kingdom. But as they are authors of an absolute judgment they must themselves be absolutely judged. The world is coming, tardily, so to judge them, and even to perceive that their Kingdom is the Kingdom of Darkness—

‘a confederacy of deceivers, that to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavour by dark and erroneous doctrines, to extinguish in them the light, both of nature and of the gospel; and so to disprepare them for the kingdom of God to come.’¹

The Kingdom of Darkness will always be seeking a passage through which it can pass and overspread new and extensive regions. And if there stands in its way a small realm, fragile and stricken, a Realm, not of Light, but still shone upon, however dimly, by the light ‘both of nature and of the gospel’, and not easily to be overcome, the servants of the Kingdom, and all those sophists who today are known as *Fellow Travellers* will pour out upon that Realm their rancour and their malice.

If in the small Realm there appear a Sedition, it will be immoderately welcomed as offering a hope that the passage will be taken by treachery within, and the Kingdom of Darkness will pass on to new conquests.

Sedition is a powerful seducer, perilous when courted at home, but safe and satisfying when courted from afar.

¹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. XLIV.

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The delights of courage displayed in absent peril, of vicarious treason, of rebellion against authority outside the reach of authority, of freedom zealously upheld against laws and conventions that impose no restraint upon freedom, can be enjoyed at a distance, by being, as it were, projected upon a far country. They are but heightened if the injury done to that country is injury to one's own (as it is if that country's independence is a vital interest of one's own). They are further heightened if that country and its affairs are exposed to an incessant publicity, for there is but little pleasure in vicarious exploits that remain concealed. Those who would injure England can safely injure her in Greece. That is the reason why those who, from afar, support the cause of the Greek Sedition are those who wish England ill (and they are many), whether they be sophists smitten by ingratitude and unbelief, or those who rightly hold that if she were to fall, the Kingdom of Darkness (which is the Kingdom of their desire) will come nearer to overspreading the world.

If the Greek Government were incomparably better than it is, it would still be the butt of censure. If it were far worse than it is, the asperity of the censure would hardly be augmented. There is only one thing that Government could do to placate its enemies and detractors—to become a Government of traitors. And that, with all its faults, it is not prepared to do.

Whatever these faults may be, they are not the cause of the Greek Sedition, which is not to be explained in terms of revolt against misrule, or indeed in any terms of cause and effect operating exclusively within the confines of Greece. The Greek State is national, the Greek Sedition is international—or, rather, supra-national. The Sedition has, in

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points of detail, been affected by particular aspects of the Greek State, but its general character is determined by one fact alone: that the Greek State is not a Communist State.

The Sedition is an act of armed rebellion against a system which is not specifically Greek, and against beliefs, principles and traditions which make Greece a part of Christendom. Whether that system be, of its kind, a good system or a bad, is irrelevant. The grievance of those who lead the Sedition is that the system is of its kind. From their point of view, the merits of the Greek State are more objectionable than its defects, the justice administered by that State more grievous than any lapses from that justice. Indeed, the questions of government good or bad, liberal or illiberal, progressive or retrograde, of justice or injustice, of penury or plenty, do not arise in this context. There is but one question: Communism. As long as the Greek State is not a Communist State the Sedition will continue until it is completely eradicated.

Greece is a constitutional monarchy or rather, a crowned republic, for the King is *under*, not *over* the constitution and has no other functions than those of a hereditary President. The Parliament is freely elected and has the power to make and unmake governments—and does so with a frequency which is widely regarded as excessive. So far from being undemocratic, the Greek State is open to the criticism of being democratic to excess.

The present Greek Parliament was elected by adult male suffrage according to the system of Proportional Representation on the 31st of March, 1946. The elections were supervised by a Mission composed of some 1200 British, American, and French observers (the heads of the Mission were appointed for the purpose by their respective Governments).

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Journalists from many countries were also present at the elections and enjoyed complete freedom of enquiry. That the polling was conducted with reasonable fairness was the clear verdict of the Mission. Not one of the observers and, as far as I am aware, not one serious journalist discovered any abuses or irregularities grave enough to impair the general validity of the returns. The Communists, although asserting that abuses and irregularities had been perpetrated, were unable to produce any evidence in support of their assertion. They objected to the elections on principle and abstained from taking any part in them. Having so long pretended that they were *the* Greek people, it was impossible for them to take part in elections which were certain to show that they were but a small minority of the Greek people. They could not altogether conceal their numerical weakness by abstaining, but could at least prevent it from becoming known in terms of a precise and unchallengeable figure. They could claim that all the non-voters were Communists, but this claim, although easily refuted by enquiry amongst the voters and by reference to the laws of probability, was not amenable to absolute disproof.¹ The Royalist *Popular Party* polled more than half the votes—altogether, the Royalists (comprising this Party and some smaller groups) polled 63.6 per cent of the total. In the *Plebiscite* on the 1st of September, 1946, the Royalists—that is to say, those who voted for the return of King George II to Greece—polled 65 per cent of the electorate (and nearly 70 per cent of the

¹ According to the Report of the Allied Observers' Mission (Cmd. 6838), 1,850,000 of the electorate were validly registered. Of these 1,117,379 voted and 730,000 abstained. The Observers estimated that 453,000 abstained for non-political reasons (illness, indifference, and so on) and 280,000 for political reasons. It is probable that most of the latter—i.e. about 15 per cent of the electorate—were Communists. The voting strength of the Greek Communist Party in the spring of 1946 must have been about 10 per cent or 12 per cent of the electorate.

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total vote), although this time the Communists took part, adding their vote to that of the Republicans.¹

There is in Greece a constitutional opposition which, far from being subservient to the State, tends to be *frondeur*. There is no censorship in Greece and the press is as free as any in the world. Some of the Greek newspapers are well informed, dignified, and responsible. Others serve to illustrate the dangers of an almost unrestricted liberty. Until the summer of 1947, the Communist press appeared without any restriction. Party and Press were prohibited not because they were Communist but because they were engaged in 'treasonable sedition'.

The independence of the Greek judiciary was attested by the British Legal Mission which visited Greece in 1946.² It is possible to criticise the laws that are administered by the civil and military courts, but I have been unable to discover any evidence that they are administered with deference to the wishes or the policy of the Government, that the judges are under political pressure, or that they are swayed by political bias. In May 1948 there was, in Great Britain, a widespread protest against the capital sentences which the Greek courts had passed on a number of murderers (some of them multiple murderers). One searches these protests in vain for any evidence that the laws administered by the courts were unjust, that the courts were not properly constituted, or that there was any specific miscarriage of justice. The protests and appeals addressed to the Greek Government, urging that the sentences be commuted,³ were all based on the misconception that Greece is a dictatorship and that it is in the power of the Government to interfere

¹ Five per cent of the electorate abstained from voting in the *Plebiscite*.

² For the Report of this Mission, see Cmd. 6835.

³ Many letters of protest appeared in *The Times* during that month.

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with the course of justice. Indeed, those who severely condemned the Greek Government for alleged dictatorial practices are those who constantly exhort that Government to assume and exercise arbitrary and dictatorial prerogatives.

Many persons suspected of complicity in sedition were sent to the islands, especially the island of Ikaria during the year 1947 without trial. This procedure was analogous to the procedure authorised by Regulation 18B in Great Britain. It was authorised for similar reasons and is open to similar criticism. Greece was as much menaced by invasion in 1947 as Great Britain was at any time, and the internal menace, that is to say, the menace of open and secret agents, of assassins and wreckers, and of spies, as well as of a powerful open and secret organisation, all acting on behalf of foreign Powers, was, and still is, far greater in Greece than it ever was in Great Britain. The Greek State, like the British, could not afford to take avoidable risks. Failure to segregate suspects would have been an inexcusable offence against the security of the nation. Many suspects were released after brief detention. Many were detained indefinitely. Indefinite detention without proof of guilt is as questionable a procedure in Greece as it was in Great Britain. But in both countries dire necessity was the master (and is so still in Greece). Perhaps not all that was done in either country was justified by the necessity. But the existence of that necessity, and the broad justification of what was done, are beyond question.

The habit, widespread in Great Britain and the United States, of public and private protest against wrong done abroad is founded in the humanity and the strong moral sense that prevail in both countries. But there is a sort of

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person who desires a cause for protest, who, while appearing to be outraged by wrong done to others, is happy when he finds it, because it will give him occasion to exercise his righteousness. Manipulators of public opinion take a particular interest in manifestations of righteousness which can be made to serve unrighteous ends. The abductions of Greek children, which the Communists began in January, were arousing some disapproval in the Western world. It became necessary for the Communists and their allies to create a diversion so that public disapproval might be concentrated on the deeds of the Greek Government. In Greece, the disparity between the meagre protests against lawless abductions of little children, and the abundant protest against sentences passed under due process of law upon convicted murderers was rightly felt to be a grievous injustice.

Both Great Britain and the United States have been a mighty influence for righteousness in the world. But the pharisaical, or at least uncritical, exercise of that righteousness imperils that moral authority which has made the British and American people such benefactors of mankind.

Wrongful arrests are rare in Greece. When they are established the victims are released. It may be an irrelevant consideration, but Ikaría happens to be more like an earthly Paradise than almost any other island in the world. It is inhabited by mild-mannered fisher-folk who show no thought of persecuting the exiles who live amongst them. The exiles receive an allowance in money and rations which afford them an economic standard slightly higher than that of the islanders. They are not kept behind barbed wire and are free within the wide confines of the island. It is true that for those of them who have professions and careers, a long period of

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enforced leisure may be a severe hardship, but to compare Ikaría with the notorious concentration camps that existed in the Third Reich, is to engage in that deductive reasoning which is imposed by Communist teleology.¹

There appears to be no evidence of present administrative terrorism in Greece. In any case, terrorism is not an organic part of the Greek administrative system as it was of the National Socialist and is of the Communist system. A resort to administrative terrorism would, in Greece, be an indictable offence. Nevertheless, terrorism has been employed against the Communists. After the massacres in December, 1944, there was a severe reaction and many Communists were murdered. The murders were not exclusively, or even mainly, political. Many persons who were murdered by the Communists for political reasons, as falling under the *purge* (a subject to which I shall return), were avenged for personal reasons: that is to say, the murdered member of a family would be avenged by another member, a friend by a friend. The traditional *vendetta* revived. When the law is not adequately administered by the State (as it could not be in the days before the authority of the Greek State had been everywhere re-established) people will take the law into their own hands. In Macedonia, where the Greek loyalists suffered atrociously from the Bulgarians and from Slavophones with Bulgarian sympathies, as well as from the Communists, there appears to have been some administrative terrorism, although without the direct or indirect connivance of the central authorities. In 1945 and 1946, when the power of the Communists was at its lowest (although it was still considerable), and loyalist bands were active all over Greece,

¹ For an account of the kind of life the exiles lead on the island, see *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th of August, 1947.

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murders by Loyalists became almost as frequent as murders by Communists.¹

In 1947 and in 1948, the authority of the State had reasserted itself. Loyalist bands disappeared and the war against the Communists was conducted by organs of the State. Loyalist excesses became extremely rare, and were punished under the law. In April, 1948, for example, a detachment of *Gendarmerie*, commanded by an officer of the regular army, struck a mine which had been laid by the Communists. Several men were wounded—the officer so severely that he was left for dead. The detachment thereupon mutinied and, entering the town of Sparta, stormed the gaol and murdered certain Communists who were imprisoned there. It must, however, be said that the Greek officer in charge of the prisoners fell in defence of his charge. The mutineers were committed for trial.

The Greek Government, accused by a certain opinion in Great Britain for excessive severity, was, in its own country, being widely condemned for its reluctance to legislate with sufficient severity against seditious violence. Pressure of British official and unofficial opinion was constantly exercised in favour of leniency in the belief that it would promote peace through conciliation. Numerous persons were released from prison and from places of exile. When Mr Sophoulis became Prime Minister under British and American pressure in the belief that, as a liberal with a 'progressive' outlook, he was particularly suited to the task of promoting conciliation, a large number of prisoners were released (or 'amnestied') under a special law. This act of clemency did not lead to conciliation. On the contrary, it caused much bitterness

¹ From the 1st of April until the 20th of May, 1946, Communists perpetrated 55 deeds and Loyalists 38 deeds of personal violence. Eighty-six deeds of violence during that same period could not be attributed to political causes.

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because it fortified the opinion widely held in Greece that the lives and liberties of the people were inadequately protected, and that massacre, murder, and incendiarism could be perpetrated with impunity. It won nothing but derision from the Communists and released many persons who joined, or rejoined, the armed bands in the mountains.¹

During the period when the Greek Communist Party was preparing and conspiring for the overthrow of the Greek State, even after November, 1946, when sedition showed itself afresh in the form of an armed attack on the frontier town of Skra (an attack prepared with the help of a foreign Power and accompanied by the massacre of Greek villagers) the Greek prisons were political universities, or places of training and indoctrination for actual or prospective conspirators. Sentence of imprisonment, no matter how severe, was no deterrent, for although Greek prisons are insanitary and overcrowded (the consequence of poverty and of general overcrowding brought about by the immense destruction of villages during the Second World War and by the presence of a vast multitude of refugees since that War) the prisoners are not separated from one another, but form a community enlivened by those eternal political discussions so loved by the Greeks. Prisoners enjoyed security and could, if they were 'political', count with some confidence on release under an amnesty or by rescue. In 1947, the gaol in Sparta was raided by a Communist band which liberated the Communist prisoners. It was the belief that Communists in prison were not suffering justice but were secure from justice which exacerbated the emotions of the Constabulary who raided the gaol in the following year.

¹ Vassilios Zannos, who played a leading part in organising the murder of Mr Ladas, the Greek Minister of Justice, on the 2nd of May, 1948, had been released from prison three times under three different 'amnesties'.

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It became impossible for the Greek Government—as it would have become for any Government with any regard for justice, for public security, and for public opinion—to refrain from severe measures against murderers and incendiaries whose crimes, often perpetrated in a fiendish manner, were steadily increasing.

None of those who took part in the Sedition that culminated in the massacres during the month of December, 1944, were punished unless they had committed crimes under the common law.¹ The articles of the Greek penal code relating to sedition were not, until the end of the year 1947, applied against the Communist Party as such. Even today Communist ideas and principles are not illegal in Greece.

In June, 1946, Parliament authorised the establishment of Military Courts to try 'crimes against the security of the State and against public order and peace'.² These Courts were at first confined to Macedonia where the Sedition had begun to assume a particularly dangerous character, and as it spread, they were established in other regions of Greece.

But the Communist Party as such continued to enjoy complete liberty. Long after its seditious character as an organisation had become incontestable, it was, by a law passed by Parliament on the 27th of December, 1947, prohibited, 'for preparing and pursuing treasonable sedition'.³ Article V of the Greek Constitution, relating to

¹ 'An amnesty for political crimes' was stipulated in the Varkiza Agreement, but 'from this amnesty shall be excluded common-law crimes against life and property which were not absolutely necessary to the achievement of the political crime concerned', Art. III.

² Act of Parliament, 18th of June, 1946, Article XI.

³ Law No. 509 (see the Official Journal, No. 293, year 1947). EAM was included in the prohibition.

habeas corpus, was suspended by Parliament as a measure in emergency.¹

In its relations with organised labour the Greek State differs fundamentally from the bureaucratic absolutisms of our day. It differs somewhat from the States of the Western world but bears a certain resemblance to the paternalistic Bismarckian State. A Greek trade union must receive a charter from the State, but the refusal to grant a charter can be contested. Even the smallest group of workers over the age of ten can form a union and can obtain a charter unless there is evidence that the group exists for an illegal purpose—and the group can contest the evidence in court.

Relations between trade unions and the State are sometimes marred by the purely political outlook of a Government which regards the unions as so many political parties which can be played off one against the other and can be persuaded (and sometimes paid) to counteract the influence of any trade unionist who might himself become a politician and, therefore, a competitor for office. Mr Sophoulis's Government has a questionable record in this respect—I refer, particularly, to its intrigues against Aristidis Dimitratos, the ablest of the Greek trade union leaders.

The Greek Confederation of Labour is composed of 16

¹ The general principle of *habeas corpus* is defined in Article iv of the Greek Constitution. Under Article v, no person may be arrested or detained without a warrant, an arrested person must appear before a magistrate within 24 hours, and the magistrate must either order the release of the person or commit him for trial within a period of 3 days. The secrecy in which the Communists worked and their efficiency in eluding and averting arrest, compelled the Greek police to operate with secrecy and suddenness (the Communist espionage was so well organised that a suspect would sometimes be informed that a warrant had been issued against him before the warrant could be served). The need for secrecy, the difficulty of establishing a *prima facie* case against the member of a highly efficient conspiratorial organisation, and the large number of suspects, made it impossible for police and magistrates to observe the normal procedure. But the principle that an arrested person must be released or committed for trial has not been abandoned, except with regard to those detained on the Island of Ikaria.

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Federations which are, in their turn, composed of 60 'Workers' Centres' and of some 15,000 or 16,000 trade unions. The total membership of the unions is hard to establish, for statistical data supplied by the unions themselves are unreliable and contradictory. It is not even possible to establish, with any precision, the number of employed and unemployed in Greece. The number of organised workers is probably over a quarter of a million but certainly not more than 300,000. All the trade union leaders, except Dimitratos, have a political backing. Most of them have dubious records. The charge, so frequently made, that the Greek labour movement suffers from persecution by the State is the reverse of the truth. The movement suffers from the paternalism of the State.

Until 1946, the Communists dominated the Greek trade union movement. They were able to do so, because under the German occupation the Greek labour movement was almost defenceless—except against the Germans themselves, for it took part in the general national resistance which was more embarrassing to the enemy than the armed resistance in the mountains. The attempt of the Germans to conscribe labour in Greece failed completely. Defective organisation, or lack of organisation, made the Greek labour movement unamenable to German management, but was by no means prejudicial to the solidarity imposed by a strong national spirit and a genius for spontaneous resistance. Amongst the hundreds of thousands of voluntary and impressed workers who went to Germany from the occupied countries, a Greek was a rarity.

But the Communists had established themselves inside the Greek labour movement and when, in December, 1944, they were masters of all Greece except Athens, they were able to

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undertake the task of removing non-Communists from amongst the leaders of the trade unions. Because of their defeat in Athens, they were unable to complete this task. Nevertheless, they removed about a hundred and forty trade union leaders by murder¹ and retained their ascendancy in the unions until 1946. By various means, such as intimidation and 'repeat voting' the Communists were able to influence the elections of chairmen and secretaries of the unions. But the unions appealed to the *Supreme Court* (Συμβούλιον Ἐπικρατίας) which declared the elections to be illegal. The Government thereupon ordered the removal of the illegally elected leaders and invited the unions to appoint persons who would act as temporary officials pending the general elections for a trade union congress. It was this circumstance which fed the belief that the unions were persecuted by the Government which had but bowed to the decision of the supreme juridical authority in Greece. The elections for the congress went on during the early part of the year 1948. The available evidence seems to show that they were peacefully conducted. There was little interference by the Communists. They were losing supporters in the labour movement because of their terrorism and the massacres and because of their association with foreign Powers. Some of their most energetic leaders were in the mountains. Others had been arrested, not as trade unionists, but as lawbreakers. These arrests were represented as acts of oppression by the Government against the unions and served to fortify the erroneous impression that the Government was 'reactionary' and 'Fascist'. The Congress was opened at the Piræus on the 28th of March. It was characterised by violent verbosity and confusion and showed that the Greek passion for politics

¹ Dimitratos escaped murder by the Communists because he was in his constituency, Corfu, at the time.

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dominates even the Labour movement, to the exclusion of what would, in Great Britain, be called the 'trade union spirit'.

British and American observers who were themselves trade unionists were rather disconcerted not only by the absence of decorum in the proceedings and the apparent triumph of inefficiency, but also by the spectacle presented by Dimitratos. This spectacle was in itself gratifying to the heart of 'good trade unionists' for Dimitratos distinguished himself by speaking little, but that little with dignity and to a purpose. He commanded the most evident respect by the exercise of restraint and singleness of purpose amid a gesticulating pandemonium. But he was reputed to be a 'Fascist' because he had been Minister of Labour in the Government led by General Metaxas. That Government was 'progressive' (in the sense of the term as used by moderate English Socialists). It was, in fact, one of the most 'progressive' Governments in Europe, although it was a Dictatorship—or perhaps because it was a Dictatorship. Dimitratos was—and still is—a Socialist of a kind that is rare in Greece, a Socialist with a European outlook, the outlook, say, of a Legien, a Jouhaux, or an Arthur Henderson. General Metaxas sent for him when he was forming his Government, told him he approved of his programme of social reform, and invited him to carry it out. After consulting his union, Dimitratos agreed and became responsible for reforms which gave Greece labour legislation of the most modern type.

Five members of Metaxas's Government stood in the elections on the 31st of March, 1946, and all five were returned to Parliament. Dimitratos was one of them. His reappearance on the political scene was not only an embar-

rassment to those who feared it would make an unfavourable impression on the British and American labour movements (which, in so far as they were at all interested in Greek affairs, had been misled into supposing that Dimitratos was a man of 'Fascist' inclinations) but also to the Greek Government which feared the possible rise of a trade union leader who might command a following big enough to hold a commanding position in the labour movement and create a Labour Party which would not be amenable to political manipulation. The Greek Government is not hostile to Socialism as such, or averse to Socialistic legislation, but recognising the bureaucratic nature of Socialism, it is determined that its own control over the bureaucracy shall not be challenged, in other words, that whatever organised Socialism there is to be in Greece, it shall not be controlled by an independent labour movement.

A majority of the delegates present at the Congress voted for Dimitratos as Secretary-General of the Federation of Labour. The Government took alarm and, alleging that the election was unconstitutional, passed a law that new elections be held. It seems certain that the action taken by the Government was unconstitutional. But there is an obscurity in the statutes of the Federation, for it is not clear whether the Secretary-General is elected by a majority of those entitled to vote or by a majority of those present at Congress. It was this obscurity that gave the Government the chance it seized with such alacrity. Under the new law, which was passed within 24 hours of the elections, Congress must elect *Administrative Council* by a two thirds majority and this Council in its turn elects the Secretary-General. Dimitratos challenged the legality of the Government's action and brought the case before the *Supreme Court*. Elections for the

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Administrative Council were held, but Dimitratos refused to stand as he regarded them as unconstitutional.

At the time of writing (August, 1948) the *Supreme Court* has not given its decision, but it is generally believed that the Government will lose the case. By its hasty action, the Government brought much disrepute upon itself, even amongst its own supporters, whereas the repute of Dimitratos has grown. But the practical outcome is hard to foresee, because the possibilities of appeal and of legal or pseudo-legal obstruction at the disposal of the Government are considerable.

The weakness of the Greek labour movement is its lack of cohesion. The unions will, at times, show a very independent spirit. At the beginning of 1948, the macaroni workers (numbering, with their families, about 10,000 persons) were threatened with total unemployment because imports of wheat from the Argentine had been stopped. The Argentinian envoy in Athens informed the union that his Government would supply sufficient wheat to keep the macaroni workers employed if the union would publicly recommend the 'moral recognition' of the Peron Government. The union refused, on the grounds that the Peron Government was 'Fascist'. The incident shows that Greek labour is not without principles, for, by refusing, the workers made a great personal sacrifice.

In November, 1946, the wretchedly-paid bank-clerks struck for higher wages. They had the sympathy of almost the whole of Athenian public opinion. But when the Communists attacked the village of Skra with help from across the border, the strike was at once called off because 'the country was in danger'.

The Greek Communist Party has not been nearly as

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successful in promoting strikes as the French and Italian Parties have been. Despite the state of extreme political tension, political strikes have been rare. Although many Greek workmen have Communist leanings, especially in the Piraeus, Salonica, and Volos, these towns have been singularly free from serious unrest. In fact, as a 'revolt of the urban proletariat' the Greek Sedition has, so far, been a total failure.

I have written of the Greek labour movement in some detail to show that it is impossible to justify the Sedition on the ground that the labour movement is 'oppressed' by a 'reactionary Government'. The movement has its grievances, but it is not in revolutionary opposition to the State. The Greek workman, in his intense individualism, aspires to become an employer himself, rather than to expropriate the employers as a class. Even those workmen who incline to Communism are at heart anarcho-syndicalist rather than Marxist. Amongst the employers there is no hostility against trade unionism as such. If the trade unions are sometimes politically used by the Government, it is chiefly because they are themselves highly political and resemble collections of small, conflicting political parties, rather than trade unions as understood in the Western world.

The action against Dimitratos has an aspect not specifically relating to labour. One of the weaknesses of Greek political life is the almost instinctive fear which those in power have of any rising personality. The Greeks revere personality which, if it overcomes the obstacles that will be placed in its way, can exercise a dominating influence in the country—as the career of Venizelos showed. Bureaucracy by its nature is inimical to personality. The issue between the rising personality and the multitude of his envious opponents

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—an issue characteristic of modern, as of ancient, Greece—has been heavily weighted against personality by the spread of bureaucratic rule during the last few years.

Greek political life is marred by the excessive use of calumny. During the Trades Union Congress in March, 1948, one of the leaders was openly accused of having stolen knives and forks when he was employed as a waiter. But the enemies of Dimitratos have been unable to discover the slightest stain in his character. He has succeeded in remaining aloof from scurrility which will sometimes pursue even men of impeccable honour, especially in a country like Greece where laxity in the law of libel makes it more difficult than it is in the Western world to secure an incontestable public vindication.

Greece, in a time of the most grievous tribulation, lacks men of stature comparable with Trikoupi, Venizelos, or Metaxas. But there is no recipe for greatness. There is no system that will, of itself, engender great men, though some systems are less inimical to greatness than others. The elimination of a class that is not purely parasitic (if such a class ever existed) will not confer the unqualified benefits habitually promised by professional revolutionaries. One class may be submerged and replaced by another in an organic process with both loss and gain to the nation. But when the submerged class is not replaced by another, the loss will be irreparable.

In 1922 more than a million refugees, mostly peasants, poured into Greece from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor. In a land with so few industries as Greece, it was impossible to employ these unfortunate people except in the fields. This was the principal reason for the agrarian reform under Venizelos and the break-up of the big estates. The land-

owners received compensation in government bonds that soon lost their value, so that the reform was but a tempered expropriation. The landowning class was submerged and today rural Greece is a land of small-holders. The problem imposed upon the State by the influx of refugees was solved boldly, radically, and swiftly. The dangers that might have been created by a landless peasantry were averted.

The régime of General Metaxas was extremely favourable to the peasants and the industrial workmen. There was a considerable transfer of wealth from the richer to the poorer classes through direct taxation, social services, insurance, holidays with pay, the reduction of peasant indebtedness, and so on.

Both the agrarian reform under Venizelos and the social reforms under Metaxas were pragmatic necessities. It is probable that the gain outweighed the loss. But the landowning class from which many able and disinterested politicians and public servants had sprung was submerged for ever.

If a class skilled in the art of government disappear, then that art—the most necessary of all the arts—will suffer. Such an art cannot be acquired by a new class in less than a generation, or even two generations.

The economic catastrophes brought about by the Second World War and the civil war that began before the Second World War was over, eliminated the merchants, industrialists, and financiers as a class. Into this class there rose men from the poorest peasantry and from this class came men who enriched their country by their public munificence, their knowledge of affairs, and their width and depth of outlook. Some were lavish and discriminating patrons of art and some were themselves great collectors—the marvellous Benaki

museum, for example, was the gift of an illustrious merchant to his country and to the world.¹

Greece has undergone a mighty levelling—levelling reforms, a levelling economic catastrophe, a levelling war, a levelling civil war in which the *élite* of the nation is being decimated (purposely, as I shall explain later on), and, to complete the levelling process, a levelling bureaucracy. It is, therefore, not surprising that she has no great men, although in every village she has men who, when the occasion comes, show greatness.

That the Greeks are amongst the most factious of people is sufficiently well known. General Metaxas suppressed faction in what was, perhaps, the only way it could be suppressed in Greece: by suppressing politics altogether. He thereby removed one of the principal impediments to the aims which he achieved with so much success, namely internal recovery, stability, and preparedness for war. But without politics there can be no politicians and, although the popular revulsion against politicians throughout the world is nowhere stronger than in Greece, a highly political people cannot do without politics. There are many Greeks today—and they are amongst the best—who would again abolish politics (Metaxas showed it was possible to do so), but it is questionable whether Greece would gain if she were to lose what is, for good as well as for ill, a national passion and perhaps the only remaining defence against the soulless, impersonal, levelling, strangulating bureaucracy.

The men who rule in Greece today are not oppressors or tyrants. They do not lie, cheat and murder as the rulers of the bureaucratic absolutisms do. They are not fanatical or doctrinaire. They are of the Western world, but hardly of the

¹ Mr Benaki is now the curator of the museum of Byzantine art which he gave to Greece.

modern Western world. Modernity is not in itself a virtue, but men who, by their training and their mentality, belong to a political era which was brought to an end by General Metaxas in 1936 can hardly be expected to possess the talents needed in a life and death struggle with so terrible an opponent as the Communist International, which is not only modern, but ultra-modern, not only the most modern, but the only modern, organisation in Greece.

Political categories have been thrown into confusion by wars and tumults, and by the action of those who promote confusion the better to impose their own order, knowing as they do that 'anarchy of thought is an initial but decisive stage in the breakdown which leads to despotism'.¹ There has been a war for mastery over the world of words, a war in which the aggressor, because he was long and well prepared, because he was animated by a doctrine, a belief, and a purpose, won a succession of initial victories. It is only of late that there has been any sign of a rally against him. The war for mastery over the world of words and the war for mastery over the world of things are one war.

Democracies are overthrown in the name of democracy, despotisms are established in the name of freedom, tyrannies more terrible than any of old are erected in the name of progress and emancipation. Traitors profess patriotism and patriots are put to death as traitors. Intermediate words have been invented so that truth can the more easily slide into falsehood and right into wrong. The word 'collaborator' is one of these, a word much favoured by modern malignants, for, where the sense of honour has not been extinguished, it is still hazardous to call a patriot 'traitor' without proof. The word 'collaborator' can be used with

¹ James Hogan, *Election and Representation*, p. 111.

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relative impunity, for its meaning is little understood and its purpose hardly at all. It is not in itself a calumny, but it serves to impute treason. This word has been a coward's weapon for the moral annihilation or extermination of many a patriot.

Unpopular tyrannies call themselves popular and force the people to acclaim them as popular. The people are robbed of their rights in the name of the people. Narrow oligarchies dominated by hated aliens call themselves 'people's governments', while bands of murderers, terrorists, and incendiaries call themselves 'democratic armies'.

The words *Right* and *Left* are weeds of continental growth and never quite acclimatised on British soil. Even on the continent it would seem that they have begun to perish. Was Hitler, the Socialist, the radical revolutionary, the implacable opponent of monarchy, the nationalist, the promoter of predatory imperialism, a man of the *Right* or the *Left*? And Metaxas, who established a despotism, who carried out reforms long demanded by men who claim to be the *Left*, who defied and defeated Mussolini—was he of the *Right* or of the *Left*? Is Stalin who has combined the heritage of Lenin with that of Ivan the Terrible of the *Right* or of the *Left*?

Is the Greek Government a government of the *Right* or of the *Left*? It matters little whether it be either or neither. What does matter is that it be described with accuracy. If we use the terms *Right* and *Left* in the sense, or remnants of sense, as they are used by those who claim to be of the *Right* or of the *Left* in this country, the Greek Government has the spirit of the moderate *Left*.

Whatever legitimate meaning we may attach to the word 'reaction', the Greek Government is not 'reactionary' 'Reaction', if it means anything in politics, means 'back to

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something'. Back to what? There is nothing in the words or deeds of the Greek Government that indicates a 'back to' anything, nothing that is not in some way an attempt to conform with modernity—the modernity not of the United States, nor of Russia, but the modernity of north-western Europe, especially of Great Britain. If those who in this country use, or misuse, the word 'progressive' were to consider the legislation for which the Greek Government is responsible, they would not, if they were candid, call it 'unprogressive'.

None of the secular religions except Communism has laid hold of the Greek people. Even Communism, despite its sustained and prodigious effort, has never commanded more than a small minority and has never succeeded in rousing one class against another. The factiousness of the Greeks has always been personal, never dogmatic. The Greek people, with the exception of the Communist Party, are the least doctrinaire in Europe. Fascism and National Socialism never had a following—neither the Italians nor the Germans had a *Fifth Column* at their service when they invaded Greece. Although Socialism has had some able exponents like Dimitratos, Canelopoulos and Papandreou, it never had a wide following.

To subject the Greek peasantry to any sort of regimentation has never been possible, except when war made regimentation necessary. Even industrial labour is too individualistic, too factious, too heterogeneous, too Greek, willingly to accept a controlled order. Nevertheless, bureaucracy has been consolidated and extended, especially during the years 1947 and 1948. To some extent this has been inevitable, for the impoverished and chaotic state of the country, the exigencies of civil war, and the shortage of foreign exchange, have imposed a regimentation of imports

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and exports and a system of priorities to satisfy the more urgent demands of national reconstruction.

Disputes between those who hold that there should be as few controls as possible and those who hold that there should be as many as are necessary prevail in Greece as in England. But controls are a means of exercising power as such, and the Greek Government has a predilection for controls. But those who groan under them are not the peasants, who defy them, nor the urban workmen, who ignore them, but the industrialists and the merchants, who are unable to resist them.

There is a word of Turkish origin *ρουσφέτι*,¹ meaning a kind of nepotism. If a candidate is returned in an election and, above all, if he takes office, his friends and dependants and those who helped him in his campaigning expect a share of his success in the form of some little privilege, some post or concession. *Ρουσφέτι*, which was accepted as a congenial system, added to the human interest and competitive stimulus of party politics. Today it is intensely unpopular for it cannot be reconciled with the spirit of an implacable conflict that imposes such terrible sacrifices. Rewards denied to those who have endured and suffered and fought for their country's survival, to those who, in every village have shown leadership, craft, resourcefulness and courage in the long, hard war of national independence, seem at best part of a system that does not belong to the present age and, at worst, a source of injurious favouritism. Bureaucracy has, by creating an unprecedented number of jobs, made it possible, as it were, to diffuse and systematise *ρουσφέτι*, and make it less amenable to correction by the public, only to make it the more unpopular.

Despite a free press—the Greek newspapers are amongst

¹ Pronounced *roos-fétti*.

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the most outspoken in the world—and a constitutional opposition, Greece, like Great Britain, displays a superabundance of laws and orders and a spreading growth of delegated legislation. In its sentiments and public utterances, the Government is floridly liberal in the manner of the late nineteenth century. Parliament resounds with grandiose phrases and is turbulent with quarrels over exalted principles. But there is also a great weariness in Greece, even more than in Great Britain. Heroic, stubborn, and loyal as they are, the Greeks are a sick and wounded as well as a weary nation. In Greece, as in Great Britain, there is more talk about freedom, justice, and equality than people can endure. To the Greeks, in their ninth year of war, the hollow words take on a tone of cruel mockery when the things those words used to denote are in extreme danger of foundering amid blood and fire.

The leading Greek politicians, including the members of the Government, belong to the world of liberal rationalism which perished in two wars. The aged Mr Sophoulis¹ is a parliamentarian *par excellence*, a liberal of the period when liberalism was still a passion, a figure who might have stepped out of a drawing by Daumier, though always willing to flirt with modernity. Republican and rationalist democracy was transplanted to Greece from France and achieved a powerful ascendancy under Venizelos. But it is no longer a force that can defeat an enemy who has transformed republicanism, rationalism, and democracy into an irreligious secular religion, a rationalised irrationalism, and a militant zealotry. The Greeks would have failed in their response to the challenge were it not for their patriotism and their piety—these, and not a modernism that is already outmoded, have

¹ Since this book was written, Mr Sophoulis has died (24th of June, 1949).

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withstood the ultra-modern advance. A false faith that has nothing to fear from half-faith has been baffled by true faith.

In such a fight politics and politicians have come to mean little. There is a distance between the Greek Government and the Greek people. There is no voice in the war that speaks with the voice of the people, save here and there the voice of a veteran, like that of Vlakhos.¹ Although the Greeks are by nature argumentative and opinionated, they are, today, fighting a silent war, a war waged not only by the armed forces, but by innumerable men and women of deep seriousness and heroic stature who are defending the villages against a pitiless enemy.

¹ Vlakhos writes a weekly article in *Kathimerini*, the leading Greek newspaper. When, in the critical days, it seemed that Greece might not enter the war, he wrote a defiantly uncompromising article which resounded beyond the confines of the Hellenic world. Today, when his weekly article appears, people can be seen standing in the streets of Athens, completely absorbed by his words.

CHAPTER TWO

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

THOSE who attempt anything so hazardous as the overthrow of the State are prolific of reasons for what they are attempting. Their reasons may be good or bad, or both. They will often be irrelevant. They will as often have their source in malice, ambition, and disloyalty, as in righteousness, love of justice, and loyalty.

Was the French Revolution justified or not? It was the product of many different and even conflicting principles, it was shaped, directed, and diverted by so many internal and external events and impulses, it underwent so many transformations, and had such momentous and far-reaching consequences (some of which operate to the present day), that a conclusive, all-embracing verdict is impossible. It can be shown that the evil wrought by the Revolution make it one of the greatest calamities that ever afflicted mankind. And yet, serious historians have convincingly shown it to be an event of grandeur and beneficence. It has been justly condemned for establishing a despotism more arbitrary and more ruthless than any that went before. It has been justly applauded for its work of liberation.

Even Hobbes, who maintained that 'Sovereign power ought in all Commonwealth to be absolute', held, that

'the obligation of the subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have

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by nature to protect themselves, when none can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished.’¹

Failure of the sovereign to protect his subjects is the principal cause of revolutions and their only general justification. Without this failure, revolution would hardly be possible, seeing that a sovereign powerful enough to protect his subjects is powerful enough to prevent or suppress revolution, so that there is some truth in the paradox that revolution is justifiable whenever it is possible. But it is not the whole truth. If the sovereign is weak, it is the duty of the subject to make him strong, and to rebel only if his weakness is intractable or if his strength is directed towards evil ends. The danger of revolution should be a constant reminder to all governments of their duty to protect their subjects against violence at home and abroad. Violence at home comprises tyranny in all its forms, including anarchy. The existence of too many laws is tyranny:

‘Where the *Laws* be few, they leave much unto *arbitrary power*; but where they be *many*, they leave *more*.’²

Anarchy is the violence of the many in a disintegrating society no longer protected by sovereign power—an outbreak, as it were, of atom-tyrannies.

Violence abroad comprises all forms of aggression and outrage perpetrated against the honour or security of the commonwealth by foreign Powers.

The surgeon who believes that a major operation is in itself good has a perverted mind. The belief that revolution is intrinsically good is the belief of evil men. The same is true of the belief that war is intrinsically good. The dream of world revolution is but a dream of universal war, and its

¹ *Op. cit.*, Part II, Ch. 21.

² James Harrington, *Oceana* (italics in the original).

end is the universal *Kingdom of Darkness*. No idea or *ideology*, no faith, no new conception of society or of the ends that society should fulfil, can justify revolution or war. Revolutions and wars can be justified *ad hoc* on pragmatic grounds, but not on theoretical or 'ideological' grounds.

The departure of the Greek Government and of the Greek armed forces, and the presence of hostile armies on Greek soil, greatly diminished the protective powers of the Greek State. But the natural loyalty of the people—a people who, in times of peace, had been more addicted to faction and rebellion than most other peoples—reinforced those diminished powers and defended the State against its internal and external foes.

The internal foe had an unprecedented opportunity. The diminished powers of the State were not a cause but an occasion to rebel. For the first time, the Communists were armed while the State was unarmed. The Bulgarians, who were not at war with Russia, were secretly in league with the Greek Communists.¹ The Communists subordinated their fight against the Germans to their fight against the Greek State. Later on, they compounded with the Germans.² With arms and money supplied by Great Britain, they were able, while waging what was no more than petty warfare against the Germans, to devote their principal endeavour to the overthrow of that State which, while fighting on the side of Great Britain and the other Allies (including Russia) outside its own territories—in North

¹ v. the agreement signed at Petritsi, 12th of July, 1943, by Ionnidis, for the Greek Communist Party, and Daskaloff for the Bulgarian Communist Party. The Greek Communist force, ELAS, co-operated with the Bulgarian-Macedonian organisation SNOF, which was *en liaison* with the Germans, against Greek nationalists in Macedonia. (*Pax Britannica*, ch. v).

² v. the military agreement concluded between ELAS and the *Wehrmacht* at Leivadi in Macedonia on the 1st of September, 1944. (*Ibid.*)

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Africa, in the Mediterranean, and, later on, in Italy—was, within its own territories, compelled to fight the Germans, the Bulgarians, the Italians and the Communists.

Just as civil war will give an external foe the opportunity to make war or, if he is at war, to prosecute the war more effectively, so will external war give the internal foe the opportunity to wage civil war. And the more effectively the external foe wages war, the more effectively will the internal foe be able to wage civil war.

For those bent on sedition, their country's enemies are their allies, and war on their country's soil offers them their greatest hope of success. The existence of this unnatural alliance and the war on Greek soil are the decisive reasons for the ascendancy of Communism in Greece, an ascendancy powerful out of all proportion with the following commanded by the Communist Party amongst the Greek people.

The great civil wars which have divided whole nations have a magnitude far transcending the bounds of sedition. Even if the peace be first broken by an act of sedition, the failures or radical errors of the sovereign power will lead to defections amongst its supporters, defections which may be inspired by a disinterested concern for the welfare of the nation. The conflict, therefore, will not be, or will cease to be, a conflict between loyalty and disloyalty, but between different loyalties, between a State affirming old loyalties and a potential or emergent State affirming new or, it may be, re-affirming older loyalties that appear new only because they had been forgotten. It is not a tenable proposition that in the great civil wars loyalty was to be found only on one side.

In the English and American civil wars, there were high-minded patriots on either side. In these conflicts, the people

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were so evenly divided and the issues were of such depth, scope, and variety, that it is not possible for the historian to condemn one side utterly and to attribute exclusive righteousness to the other, even if he may have the conviction that the triumph of one side was a national calamity or the reverse.

Even in a statesman so persuaded of the righteousness of his cause as the great Clarendon, we find a generous recognition of the virtues displayed by men on the other side. His portrait of Cromwell, profoundly hostile though it is, has a grandeur that far transcends the narrow confines of partisan polemics. Posterity honours men who fought for King or for Parliament in the English civil war. Both Grant and Lee are amongst the national heroes of the American people.

In both civil wars there were men who were torn by loyalty to both sides or believed that both sides were at fault and that the triumph of neither could confer upon the nation benefits comparable with the blessings of an honourable peace.

Even in the French and Russian revolutions, and in the Spanish civil war, the soul of each nation was rent, and patriotic men fought on either side—or accused both sides.

Such considerations do not apply to the Greek Sedition which attained the magnitude but not the nature of an indigenous revolutionary civil war. The Sedition is not to be explained in terms of any popular grievances or of any failure on the part of the State. Whatever abuses there may have been, they were not such as could not be remedied by constitutional means. The Greek people were not divided as other nations have been divided by one of the great domestic conflicts of history. On the contrary, as the nature of the Sedition grew apparent, they combined against it. When the

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Second World War was still in progress, and the Communists were able to conceal their true purpose, and professed to be the principal opponents of the external enemy in Greece, they attracted many patriotic Greeks who were drawn into a struggle which was not to their knowledge a Sedition against the Greek State, although from the beginning there were Greeks who with anguish harboured this knowledge but were long unable to impart it to the incredulous representatives of Great Britain in Cairo and in London. Full revelation did not come until December, 1944, when the Communists, who had made themselves masters of all Greece except Athens, carried out a purge of loyalists, a purge which was an extension into the Hellenic world of those purges which are so familiar in the modern tyrannies. The *December Massacres* brought to the Greek people as a whole the simple, indubitable knowledge of the Communist reality, of its character and purposes—and of the consequences, if it were to triumph finally. Murder had been frequent in Greece until the *vendetta* ceased under the strong and liberal administration of Venizelos. Massacre of Greeks by Greeks was unheard of.

The *December Massacres* are the great dividing line in modern Greek history. They distinguished one side in the conflict from the other, and although they were followed by many acts of reprisal and of private vengeance, the distinction was, and is, absolute. After a contractual basis for peace and reconciliation had been found at Varkiza, murders were committed on both sides both by roving bands and by individuals bent on private vengeance for the murder of a father, son, or friend. But never did the murders committed by Loyalists approach, in number, the murders committed by Communists, though murders were numerous on both sides. But in November, 1946, the Communists once more

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resorted to systematic massacre as an instrument, not of reprisal or of personal vengeance, but of political action, although the particular barbarities which characterised the massacres leave no doubt that there was a savage spirit in the ranks of the Communists and that even amongst their leaders there were men who loved cruelty for its own sake. The massacres also had the effect, which the Communists certainly desired, of spreading fear and of increasing the number of refugees. But their essential purpose was to purge the Greek nation by exterminating the loyalist *élite*.

It is a commonplace that in the great civil conflicts of history, excesses are perpetrated on both sides, often in commensurable proportion. If we exclude the massacres perpetrated in Ireland, there is not much to choose between the excesses of the Roundheads and the Cavaliers, although in Scotland the Covenanters seem to have shown the greater savagery. In the American civil war, neither side distinguished itself from the other by excessive inhumanity. If a country is deeply and evenly divided in civil war, the civilisation of that country will still be shared by both sides. In Spain, both sides massacred because that is the Spanish way of waging civil war. Besides, the influence of the Communists in Spain was not very great and was discreetly employed.

The Spanish civil war was a highly complex phenomenon. It was made up of five main revolutions: the Nationalist revolution, led by General Franco; the Republican revolution in the south, which was the most radical and the most murderous of all; the Republican revolution in Madrid and Valencia, which was but imperfectly controlled by the Spanish Government which, although quasi-legitimate, had a semi-revolutionary character; the revolt in the Basque

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country; and the revolution in Catalonia which was secessionist and strongly influenced by the Anarchists. There was, on the Republican side, an internal terrorism in which Communists took a leading part. It did much to promote the ultimate defeat of the Republican cause which had shown far greater internal divergencies than the Nationalist cause. But the character of the civil war was Spanish throughout, or at least predominantly so. Even the massacres of priests and the burning of churches were a Spanish phenomenon, and by no means unprecedented. Although the intervention of Germany, Italy, and Russia influenced the course of events, the Spaniards of all factions except the Communist Party, remained Spaniards above all.

The divisions in the Spanish world were deep and manifold. That world was at war with itself. The divisions in the Hellenic world are neither deep nor many. That world is at war, not with itself, but with an alien world. The massacres are a characteristic of that alien world. The massacres perpetrated by Croatian *Ustashi* upon the Serbian peasantry during the Second World War, the terrorism, which was so murderous that it could justly be called massacre, during the dictatorship of Tsankoff after the attempt made, apparently by Anarchists,¹ to exterminate the Bulgarian Government in the spring of 1925, and the massacres that go under the name of purges in Communist countries, are phenomena that have been wholly alien to Greece ever since she brought Turkish domination to an end. The Greek dictatorships have been relatively merciful. The dictator Metaxas did not put one of his political opponents to death, although he had to contend with an armed rebellion on the island of Crete.

¹ Communist participation was never conclusively proved.

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During the year 1947, the Greek State was able to suppress or disperse private bands of Loyalists, so that the task of quelling the Sedition fell exclusively to the armed forces of the Crown and to the police. There can be no comparison whatever between the two sides—between normal and lawful actions by the Army, the Constabulary, the Home Guard, and of the police, and the massacres, the terrorism, the incendiarism, the abductions, perpetrated by the Communists and their followers. Excesses perpetrated by the Loyalists have become rare. They are incidental to a condition of extreme hardship, danger, and emotional stress, whereas the excesses perpetrated by the Communists are abundant, systematic, and alien in character.

The Greeks, today, are a united nation at war with a lawless Sedition which is the instrument of a lawless alien aggression—and one which has been specifically defined as such by international treaty. In the *Convention* signed in London by the representatives of Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Turkey, Russia, Persia, Afghanistan and Finland on the 3rd of July, 1933, the *aggressor* was defined as ‘that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions’. These ‘actions’ were five in number, the fifth being :

‘Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive these bands of all assistance or protection.’

This Article exactly covers the aggression perpetrated by Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria against Greece. On the 3rd of December, 1946, the Greek Government charged the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia ‘with encouraging and assisting the guerilla movement in Greece’.

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On the 19th of December, 1946, the Security Council of the United Nations voted unanimously that a *Commission* be appointed to examine the facts and to report upon them.

The *Commission*, generally known as the *Balkans Commission* or UNSCOB, has been at work from the beginning of February, 1947 to the present day, has held an immense number of meetings and has produced a voluminous literature of reports, supplementary reports, and recommendations. It would be superfluous to examine these reports in detail here.¹ It will suffice to point out that they confirm the charges made by the Greek Government and that the most recent supplementary report, which covers the period from the 17th of June to the 10th of September, reaffirms the main conclusions of previous reports, namely that 'armed bands' in Greece continue to receive aid on a large scale from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, that the Greek 'rebels' largely rely on supplies from outside, that large quantities of arms, ammunition, and war-material for the 'rebels' have come from across the frontier, and that 'the rebels' have frequently found refuge across the frontier when pursued by Greek troops.

The *Commission* also repeatedly established the fact that Greek children had been abducted by the 'rebels' and had been taken to countries under Communist control.

The *Commission* officially brought the assistance given by the three northern neighbours of Greece within the purview of international law. The legal case of the Greek State is complete, both under municipal law, with regard to the Sedition itself, and under international law, with regard to the assistance given by foreign Powers.

¹ The most important reports and recommendations of the *Commission* and many relevant documents will be found in *The United Nations and the Problem of Greece*, issued by the *State Department*, Washington, September, 1947.

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Frequent charges were made by the northern neighbours that Greek troops had, in the course of operations, violated the territory of these States. As the Communists often attacked from across the frontier, which is six hundred miles long and not marked by any visible line, except on the few roads and railways that cross it, there is a possibility that Greek troops in pursuit of Communists retreating across the border occasionally went too far. Whether they did so or not has never been conclusively established. But the orders by the Greek Government and by the Greek High Command that the frontier be treated as inviolable by the Greek armed forces are clear and peremptory. Greek batteries are not even allowed to return the fire of Communist batteries when that fire comes from across the frontier. There is no evidence to show that these orders are not respected as far as is humanly possible. If Greek troops have crossed the frontier they have done so inadvertently.

Revolution widens the fissures and augments the stresses that exist in every human society. It exercises a powerful attractive and repulsive power on different classes and interests. It divides and confounds loyalties, it fortifies some, it weakens others, and it evokes new loyalties. The Greek national community is amongst the most loosely organised in Europe. The Greek Government has not shown exceptional resolution, indeed, until about the middle of 1947, it was, with some justice, accused of erring on the side of compliance to the Communist Party. But this compliance, for which the Greek people had to pay a heavy price, was largely brought about by the influence of Great Britain and of the United States, and of the British and American public opinion. Nevertheless, the Greek community was united rather than divided by the terrible impact of a Sedition

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which had at its disposal all the means of an armed and powerfully organised, centrally directed conspiracy and revolution supported and constantly replenished by invulnerable neighbouring Powers.

Not one class of the Greek community—neither the peasants, nor the industrial workmen, nor the impoverished middle class—supported the Sedition. Not one town opened its gates to the Communists who claimed to represent ‘the people’ or even to be ‘the people’. Villages were raided and sometimes held, but in no villages were the Communists received with any emotions other than hatred and fear.¹ There is no sign of class-warfare. The most ardent royalists and patriots can be found amongst the poorest peasantry of the Peloponnese and Epirus. The Communists have a considerable following in the Greek factories, and yet relations between workmen and employers are generally better, in fact, than in most western European countries.² The stages in the revolutionary process as projected by Marx, Lenin, and others, have failed to make their appearance. Discontent of the ‘labouring masses’ in town and country, strikes and sabotage in the factories, riots and risings in the rural areas, increasing ‘contradictions’ within ‘the bourgeoisie’ and ‘the capitalist system’, and a general

¹ It may be that a few Slavophone villages in Macedonia were exceptional in this respect. The Slavophone population of northern Greece, which numbered nearly 82,000 in 1928 (according to the census held in that year), was much favoured by the Bulgarians during the war and was the object of considerable resentment on the part of the Greeks after the war. At the present day, there is much apathy in the Slavophone villages and, while not welcoming the Communists, they do not appear to share the general hatred of them (the tendency of the Communists when they raid these villages is to spare the Slavophone peasants, and to murder the Greek peasants or at least destroy their houses).

² I have found that American observers, irrespective of whether they themselves represent the interests of American trade unionism or of American business, are highly critical of the Greek trade unions as effective organisations, but struck by the easy and familiar relationship between Greek workmen and their employers.

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insurrection of 'the workers and peasants'—one searches all Greece in vain for any sign of these classical phenomena. Even the 'contrast between wealth and poverty', the favourite resource of those *litterati* who affect a hyper-sensitive 'social consciousness' falls short of expectation in Greece.

Poverty is extreme when judged by western, but not so when judged by eastern, European standards. Of personal wealth, little has survived in Greece. The great levelling process of many years has been consummated by inflation and taxation. Large fortunes can no longer be maintained or gained. Athens offers the appearance of a certain luxury and even brilliance, but the luxury is limited, superficial, and largely dependent on the presence of British and American officers, members of missions, journalists, and so on. Such as it is, it must be accounted a boon, for on every restaurant or place of entertainment many peasants, who bring their olives, wine, lemons, oranges and other produce from the countryside, are able to live. In no country are peasants amenable to controls and rationing, and the Greek peasants are no exception. It is neither possible nor desirable to extinguish free trade between town and country. The peasant, who in France, Italy, Germany, and other countries was able to hoard and, to some extent, demand his own price, while enjoying relative security in a world at war, is almost unknown in Greece where the peasants have suffered, and continue to suffer, far greater wrongs and miseries under the Communist infestation than they did under the German occupation. The Greek middle classes, especially the civil servants and salaried employees, although enjoying greater security than the peasants, have been reduced to penury. In their frequent strikes they have had the sympathy of the

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public, but these strikes have, during the last few years, been economic, not political. Industrial labour, especially skilled labour, has, on the whole, suffered least.

The more expensive luxuries of the rich—large establishments in the country, yachting, hunting, and so on—have disappeared almost completely. The wealthier quarters of Athens have been adapted to a modest economy. The mansions and houses of Kolonaki, which figures prominently in Communist and Socialist propaganda as the principal haunt of luxury, are being turned into small flats in which, during the cold weather, the former *haute bourgeoisie* shivers for lack of fuel.¹ The hotels and clubs at Phaleron and the holiday resorts that used to rival those of the Riviera are, today, abodes of austerity bordering on desolation.

Equality in suffering is unattainable in any country, but in no country has it been so nearly attained as in Greece. All the cruelties and deprivations of war—death in battle, massacre, torture, terrorism, sedition, homelessness, the flight of whole populations, famine, disease, the destruction of villages by the thousand, and a bleak levelling penury—have fallen upon Greece in a manner that can hardly be imagined by a western European. And, whereas Great Britain had less than six years of war, Greece began her ninth year of war in the month of October, 1948—and the end is not in sight.

* * * * *

The cohesion of a society amid such disasters and under such fearful blows, a society so loosely organised as that of

¹ Although Attica has a Mediterranean climate, it has periods of bitter cold. Glacial winds were blowing through the streets of Athens during the greater part of March, 1948, although the months of December and January had been warm.

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Greece—and judged as inefficient even by some benevolent observers—is only to be explained in terms of national character. So factious in time of peace, and so *frondeur*, the Greeks have found in the presence of implacable external and internal enemies an unsurpassed fortitude. Strife between political parties remains acrimonious but it is chiefly confined to a restricted sphere that is remote from the people. The alien provenance of the Sedition is recognised by every peasant. International affairs are an object of inexhaustible curiosity and speculation to all Greeks. In no other country were the Italian elections in April, 1948, followed with such intense interest as in Greece. The reason, however, does not lie only in the specifically political bent of the Greek mind, it also lies in the sense of national danger, a sense sharpened by long experience and by an instinctive awareness that even distant events may have rapid and all-enveloping repercussions.¹

The Greek people were torn between the Monarchy and the Republic. The contention persisted throughout the war and was a source of weakness by which the Communists were able to profit. No ruler of an Allied Power was the object of more acrimonious attack both at home and abroad than King George II. The cause of Greek republicanism, which was not in itself an unpatriotic cause, suffered because it was brought into association with Communism which, in Greece as elsewhere, is uncompromisingly hostile to Royalty. The greatness of King George lay in his quiet wisdom, his foresight, and his tenacity of purpose which received little recognition before he died in the spring of 1947. When a

¹ On the eve of the Italian elections I had to take shelter from the rain in a poor cottage on the island of Aegina. The old peasant was full of the impending event, as though nothing else mattered by comparison. As we parted, he called out, *Zito o Gasperi (vive Gasperi)*. He pronounced it *Ydsperi*.

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large majority of the Greek people had voted for his return in October, 1946, the attacks upon him were discontinued except by the Communists. But he never enjoyed personal popularity. Personal popularity of the warmest and broadest kind has been won by the present King and Queen. If, in a dark present and an uncertain future, one person outshines the dullness of ordinary politicians and has words of simple sincerity that live amid the dead or moribund verbiage which, because of constant repetition in speeches and leading articles, has become almost unendurable, that person will be a remedy against lurking despair and a help in sustaining that ultimate confidence without which a nation cannot prevail against a multitude of enemies and an unbroken succession of disasters. Mr Churchill was such a person in the Second World War. Such a person is Queen Friderika of Greece today.

No 'sociological analysis' of the Greek Communist Party and its followers is possible, because its component parts are too varied to allow a generalisation. The Party has drawn its membership from no particular class and from no particular region. The number of school teachers and lawyers amongst the leaders suggests that the Greek professional class is strongly represented in the higher ranks of the Party. It would seem that the Party has been reinforced by many persons from amongst the refugees who fled from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor in 1922, although, on the other hand, refugees, especially those from Eastern Thrace and the Pontus, have shown themselves to be the stoutest of patriots. Many young people, including young women, have been attracted by Communism in Greece as elsewhere.

As a revolution, the Greek Sedition has proved to be spurious, for it has released no broad revolutionary impulse

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and has failed to create what Marxists call 'a revolutionary situation'. It has proved to be equally spurious as a civil war, for, instead of dividing, it has united the nation against a small minority in a struggle for national survival.

The first warning signal in eastern Europe was the dissolution of the Comintern in the spring of 1943. *The Times* welcomed the event as though it did indeed mean the end of the Communist International and the beginning of a general reconciliation between Russia and the Western world. Public opinion, deeply impressed by the prowess of Russian arms and moved by genuine gratitude to an ally who had achieved so much in the common cause, was unable to imagine that Russia had not changed and the great reconciliation had indeed begun. Long after the first disillusionment caused by the evident purpose of Russian foreign policy, the belief persisted that, while Communism may be an erroneous doctrine and often deplorable in its methods, it contains much that is good and is a natural, indeed inevitable, reaction against poverty, oppression, war, and imperialism. The corollary to this belief is the assumption that the causes of Communism can be removed by social and political reforms and by a foreign policy based on collaboration with Russia no less than with America. There was a general presumption, fostered by the daily press, that the present masters of Russia would, out of sheer gratitude and devotion to universal peace and the brotherhood of men, betray all the principles for which they and their teachers and predecessors, especially Marx, Engels, and Lenin, had lived and fought, principles upon which one of the mightiest Empires in the history of the world was founded, principles upon which (according to their exponents) the whole future happiness of mankind depended.

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While this illusion was establishing itself, Russia was undertaking that campaign of conquest by conspiratorial, revolutionary, and political action which brought more than a third of Europe under her sway. The principal opening move in this campaign was the mobilisation of the *Comintern*, a mobilisation which was concealed by the simple device of calling it a 'dissolution'. The Communist Parties took 'action stations', as it were, and, although it was easy to discern what they were doing, and why they were doing it, the press and, therefore, the public, remained undiscerning when events in Poland, Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece provided conclusive evidence that these Parties were engaged in offensive operations on behalf of Russia against the Western Powers.

Even when events showed that there was a world-wide conflict between the interests and the aspirations of Russia and of the Western world, it was assumed, with the help of various metaphors, that the conflict could be 'bridged' or that 'a middle way' could be found between 'Communism' and 'Capitalism' and that England, in particular, being both geographically and 'ideologically' situated 'between Communist Russia and Capitalist America', could perform the grateful function of 'mediator'.

It was not until about four or five years after the dissolution of the *Comintern* that British public opinion began to show some awareness that the differences between Russia and the Western world are not amenable to mediation and conciliation, and it took more than five years, that is to say, until the summer of 1948, when Russia imposed her blockade of Berlin with the evident purpose of expelling the Western Powers from the German capital, that the press had to recognise the magnitude of the menace.

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The advance of Russia into Europe was arrested in December, 1944, by the Battle of Athens. Mr Churchill's mistakes, which made Russia master of Yugoslavia and Albania, were the mistakes of his friends and his advisers, rather than his own, though unhappily he made them his own. But in Greece he saw the danger and Greece was saved. The realism and decency that exist in the heart of the British Trade Union movement was outraged by the crooked designs and the terrible misdeeds of the Communists. Thanks largely to Sir Walter Citrine, Mr Churchill and the Foreign Office were not the only influential supporters the Greeks had in this country.

Rarely has one small country been subjected to such moral pressure as Greece underwent during that period. The Communist press and wireless, the mobilised *Fellow Travellers*, and the would-be-conciliators of Russia turned upon Greece as though she were the embodiment of the darkest reaction, as though her rulers were the corruptest and most inhuman oppressors and the willing instruments of the most rapacious war-breathing imperialism. This moral pressure reinforced the raids, the massacres, the abductions, and the burnings, and all the destructive and disruptive actions of the Sedition. The very boldness and abundance of the accusations against Greece, their falsity (which was such that British public opinion, as it was in those days, could not believe that it was entirely false) and their apparent precision of cumulative detail, created a movement of opinion which swept into its vortex a multitude of people, both influential and un-influential, who would normally have been indifferent or would, had they been passably well-informed, have been shocked by misrepresentation so outrageous and so contrary to the vital interests of their country.

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That Greece had fought on the right side and had never betrayed an ally, only inflamed the rancour of those to whom loyalty is always an offence. That she was a monarchy drew upon her the enmity of those who maintain that all thrones are pillars of reaction. Even her ancient glories told against her, for the Intellectual often harbours a covert envy of that classical antiquity which confronts him with objects of such magnificence that he and his works are dwarfed to irremediable insignificance.

If we consider what Greek independence meant to the romantic poets and to all liberal Europe in a past generation, we can measure the decline that has, in our generation, befallen a liberalism which can condone or fail to condemn those who would bring that independence to an end by massacre, arson, and abduction.

If we survey the public utterances of politicians and the leading articles in the newspapers during the last five or six years, we shall find diffuse moral principles in abundance. But we shall also find them without direction, purpose, or central significance because they are devoid of any transcendental sanction. We shall find abstract ideas in that state of inextricable confusion which reveals the lack of that deeper critical spirit which can only operate on a strong foundation of ultimate beliefs. For sound political principles we search in vain. It is not surprising that people have begun to wonder what politics are really about!

‘Without the light and guide of sound, well-understood principles, all reasoning in politics, as in everything else, would be only a confused jumble of particular facts and details, without the means of drawing out any sort of theoretical or practical conclusion.’¹

¹ Burke, *Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians*.

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Not all events are foreseeable, but because this 'light and guide' was absent, foreseeable events were unforeseen; events, when they came, were not perceived in their true significance and proportion, and, as 'the means of drawing out any sort of theoretical or practical conclusion' were also lacking, the consequences of these events were not anticipated.

Russia, on the other hand, had—and still has—a hierarchic *apparatus* of moral, abstract, and political principles. We may say that they are all false. But they have shown themselves, and continue to show themselves, as guides to successful action. They have been pursued with a critical regard for contingent circumstance. Russia has shown herself capable of great flexibility in her conduct of foreign affairs. She has that ultimate consistency which makes success cumulative. A policy informed by consistent principles, even if those principles are false, will, if pursued with sufficient resolution and adequate means (and Russia disposes of both), prevail over policies informed either by a confusion of principles or by no principles at all.

But when events take the form they are taking today, when unforeseen consequences are at last seen in all their magnitude, their immediacy, and their terrible urgency, the nation, if it has not lost heart, will emerge from the confusion of the past. It will discard irrelevancies, and begin those preparations which should have begun long ago to avert at the last moment the dangers which could have been averted at the first. Mere defensive preparations are not a policy. Policy is power applied for a certain end. When that end is envisaged, the policy by which it can be achieved will be engendered.

There was, in the West, a confusion of principles, an

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interest, indeterminate, undirected by any valid authority, not very serious, but taking itself seriously, with abstract ideas and with various and often contradictory rights (rather than duties). But there was no policy. It was assumed that, the war being over, peace would come of itself, with only a little guidance and encouragement. In Russia, on the other hand, there was a policy pursued with singleness of purpose, craft and determination, and the knowledge that the war was not over—or rather, that the conflict with Germany was over and the conflict with the West had begun. This was the situation which enabled Russia to attempt the almost simultaneous solution of all her great historical problems, including the problem of the Straits and of access to the Mediterranean. British public opinion fell into confusion amid the already existing confusion. Only the Communists were not confused. They knew what they wanted because it was what Russia wanted. The *Fellow Travellers* strove for what the Communists wanted without clearly understanding what it was. The Communists achieved a powerful ascendancy because they were able to command a multitude of unwitting or half-witting followers. But it was the unforeseen event that made the British Government and, in particular, Mr Churchill, act in accordance with sound political principle. This it was that saved Greece—and much more.

Almost any other Power would have accepted its defeat. Russia showed her strength of principle and her tenacity of purpose by not accepting it. Events in Greece today, four years after that defeat, display the unswerving effort to retrieve it.

About the events that culminated in the Battle of Athens four years ago, in the agreement signed at Varkiza, and in

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the renewal of the Communist offensive in 1946, there is a growing literature. It is not my purpose to augment this literature, but rather to examine, in the light of events even more recent, the character of the attack on Greece, the methods and the strategy employed by the Communists, and the type of situation such an attack imposes, for the attack on Greece is an attack on Europe, on Great Britain and on the United States, it is the first armed attack carried out by Russia through the agency of the Communist Party outside the range of Russian domination, in a region where Great Britain and the United States have an ascendancy. In Greece we see militant Communism at work and, as enquiry is unimpeded by artificial difficulties, we can study the matter *in vitro*, as it were, as we cannot study it in countries where the Communists are the masters and, therefore, able to impose an extremely close secrecy. The initial character of the next war is already indicated in Greece. There we can see what that war will be like before it becomes general, in all countries where the Communist Parties resort to general overt and covert armed action against the State. If France had countries under Communist control as neighbours, she would be as Greece is. If western Germany were to be invaded by the Russian army, or to fall under the domination of the German Communist Party, the Communist Parties in France and in the Low Countries would receive the support they would need for successful Sedition. They will, as it were, be armies of Russian pre-occupation.

Greece is not only a battlefield in a world-wide conflict: she is also the tragic field of military, political, and conspiratorial manœuvres, of trial and experiment, a testing ground and a laboratory, in which practical and theoretical conclusions have been drawn, conclusions of great value for

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warfare in the larger field of Europe and in the Middle and Far East. The staff-work of the Greek Communist Party is of a high order. Its political and military intelligence has been organised in masterly fashion. Its political and military experts have prepared analyses based on fresh experience and on the scientific study of the political and military operations. The Party is, rightly or wrongly, convinced that in Greece a new form of war is being perfected, a form in which the principles of classical strategy and of revolutionary action are combined. The interrogation of Greek officers who are captured by the *Democratic Army* is of a searching kind. Its purpose is not only to elicit military information but to establish the mental outlook and the psychological reactions of the prisoners and, by inference, of their masters, by which Communists mean not only the Greek commanders and politicians, but also the British and American 'imperialists.'

While it is not permissible to remain indifferent to the inhumanity with which the Communists are waging the war, it is necessary to study even this inhumanity itself with a view to establishing its pragmatic purpose. Acts of indiscipline are, of course, perpetrated. Blind passion and cruelty sometimes have their own, uninstructed way. But the war as waged by the Communists in Greece is an organic whole, it is subordinated to a definite conception, and while we must neither ignore the deep moral significance of the massacres, nor fail to realise that such massacres may threaten western Europe, we must also apprehend their purpose, *sine ira et studio*.

That the more inhuman methods of the Communists be imitated by the Western Powers is not to be thought of. But the time may come when these Powers will be compelled to

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consider ways of liberating central, eastern, and south-eastern Europe. That the Communists have failed until now does not alter the fact that they very nearly succeeded, that it is a considerable achievement on their part to have sustained a formidable offensive with relatively small means against a strategic position vital to Great Britain and the United States, and that they may yet succeed. The task of the Western Powers in the Balkans will be not one of domination but of liberation. This task, so different from that of the Communists, will impose different means. Nevertheless, there is much to be learnt from the means employed by the Communists in Greece—both for the task of defending western Europe and all free countries from Communist domination and for the task of future liberation.

It is also necessary, not only for the conduct of foreign policy, but also for that return to the rule of law, that Communism in action be understood.

No ideal systems can be free. It does not follow that all ideal systems—Communism included—are intrinsically evil. But it does follow that an ideal system, however good it may be, must exact conformity and uniformity, that it cannot make allowance for the vagaries of the varieties of human nature, and that it is bound to be distrustful of the free human personality, and that it can never tolerate genius. It must be tyrannical.

The converse of this proposition is that a tyranny will embrace or engender an ideal system, for such systems are a means (and, in our own day, perhaps the only means) of achieving absolute power. They are also a means of perpetuating power, for a tyranny is greatly assisted in its endeavour to prolong its own life if it can invoke abstract and ostensibly eternal principles. All political idealists are potential tyrants.

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All modern tyrants are idealists. The slogans employed on behalf of ideal systems make up a rat-catcher's tune, a tune with which the pied pipers of our time have led multitudes of people astray, especially young people, a tune which operates as a dream-engendering drug: 'the opium of the people'. Their dream will be of freedom, of human rights, and equality:

*Libertas et speciosa nomina praetescuntur; nec quisquam alienum servitium et dominationem sibi concupivit ut non eadem ista vocabula usurparet.*¹

No events have shown more persuasively than the events of our own time 'what an effectual instrument of despotism' is 'to be found in that grand magazine of offensive weapons, the rights of men'.²

Whether Communism is in itself good or bad is an important question, but it is not a question specifically germane to our foreign policy. Those responsible for the conduct of that policy must above all ask themselves: Is the ascendancy of Communism compatible with the security of these islands? The Greeks, as I have pointed out, have not taken, and do not take, action against Communism as such, but against the Sedition which threatens their national independence. What is true of the Greek Communist Party is true of all Communist Parties today, even if in varying degree:

'When men are furiously and fanatically fond of an object, they will prefer it, as is well known, to their own peace, to their own property, to their own lives; and can there be a doubt in such a case that they would prefer it to the peace of

¹ 'Liberty and specious names are their pretexts; but no man has ever been desirous to enslave another or to win domination for himself without using these same words.' Tacitus, *Histories*, iv, 73.

² Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.

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their country? Is it not to be doubted, that, if they have not strength enough at home, they will call in foreign force to aid them?"¹

It is not to be doubted! Nor is it to be doubted that the menace of war is greatly augmented by the existence of Communist Parties. They are an almost indispensable means of consolidating and perpetuating Russia's conquests. It is a defensible supposition that if there were no Communists except in Russia, or if every Communist in the world were loyal to his own country, Russia could not, for lack of this powerful agency of sedition, venture to challenge the Western Powers. These Powers have the atomic bomb. She, apparently, has not. But she has the Communist International, which they have not. And of the two weapons, the latter is the more potent as a means of conquest.

Those who hold that Communism is in itself good, or that it represents a noble ideal, and therefore give it their support, do not appear to perceive that by doing so, they are supporting the actions of the Communist Parties throughout the world, that is to say, the means used in pursuit of the supposedly desirable end. There are Communists who call themselves Christians and Christians who call themselves Communists. They hold that Christianity pursues a desirable end. But do they hold that Christian men should engage in massacre, arson, and civil disobedience? Apparently they do not, at least they do not say so. But why not? Perhaps they have not thought about it. Perhaps they delude themselves. But they do not thereby absolve themselves of a responsibility that weighs, or should weigh, most heavily upon Christian men.

There can be no reasonable doubt that the attitude of an

¹ *Idem.*, *Petition of the Unitarians.*

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influential press on both sides of the Atlantic during the critical years was an encouragement to the Greek Communists, not only in pursuit of their ultimate purpose but in their deeds of bloodshed and destruction. Communists set store upon bearing a good reputation throughout the world, for such a reputation augments the power of their propaganda. They are encouraged when they are represented as virtuous men fighting in a just cause. Had their misdeeds in Greece been condemned throughout the world, especially in Great Britain and the United States, and had not condemnation been concentrated almost exclusively (and, for the most part, unjustly) upon the loyalists of Greece, it is certain that, although the Communists would not have desisted from their practices, which, as I shall try to show, are an organic part of their policy, they would certainly have acted with greater circumspection and would have made a more serious effort to curb the savageries of their more fanatical followers. It is highly probable that if there had been less languor with regard to such matters in the Western world, the abduction of Greek children might have been stopped almost as soon as it began. Perhaps it could have been averted altogether.

Those who support the Communist cause must accept the effects of that cause. Those who believe that the end justifies the means must endorse the means. These are responsibilities from which there is no escape—and for the things that are being done in Greece, the responsibility is wide and deep.

CHAPTER THREE

PROPAGANDA AND TRUTH

WE can observe a singular phenomenon in the Greek war: propaganda, used as a powerful, indeed, indispensable, weapon on the one side, and, on the other side, little or no propaganda at all. It would seem, on the surface, that the loyalists have no weapon against this great weapon wielded by the Communists. Broadly speaking, the Communists believe fervently in propaganda, whereas the loyalists do not believe in it fervently, if at all. To understand this apparent paradox, we must consider the nature of propaganda.

Hitler regarded the English as the best propagandists in the world. He was mistaken. They are the worst. He was himself a master of propaganda which he rightly regarded as an art and not a science. He briefly laid down the principles of this art in his book *Mein Kampf*.¹ What he said on the subject leaves little for any one else to say, except with regard to matters of detailed application according to time and circumstances. Those who want to know what propaganda is, and those, above all, who want to study this art, must read his book and his many speeches.

He did not know the English well. He never visited England and he does not seem to have read any English books. He had no English friends—it is doubtful whether he had any friends at all, for friendship was not in his nature. But he

¹ The brief sixth chapter of *Mein Kampf* (pp. 193-204, German edn.) is devoted to the subject of 'War Propaganda'.

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realised, in a rather simple fashion, the greatness of the English, their strength of character and their tenacity. He admired them immensely for their imperial achievement. He had some respect for the Americans, but the English are probably the only people in the world for whom he had deep admiration. For the German people he had much contempt although he believed them capable of doing great things if they were greatly led.

He did not regard propaganda as a creative art, he admitted that it was 'only a weapon', but a 'truly terrible weapon in the hands of an expert'. He was convinced that in their pursuit of victory, the Western Powers owed much to the use of this weapon. What he failed to see was that the propaganda of the English in the First World War was effective because there was so little of it and what he regarded as propaganda was, for the most part, not propaganda at all.

Propaganda is an art of persuasion and by nature polemical. It is an attempt to weaken or displace the convictions of an opponent, so that he shall either be left without a conviction and, therefore, without a will, in which case he will be a defeated enemy, or adopt the conviction of the propagandist, in which case he will become an ally.

A nation at war has one purpose: to impose its will upon the enemy. The degree to which propaganda can serve that purpose is the measure of its value as a weapon. If propaganda alone could achieve it, there would be no need for artillery, tanks, battleships, and atomic bombs. And it is indeed true that, given certain conditions, one active will can impose itself upon another without the use of other weapons, though it will generally be found that the existence of other weapons at the disposal of the active will is an aid,

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perhaps a decisive aid, to propaganda, even if these weapons are not used.

But even if we imagine, hypothetically, that disputes between nations were to be decided by propaganda only, we should not see the end of wars. There would be no more physical wounds, death, and destruction, at least for a time. Wars would be wars of souls and only souls would be stricken. Truth would be defenceless and falsehood would triumph, for falsehood is polemical, truth is not.

Alone amongst the weapons of war, propaganda is in itself evil. A howitzer is a dead thing, an instrument, a means to an end. Propaganda, being an art, is a living thing. It serves an end, but having served that end, it is not silent, like a howitzer the moment an armistice is concluded, but lives on. It has a life of its own and although it appears to serve those who use it, it uses them and is their master. To invoke it, is to appeal to the powers of evil. In nothing is the Satanic character of war more evident than in propaganda.

Truth is not *always* strong. It has its doubts and hesitations. Scepticism is its corrective, a refining acid, as it were. Truth must fight its internal battles. It can never refuse battle, for if it refuse, it will give way to falsehood and will, in time, itself become falsehood. Falsehood, too, may have its doubts, but as it has no scruple, it will not refute them. It will not try to correct or remove them in accordance with truth, but will smother them with falsehood and will itself become more false. It will make truth falsehood. Propaganda is not merely an instrument by which the *Kingdom of Darkness* spreads, it is the very spirit of that *Kingdom*. Artillerymen who serve a battery are not the servants, but the masters of the battery. Propagandists are the servants of their medium. They endeavour to extend this servitude to the enemy. If they are

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successful, they make him their fellow-servant under the same master.

An idea may be true, or may contain some truth, but if it becomes an ideology, that is to say, a secular religion, it becomes falsehood. There is certainly some truth in the democratic idea, and to hold that a democratic order is the best kind of order is a defensible proposition. But the belief that democracy is in itself good, that it has some peculiar potency by which it makes bad men good—such a belief is false, and will, if imposed, whether by force of arms or of propaganda, falsify democracy. Its truth becomes falsehood. We have, in our own day, seen established tyrannies ‘of which the Middle Ages had no idea’,¹ those bureaucratic absolutisms which call themselves ‘popular democracies’.

Enlightenment and propaganda are not only different. They are opposites. To enlighten is no part of the propagandist’s purpose, but only to darken. Even if what he says be true, it acquires the nature of untruth in the course of its operation. No man with any regard for the truth will assert that everything his party or his country does and says is right and true. If he did, he would be a liar. But this is precisely what the propagandist does assert—with the corollary that everything an opponent does and says is wrong and false. And if a propagandist—as such—admits that there is wrong on his own side, it will be found that he is a twofold liar, in so far as he believes that admission of wrong will create the impression that he is truthful. It is a common trick of the propagandist to concede small truths so that big lies may be the more believed. But it is a trick rarely employed by masters of the art.

Propagandists never argue. Hitler never took part in a

¹ De Tocqueville, *l’Ancien Régime* (p. 243).

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debate, at least not after his following was strong enough to exclude all opponents from his meetings. His book *Mein Kampf* is not propaganda, or at least not altogether so, for it offers much enlightenment. It is exposition intended for propagandists and others destined to make the National Socialist Party the master of Germany and Germany herself a master Power. Even if propagandists of opposed factions are brought together for debate, no concession is ever made. The debate is a struggle, as it were, between two solid masses that cannot interfuse. All that either learns from the other is certain tricks and points which must be countered with greater craft in future, verifiable facts, it may be, which must be explained away or falsified upon the next occasion, but on no account recognised as true. The propagandist does not even debate with himself. If he is assailed by doubt, he will extinguish it—by a lie, if there is no other way. If he is confronted with some plain, irrefutable truth that is not favourable to his cause, he will either deny it absolutely or will falsify it so as to make it appear favourable. Youthful propagandists are sometimes eager for debate. As they mature, they grow to know better. They equip themselves with a knowledge of tricks, arguments, and possible questions which an opponent may employ, and acquire a special dexterity in the use of plausible irrelevance (always a help in evading the pertinent question), but they do not argue. The principal process by which truth is disentangled from falsehood, namely self-debate and debate with others, is absolutely rejected by the propagandist. A truthful person, when confronted with a fact incompatible with his own conviction, will modify his conviction. If he does not, he is a self-deceiver—and will become a deceiver of others. Every propagandist, every propagator of a secular religion, will do

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the opposite—he will modify and, therefore, falsify the fact. Secular religions, even if they may originally have held some truth, accumulate falsehoods, and are, in the end, dominated by falsehood. They strive to extend this domination to others—not by argument, least of all by enlightenment, but by force.

Whoever pursues truth, whoever is concerned with self-enlightenment and the enlightenment of others, will make an objective and subjective study of his opponent's case. Whatever truths he discovers in that case, he will make his own, even if by doing so he makes his opponent's case his own, in which event he will become a convert. This is a danger, that has claimed many victims, especially amongst men and women of the Christian faith. It is a danger not because the discovery of truth is injurious—only the non-discovery can be injurious—but because it is possible to be mistaken about the truth and sincerely to believe that falsehood is truth. But the danger is one that cannot be shirked, although it is, or ought to be, part of education to protect people, especially young people, against too easy an acceptance of what merely seems to be true, and to guide them amid the twilight perplexities of this world by sound doctrine. The propagandist will also study his opponent's case, but whatever truths he discovers therein, he will not accept as true, but will either deny or belittle or, preferably, make to seem untrue. If he discover falsehood—and this, indeed, will be his chief pursuit—he will magnify it. And if the falsehood be such that it will suit his own purpose, he will accept it, make it seem true, and propagate it as his own truth. In the end, falsehood will be his master. Having sought to darken, he will himself be in darkness. The secular religions of our day, as they establish their power, establish

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the *Kingdom of Darkness*. This is a phenomenon that perturbs many who would repudiate ideological war, but seeing the terrible menace of a Third World War, ask themselves: If ideological war is waged against us, must we not, in sheer self-defence, wage ideological war too?

To answer this important question, we must give it point. We are menaced by a Power that is even now engaged in an ideological attack which stops short of armed warfare in Europe, excepting Greece, where undeclared armed warfare is being waged. The ideology—or ‘armed doctrine’ as Burke would have called it—that inspires and incites this Power to a war of secular religion, is Communism. Must we not, therefore, fight Communism? If we can do so successfully—and perhaps without resort to arms—shall we not remove the menace? If Russia were to abjure Communism, would she not, in the fashionable jargon, become a ‘peace-loving’ Power?

The answer is, that we must not fight Communism as a doctrine except in so far as we must refute by reason whatever untruth it may contain. A doctrine may be of the noblest kind and yet be propagated by ignoble means and for an ignoble end. Men have fought and died for sound doctrine and with complete sincerity of conviction. But both the means and the end have often been devilish.¹ History abounds in Christian men who with sincerity did un-Christian things.

If our security is menaced, we must defend it, irrespective of our enemy’s convictions. If he attacks our convictions we

¹ General Fuller in his masterly *The Second World War* (p. vii) overstrains paradox when he writes that ‘invariably, the holier the cause the more devilish the end’. It is not ‘invariably’ so, and it is not the ‘holiness of the cause’, but the spirit in which that cause is propagated that determines the nature of the end—and of the means. Would General Fuller accept the converse: ‘The more devilish the cause, the holier the end’? It would, no doubt, be made to appear the holier, but would it be so?

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must listen to him patiently and try to refute him where we believe him to be mistaken. But his convictions may be sound, in which case we must recognise them as such and revise our own. But we must continue to defend our security just the same, and, if there is no other way to preserve it, go to war until its preservation is assured. We may defeat his armed forces and impose stringent terms of peace upon him—and accept his convictions even to the extent of inviting him to instruct us in his doctrines. If his convictions are unsound, we may offer him our instruction. But in no circumstances may we exploit our physical strength in victory and his weakness in defeat so as to impose our doctrines upon him. It was not only a political mistake, it was a violation of the moral law and a misuse of that noble faculty, the intellect, to exploit our strength and the weakness of the Germans to teach them democracy. It was an attempt at forcible conversion. It was doomed to failure, but even if it could have been successful it would have been unethical. Whether ‘democracy’ is right or wrong, good or bad, is irrelevant.

If we are successful in the armed defence of our security, we shall also be successful in preserving our freedom to reason, both within our own country and with men of other countries. But if we fight with arms for our convictions, as distinct from our country (in which there may be many men of indubitable patriotism who hold the convictions we may profess to be fighting) we destroy, or at least impair, our freedom to reason, both at home and abroad.

We may in no circumstances wage ideological war. Our failure to obey this imperative in the Second World War was not only unethical. It was also impolitic. Its consequences were disastrous, for it favoured the monstrous formula ‘unconditional surrender’, and promoted a peace that was

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false, precarious, and, it may be, short, because it made concessions to ideologies at the expense of security. It will, perhaps, be said that, after all, Russia waged ideological war successfully, so why should not we have done the same. The answer is that we did do the same and that is the reason why the war was but half won, for, if our object was security, as originally it was, we cannot claim to have achieved that object, seeing that despite the defeat of the original enemy, a present opponent and prospective enemy has taken his place, and we are not secure.¹ The reply to ideological war is not ideological war. The reply to propaganda is not propaganda.

Mein Kampf reveals Hitler's genius in its critical as well as in its fanatical aspects. It contains much ideological *bourrage de crâne*. But it also contains much shrewd observation. The strategy and tactics with which the Germans nearly won the war are anticipated with deep and simple insight. Hitler erred with regard to Russia chiefly because he erred with regard to the Jews. He believed that Russia was at the same time corrupted and dominated by Jewry and, therefore, without the inner strength that is conferred by patriotism, a strength Hitler rightly recognised as the foundation of power in a people. He also recognised the immense potency of ideas and, himself a fanatic, he was a consistent preacher of fanaticism. Because he regarded Jewry as a disintegrating agent, he could not believe that the Russian people would fight for an idea, the Communist idea, which he believed to be Jewish. The Russian people did not fight for Communism any more than the German people fought for National Socialism. Nevertheless, the Communist, like the National

¹ General Fuller (*passim*) is trenchant, courageous, and illuminating on the subjects of 'unconditional surrender', ideological warfare, and security.

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Socialist, idea was fanatically held by the governing class. Love of country and devotion to an idea combined in Russia as in Germany to create a powerful martial impetus when both country and the idea were menaced. It is idle to accuse Hitler of 'making a great mistake' by invading Russia. The invasion of Russia, and the colonisation of the Ukraine for Germany's benefit, was the reason why he went to war. To have gone to war at all was, no doubt, a 'great mistake', but to have gone to war without attacking Russia would have been senseless. The 'mistake' was not the invasion of Russia, but the defective strategy and the even more defective policy that dominated the campaign. There were, during the first few months of that campaign, symptoms of disintegration in Russia. In countless Ukrainian villages the Germans were welcomed as liberators and from no other army in the Second World War were there so many deserters as there were from the Russian army.¹ But these symptoms were not induced by German propaganda, they were induced by hatred of the Muscovite tyranny and by the desire for private ownership of the land. When the Germans failed to break up the collective farms for the benefit of the Ukrainian peasants, when they showed themselves as ruthless as the agents of the central tyranny, and when they allowed vast multitudes of their Russian prisoners to die of starvation, they not only missed the opportunity that was theirs, they also consolidated the resistance of the Russian people. Even so, defeatists and waverers might have spread alarm and despondency, but they were exterminated by those powerful forces which the Russian State maintains for its own preservation. It must be recognised that on this occasion, at least, the Russian State did its duty by Russia as well as by itself.

¹ The desertions continue to the present day.

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But Hitler was not radically wrong about Great Britain as he was about Russia. He was a great expert on the theory and practice of propaganda, one of the greatest the world has ever known. Why then did he err radically with regard to British propaganda?

The reason is that he failed to see that there was no British propaganda, or at least very little and that little of poor quality. Hitler was never interested in truth, except as an obstacle to be overcome or as a weapon for his own armoury. He never denied that the truth might be useful though not necessarily more so than an untruth. He held that the British and the Americans were 'psychologically right' when they represented the Germans as 'Huns and barbarians' because, by doing so, they prepared 'the individual soldier for the terrors of war' and 'intensified the fury and the hatred felt against the common enemy'.¹ Hitler did not think it was true that the Germans were 'Huns and barbarians'. To call them so, was in his opinion effective—and this was all that mattered. He was contemptuous of the German propagandists—and, in particular, of the German comic papers—which constantly made the British and Americans appear ridiculous. He did not think it was untrue that they were ridiculous, but that it was ineffective to call them so. Propaganda, he said, must be simple and popular, it must be unencumbered 'with scientific ballast', it must respond to 'the feelings of the masses'. It is not there to satisfy 'a few learned men or aesthetic youths'.² He calls it 'a terrible weapon' in *Mein Kampf* and, in his conversations with Rauschning, he maintained that 'revolutionary propaganda' could 'break down the enemy psychologically before the armies begin to function at all', that it could demoralise

¹ *Mein Kampf*, p. 199.

² *Ibid.*, p. 198.

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the enemy, make him 'ready to capitulate', and drive him 'into moral passivity, before military action can be thought of'. 'We have,' he said to Rauschning, 'friends who will help us in all the enemy countries. We shall know how to obtain such friends. Mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, indecisiveness, panic: these are our weapons.'¹

These, exactly these, are the weapons used by the Communists in the Greek war. But they were hardly used at all by Great Britain in the First World War. And yet, according to Hitler's criteria, the British used them with decisive effect, whereas the Greek Communists have used them with an effect which, although considerable, must be judged a failure if we apply Hitler's criteria, or their own, and bear in mind their great and sustained effort, the financial and technical means at their disposal, their cunning and their singleness of purpose, and the weakness of the propaganda against them.

On the 8th of January, 1918, President Wilson had proclaimed his *Fourteen Points*. They were a great embarrassment to Great Britain and France, they revealed in the mind of the President a deep ignorance of what the war was about and a cold indifference to the vital interests of the Allied Powers. Amid all the emotions and aspirations represented as 'war aims' and foisted upon them by leading idealists, ideologues and a multitude of writers with a large following on both sides of the Atlantic, the true purpose of the war, security, was in danger of being lost. The President seemed to be unconcerned even for the future security of the United States. One of his *Points*—the second—which related to the *Freedom of the Seas*, would have robbed Great Britain and the United States of their most formidable weapon, the weapon

¹ Hermann Rauschning, *Hitler Speaks*, pp. 16-20 (English edn.).

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of blockade: with this weapon Great Britain had defeated Napoleon, with this weapon she and the United States defeated the Empires of the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns, and with this weapon the two Powers defeated the Third Realm and the Italian Empire in the Second World War.

It can be said that the *Fourteen Points* were the beginning of all that deserves to be called serious and effective propaganda on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers in the First World War. All the pacifists throughout the world regarded them as a 'charter' (as it would be called today). The simple, popular ideas, corresponding with widespread popular aspirations, all that Hitler was to exalt, a few years later, as the compound from which the 'terrible weapon' of propaganda was to be forged, were contained in these *Fourteen Points*. Thanks, chiefly, to Mr Lloyd George, the second *Point* was eliminated from the terms of the armistice with Germany, though as a doctrine, the *Freedom of the Seas* remained a source of danger to British sea-power and to Anglo-American relations which, as Mahan and other great naval strategists had so often explained, are founded on nothing if not on the vital interest of both Powers in naval supremacy.

Wilson was an ideologue and, as such, he belonged to the same category as Lenin and Hitler, with this difference, that Lenin's ideas were the germ of a Russia, Hitler's of a Germany, mightier by far than ever before, whereas President Wilson's ideas were the germ of that organised pacifism which was decisive, both by its influence on public opinion and by its effect on national policies, in promoting that disregard for vital interests which, under specious titles like 'collective security', struck at the foundations of all security,

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that is to say the power, the sea-power above all, of Great Britain and the United States and so created that insecurity which made the Second World War possible and prepared the way for the Third.

The British Government decided to create a special department for the dissemination of propaganda to hostile countries soon after President Wilson had spoken. It was known as Crewe House. Lord Northcliffe was placed in charge. He himself was a gifted propagandist with a tendency towards megalomania. He had something in common with Hitler; he was far inferior to him as a propagandist, for although Hitler by no means despised advertisement as a means of making ideas, methods, and policies appear more attractive than they really are, he regarded propaganda as something far greater than mere advertising, as polemical rather than alluring—as ‘a terrible weapon’. Besides, Lord Northcliffe was extremely ignorant of foreign countries. He had to engage in propaganda that was unsuited to his talent and addressed to people he could not understand. The Germans, however, credited him with almost occult powers and were convinced that so sinister a genius could only be a Jew.¹

Mr Lloyd George—like Mr Churchill after him—was not interested in propaganda. But the German offensive that opened in March, 1918, threatened the Allies with defeat and made them more inclined than they had been to use any means, however dubious, that might be of some service, however modest, against the enemy. There appears to be no evidence, however, that it was of any service at all. But Wilson’s Jacobin ideology was bound to encourage even the

¹ When in Germany soon after the War, I found many Germans incredulous when I told them Lord Northcliffe was no Jew.

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obtuse Germans when, all their offensives having failed, they saw the approach of final defeat. On the 22nd of January, 1917, Wilson, addressing the Senate, had called for 'peace without victory'. To those who cannot win, victory for none is preferable to defeat. Indeed, no victory at all would have meant a German victory, for events had shown that Germany was the greatest single military Power in the world. It was not merely a matter of defeating her in the field and on the sea, but of reducing her 'exorbitant power'. As long as that was not reduced and kept reduced—absolutely, by depriving her of territories, industries, and bases, and, relatively, by maintaining the Balance of Power against her—she would remain the potential master of Europe.

The German Revolution was the consequence of defeat in battle and of the blockade. There was disintegration in the German army, although the troops fought formidable rear-guard actions to the last. The Revolution soon imposed its own order. It foiled a mad attempt on the part of the German fleet to fight a last battle which might well have wrecked the negotiations for an armistice and have exposed western Germany to destructive invasion (as distinct from occupation), to anarchy, and to terms more onerous than those imposed at Versailles. Thanks to the revolutionary Workers' and Soldiers' Councils as well as to the natural discipline of the German people, the troops returned home in good order. The Revolution established a new central authority. It crushed the radical and separatist Revolution in Bavaria, and consolidated the foundations of a new German unity. The Anglo-American idealism exalted the virtues of democracy and the purpose of a war, originally waged for security, was perverted by the ascendancy of aspirations expressed in phrases like 'making the world safe

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for democracy.' German 'democracy' was able to continue the work of Bismarck and by abolishing the dynasties (which it did with more than encouragement of the Allied Powers, and, in particular, of Mr Lloyd George), it destroyed the last possibility of establishing a decentralised, federal Germany.

Russia, in those days, was not strong enough to exploit the unrealism of the Allied and Associated Powers to whom she had become implacably hostile. Had she been strong enough, they would have been compelled to continue the war by a gigantic effort against the combined revolutionary forces of the German and Russian Soviet Republics, instead of limiting themselves to an intervention designed not so much against Russia or the Russian Revolution as against the menace of a German-Russian alliance. That menace was averted thirty years ago. It may re-emerge in the course of the next few years if the Western Powers do not take adequate military and political precautions to avert it for the second time.

It was in the territories of the Dual Monarchy that neo-Jacobin doctrine operated most powerfully. The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire may have been inevitable after the failure of the Allies to clinch the offer of a separate peace which the Monarchy made in 1917. The dissolution was in the interest of Russia, and, ultimately, of Germany. It was perilous to the interests of the Western Powers because it weakened the Balance of Power.

It can be said at this point that British propaganda had an effect, for with the assistance of Austrophobes like Professor Seton Watson and Mr Wickham Steed, it reinforced the operation of Wilsonian idealism and augmented the centrifugal forces at work in the Monarchy.

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Towards the end of the war, and long after it was over, the Western Powers, especially Great Britain, enjoyed an immense prestige in Europe—and not least in Germany. But this prestige was the result not only of the might but also of the majesty of England, of her high standards of honour, of her civilisation, of her statesmanship, and of her success through the centuries. The term 'Fair Play' became part of the German language. England became the exemplar of political sagacity and vision. Her political unwisdom seemed wisdom and vision to the Germans and engendered in their minds the hope, first, of equality with Great Britain and the United States, and, through equality, of domination in Europe.

If we analyse the moral power of Great Britain in Europe during the First World War and in the years that followed, we must conclude that it owed its magnitude to its intrinsic virtue and not to propaganda. To the ideologue—to a Lenin, a Wilson, a Hitler, a Stalin—propaganda is the exercise of moral power and moral power is the exercise of propaganda. The reason why such tremendous potency was ascribed to British propaganda was this: those emissaries of the *Kingdom of Darkness*, the ideologues and the propagandists, cannot conceive that there is any virtue or potency in truth, honour, and loyalty divorced from the ulterior purpose of promoting abstract ideas, to be imposed and maintained, ultimately by a universal, supra-national system which must, in the nature of things, become tyrannical.

It is constantly asserted that ideas cannot be imposed by force, and, as a corollary, that they cannot, as the phrase goes, be killed 'with bullets and bayonets'. There is some truth in this assertion, but it is not the whole truth. The whole truth was expressed by Hitler, when he wrote:

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'Conceptions [Vorstellungen] and ideas, as well as movements with a definite spiritual foundation [geistiger Grundlage], *whether this foundation be false or true*, can, when they have reached a certain point of maturity, only be broken by the exercise of technical power if these material weapons are, at the same time, themselves the carriers of a new, inflammatory [zündenden] thought, of an idea or of a universal philosophy [Weltanschauung]'¹

In other words, an idea cannot be destroyed by physical force unless that force is the instrument of another idea—no matter whether the idea is true or false (a rider that is characteristic, not only of Hitler, but of all ideologues).

The policy, both domestic and foreign, of Russia is not merely served by propaganda, it *is* propaganda. The habit of dismissing Russian utterances as 'mere propaganda' shows a misunderstanding both of propaganda itself and of Russian policy. Propaganda is not a subject that is much discussed in Russia, at least not by the Russian, as it was by the German, leaders, for it has become so completely integrated in the official Russian outlook, and is so much taken for granted, that it is hardly recognised as a force in its own right. The Russians do not talk of it as a 'weapon'. Whenever it is suggested that this or that statement by Vyshinsky in the Security Council is propaganda, the intended implication is that it is insincere. It is, however, sincere—even when it is clearly untrue. On the other hand, the counter-statements made by representatives of the Western Powers, are rarely, if ever, untrue (except perhaps through unintentional error), but they contain an element of insincerity when they have a polemical purpose, that is to say, when they are meant to be counter-propaganda. It is this that makes the debates between the Russian and Western representatives so

¹ *Mein Kampf*, pp. 186-7 (italics my own).

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distressing to the critical western observer. There is an atmosphere of unreality and insincerity about them—but the unreality and insincerity are not only on the Russian side.

To the ideologue a medium that is only used in time of declared war, and is abandoned when peace is proclaimed, cannot be the medium of ideas which have universal application and universal validity. How can an idea be sincerely held by one who propagates it so opportunistically? It will, perhaps, be objected, that Hitler regarded propaganda as an instrument of war and no more. He did indeed, but he was always at war. To the ideologue, not only war, but permanent and universal war is the natural and necessary state until his ideology has permanently and universally prevailed, whether it be the ideology of Communism, of National Socialism, or of that Wilsonian Pacifism which would institutionalise universal war against wars.

Lenin, Wilson, Hitler were prepared to go the whole way, to fight for what they believed in, and to impose it by force if necessary, no matter what the sacrifice. The Western world does not feel and think in such terms, although powerful minorities in the Western world do. The Western world has not been sufficiently corrupted, although its corruption is far advanced. It still reveres truth. The sincere liar is a phenomenon so incomprehensible to Western man, that he regards the phrase as a *contradictio in adjecto*.

Stalin is prepared to go the whole way, not now, perhaps, but some time—the way that has been studied, planned, attempted, and apparently abandoned, only to be attempted again, for more than thirty years. Russia is permanently at war: with capitalism, with imperialism, with 'Fascism', with the 'bourgeoisie', the 'Kulaks', the 'deviationists', with saboteurs, 'objectivists' (or 'subjectivists') and so on. She is

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always giving battle on some 'front'—on the 'scientific front', the 'agricultural front', the 'artistic front', the 'musical front', and so on.

A sincere man may become a sincere liar. A truthful man cannot. British propaganda is, and always has been, a pretence. It might be a justifiable pretence, one of those necessities that war imposes. If propaganda is an effective weapon of war, why not use it? It is a weapon that corrupts the soul of those who use it as well as those upon whom it is used. But is not that a risk that might have to be taken? If we must suffer physical death to win wars, must we not also suffer spiritual corruption? The answer is, that the ideologue is already corrupted, and that his propaganda has no other purpose than to infect those upon whom it is used: to infect them with his own ideology at all times, with sedition in time of peace, and with treason in time of war. Corruption ceases to be an instrument of war, war becomes an instrument of corruption. The uncorrupted reality of the European, that is to say, of the Christian and Greco-Roman heritage (in so far as it is still uncorrupted and still a reality) is incompatible with sincere and, therefore, with effective propaganda. The ideologue, being corrupted, can corrupt others but can no longer corrupt himself. Whoever is true to the European heritage cannot corrupt others but can corrupt himself. Every true ideologue has fanaticism. He does not possess ideas but is possessed by them. It is evident that fanaticism imparts audacity, singleness of purpose, and a spirit of sacrifice. But he who has not these virtues and is unfanatical cannot acquire them by simulating fanaticism—and he who has them without fanaticism will always prevail over fanatics. Those who are not ideologues and cannot, therefore, be natural propagandists, cannot become effective

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propagandists by simulation, for it is the sincerity of the propagandist that is his power—the sincerity that will, at times, express itself in the most evident and astounding falsehoods. It is to the credit of the English that they are poor propagandists—and to their discredit that they should attempt to engage in propaganda.

British propaganda, in the First World War, was belated and meagre, it achieved little, and that little injurious to British interests. England's moral greatness achieved much in that war. This achievement is little recognised today because moral greatness is today little recognised. That pure patriot and profound thinker, von Clausewitz, exalted moral greatness above all else in war. Hitler mentions von Clausewitz in *Mein Kampf* with respect, but he belongs, as it were, to a different world. Ludendorff, a bigoted obscurantist, who, after he returned to civilian life, devoted himself to polemics against Christianity in general and Roman Catholicism in particular, as well as against Judaism and Freemasonry, rejected von Clausewitz and reversed the doctrine that war is an instrument of policy. He wrote that

‘All the theories of Clausewitz should be thrown overboard. Both warfare and politics are meant to serve the preservation of the people, but warfare is the highest expression of the national “will to live”, and politics must, therefore, be subservient to the conduct of war.’¹

Hitler owed much to Ludendorff. Together they led the armed insurrection against the Bavarian State in 1923, the prelude to the National Socialist Revolution ten years later. It was Ludendorff who first expounded the doctrine of the ‘totalitarian State’ (*der totale Staat*) and of ‘total’ or ‘totalitarian war’ (*der totale Krieg*).

¹ General Ludendorff, *The Nation at War* (English translation), p. 24.

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Moral greatness cannot be donned in war and doffed in peace, though it may assert itself more greatly in war than in peace because in war it will be greatly challenged. Von Clausewitz held that national greatness as such is moral—and that a nation can only once lose its honour.¹ He insisted that the spirit of the army, from the lowest rank to the highest, must be one of moral greatness. The moral greatness of a nation is compounded of patriotism and piety. Underlying Tacitus's indictment of his era, is the charge of impiety—an era which, like our own, was

*'opimum casibus, atrox proeliis, discors seditionibus, ipsa etiam pace saevum.'*²

Moral greatness will submit all power to the supernatural powers. It presupposes reverence and fear of God or, in ancient times, of the Gods. It presupposes a humility that will avert the consequences of *Hybris* and *Superbia*.

Every ideology is itself a *Hybris* or a *Superbia*. It is a radical infidelity, whether it be a denial of the gods, or a usurpation of their authority, or a violation of the First Commandment. However patriotic its language may be, it is a negation of patriotism, for love of country is replaced by subservience to the idea, so that country itself is sacrificed, as it were, on the altar of the idea, whether that idea be universal war for eternal conquest or the eternal threat of war for universal peace.

England impaired her moral greatness by her propaganda in the First World War. She impaired it more by her propaganda in the Second World War. The purpose of the second war was falsified even more radically than the

¹ See his *Drei Bekenntnisse*, which were not published until after his death (they were first made known by Perty in his biography of Gneisenau).

² 'Rich in disasters, terrible with battles, torn by seditions, horrible even in peace' (*Histories*, 1, 2).

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purpose of the first by the official propagation of abstract ideas, by incitements to disloyalty, murder, and sedition. Devoted allies were perplexed, estranged, and stricken, the authority of legitimate governments was broken. Resistance to the enemy, ostensibly strengthened, was weakened by perplexity and division. The enemy was the gainer. But it was Russia who gained most of all, not as an ally, not as a Power at war with Germany, but as the potential enemy, as the Power that sought and found political and strategic positions for that attack on the Western world which is now moving towards its climax, an attack in which the independence of all central and eastern European Allies (excepting Greece) was extinguished.

The purpose of a just war is, above all, security, and not to *destroy*, but to *reduce* the enemy's power, to promote a balance, not a new unbalance. The destruction, as distinct from the reduction, of a hostile Power may remove the immediate menace to security but it will create a vacuum which will be the cause of future insecurity. The vacuum created by the destruction of the Dual Monarchy was never filled. Perhaps it could have been filled in time by a new central and eastern European confederation, but Hitler did not give the world time—naturally enough, for time would have denied him the consummation of his purpose. The vacuum announced by what was surely one of the most terrible blunders ever perpetrated by civilised States, the proclamation of unconditional surrender as the war-aim of the Allied Powers—as though war could have any legitimate purpose other than to impose conditions of peace. This vacuum engendered by the destruction of the German State, is the immediate, perhaps the decisive cause, of a conflict so intractable that only the most formidable combination of

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statesmanship and power the Western Powers can command will avert a Third World War.

The greater the moral greatness of a nation, the less susceptible it will be to the propaganda of the enemy, whether in victory or defeat.

One may hope, though perhaps it is a forlorn hope, that England will, if war come, and even if it does not come, distinguish herself by abstaining from all propaganda. There is nothing to be said against a sober and veracious publicity. It is for the wireless to transmit clear and truthful *bulletins*, and even explanatory and analytical *talks*. But no propaganda! England will, if she abstain from propaganda, build up a reputation for veracity in a world that is doped and crazy with propaganda, and leprous with the doubt and indifference largely engendered by propaganda. She will, in time, be believed. She will, in the end, have achieved a moral authority that will augment her power to promote a just and enduring peace. Without this authority, her power will not only be impaired, it will be worse than impaired, it will be corrupted and misdirected to corrupt ends. Falsehoods, half-truths, propaganda, endless chatter about rights, freedoms, abstract ideas, and charters, that do violence to every sense of justice, realism, and propriety, in the press and wireless and in the debates of UNO, UNESCO, and other institutions designed to promote universal felicity, are but conducive to that universal infelicity which marks the *Kingdom of Darkness*.

It was never more evident than it is today that ideas as such have power, whether for good or evil. It is evident, also, that some measure of protection must be extended to perplexed and susceptible minds. Ultimately the only protection is to be found in sound doctrine and authority

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which imparts sound doctrine. Is any restraint to be imposed upon any idea in any circumstance? The test is pragmatic:

“It is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted with all, in speaking to multitudes of people.”¹

The test does not, therefore, relate to the truth or untruth, or the quality of an idea, for of this no secular authority can be the judge. An idea that is true may be ‘averse to peace’ if it engenders or inspires a movement. The test does not apply to the idea itself—for its truth or falsity can be decided only by reason—but to the manner of its propagation, especially to its exponents ‘speaking to multitudes of people’. An idea which, by the test of reason, is considered true, may, nevertheless engender a conspiratorial movement or a sedition. It may become ‘an armed doctrine’. The idea that has achieved the character of an official orthodoxy endowed with secular power in Russia is Communism. We may hold that idea to be false and incompatible with Christian doctrine which we hold to be true. But if Christian men in Russia were to conspire in the name of Christ for the overthrow of the Russian State, that State would be justified in condemning Christian doctrine as ‘averse to peace’ in those specific circumstances.

Communism, as an idea, is to be opposed only by reason, but if it becomes a conspiracy, it is to be opposed by force, irrespective of its truth or untruth, in so far as it is ‘averse to peace’. To engage in an ‘anti-Communist crusade’, as some, in genuine apprehension over ‘the Communist menace’ are demanding, is not to be thought of. If ideologues fight one

¹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, II, 18.

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another, so much the better, but it is not for those who are not in the bondage of an ideology to accept that bondage so as to fight another ideology. We have seen, during the last few years, how movements calling themselves 'anti-Fascist' have become far more dangerous, more barbarous, and more malignant than the movement of which Mussolini was the leader, and how, instead of disappearing when their *raison d'être* disappeared with the overthrow of Fascism, they intensified their fanaticism and multiplied their energies.

A war that assumes the character of a crusade will lead to disaster even if it leads to victory, because it will sacrifice the lives, the wealth, and the happiness of the nation to a cause which will not only be illegitimate, but will be prejudicial, and perhaps fatal, to the only legitimate purpose of a war—security. If we apply these considerations in the nature of propaganda to the war in Greece, we shall find, on the one side, a world dominated by and seeking to dominate by propaganda. This, more than anything else, marks the radical difference between the two worlds. It is true that the Greek press and wireless attempt to engage in propaganda. But the attempt is curiously weak and inorganic. The weakness is, however, outward. Like England's weakness in the art of propaganda during the First World War, it is conditioned by inward strength.

CHAPTER FOUR

LOYALTIES AND DISLOYALTIES

THAT Communism is the primitive form of all society, as Engels supposed, is no longer a tenable proposition. There are, in Marxism, relics of the once prevalent belief in an original golden age, or age of innocence. According to the Marxian thesis, exploitations of men by men, class, the State as such, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and imperialism, are not in the nature of man, for man is by nature good. The Marxist rejects the Christian doctrine of radical evil resulting from the Fall and ineradicable except by Grace. He regards evil as the result of economic forces which can be overcome by an endeavour sustained and doctrinally guided by the collective will. Men are only evil in so far as they operate these forces for the sake of advantage over other men, or in so far as they willingly accept their operation because to do so is to their own particular advantage. But the natural goodness of men must, in the end, prevail, and establish universal Communism in a universal class-less and state-less society. It follows, though this is not readily admitted by Marxists, that the end is a return to the beginning.

Communism is much older than Marxism. It is older than history. It has always attracted religious sectarians of Pelagian tendency. As a way of life and a discipline to be practised by an *élite*, it is to be found in the works of Plato. As a hypothetical ideal it is expounded in Sir Thomas More's *Utopia*, the work of a great and true Christian. When, therefore, we speak of Communism in our day, that is to say,

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when we refer to the international organisation composed of national Communist Parties under the leadership and authority of the *Politbureau* established in Moscow, we must, whether explicitly or implicitly, qualify it as Marxian. In practice it is not Communism. It is not even Marxian. Communism remains its ideal, an ideal not yet realised even in Russia, as orthodox Marxian Communists readily admit—they describe Russia as a Socialist State which embodies a transition from capitalism to Communism.

We are not told what practical reforms are needed to establish the Communist as distinct from the Socialist State. Communism may mean many things, but one thing is essential to it—namely that men hold wealth in common. But the common ownership of wealth presupposes, in a last analysis, equality of wealth (as Mr Bernard Shaw has been pointing out during the last seventy years or so), for the wealth of one in excess of the others is no longer held in common. Net income is wealth and the trend in Russia has been towards ever greater inequality of income. This may be for the good of the Russian community, for equality has its evils, no less than inequality, but it is not Communism. How this trend is to be reversed, we are left to guess.¹

¹ According to an article in *The Cominform* (as quoted in *The Times*, 13th of Nov. 1948), the difference between Socialism and Communism is only a matter of maturity. Under Communism, the 'productive forces will reach their peak' and society will be able to realise the principle, 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs'. The difference between urban and rural labour will disappear because the countryside will be industrialised. The distinction between physical and mental labour will be abolished. The educational level will be raised so that all will be as educated as engineers and technicians. In the end, 'there will be a society composed entirely of highly educated people.'

These aspirations, as outlined in *The Cominform*, indicate a trend towards general conformity with one kind of society, the industrial and technical kind, but it is hard to see in what respect that society is specifically Communistic—or even Socialistic. Such aspirations could, indeed, come as near to realisation in a capitalist order as in any other.

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The Russian State, nor any of the ruling Communist Parties, are more tolerant of what is to them heretical Communism than of doctrines for which no claim of Communism is made. Christianity is tolerated in Russia. It is attacked and allowed to exist only under severe restrictions, but it is allowed to exist—openly and officially. Christians practising a true Communism would not be tolerated. Communism is an ideal that can be achieved by small communities, but there can be no Communist State. As an example and an aspiration, it is not irreconcilable with the Christian faith and may even be a form of practical Christianity, of equality in abnegations and symbolical repudiation of earthly riches, a sharing, not of wealth, but of poverty, as some monastic orders have shown. But Marxian Communism is, like all secular religions, incompatible with Christianity. Marx himself did not differentiate between Communism and Socialism, and it is highly questionable whether he would have accepted Stalin's interpretation of his doctrines. If, therefore, we speak of organised, international Communism today, it is necessary to qualify it as Muscovite rather than Marxist, and to remember that it has nothing to do with Communism.

Muscovite Communism, because of its consistency and its exclusiveness, is the implacable enemy of Communism. Communist aspirations have existed as long as human society has existed, but, for the first time in history, a single organisation has claimed a monopoly of Communism throughout the world. For the first time *true* Communism, or at least Communist movements, which today might have as good a claim, or even a better claim than the Communist International to represent true Communism, are regarded with implacable hostility by Marxian Communists. In

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countries that are not under Communist control, such movements are doomed in advance by reason of the monopoly exercised in militant fashion by the Communist International. The very word 'Communist' has been, as it were, patented, so that even if there were a party aspiring towards true Communism, it would hardly venture to call itself Communistic. It could not contest the patent with impunity, because of the attack it would draw upon itself, and because of sinister connotations which the word Communism has acquired. If we hold that there is, or can be, such a thing as true Communism, we must conclude that it has, for the first time in history, been effectively suppressed.

When I speak of Communism in these pages, I shall take it as understood that I mean Muscovite Communism whether it be regarded as 'true' Communism or not.

The Russian State is represented as an example on a vast scale of emergent Communism, but no insistence on its real or alleged merits can disprove what is proved by two of the expedients employed by that State itself: the secrecy which it imposes within its own confines and the distortion which it imparts, through propaganda, to the image of the reality that prevails under its own domination. If the Russian State had validity as an example to the world, if it were a State truly passing from Socialism to Communism, Russia would be the most accessible of all countries. She would be, *par excellence*, the land of free enquiry. She would be open to the world, while the world would be closed to her, whereas she is closed to the world and the world is open to her. In so far as the world is closing itself to her, it is inhibiting not free enquiry but conquest.

Russia is neither the Hell her detractors nor the Heaven her adulators represent her as being. But the image of herself

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which she herself projects, is not a true image. It could not be true of any human society. As an example to the world, she has failed. Her failure by her own declared standards is absolute. By human standards it is relative, but, nevertheless, so great that the severest secrecy and the most prodigious distortion ever practised by any organised State that did not enjoy complete geographical isolation from the world are needed to preserve the projected image against rectification.

This image of the Russian State is not merely projected *into* the world, it is projected *upon* the world itself with great obliterating and penetrating power, so that it may impose itself not only upon all other images but also upon the underlying reality. Of all the countries not yet under Communist control, Greece is subjected to the strongest, the most constant, and the most implacable process of obliteration and penetration.

Propaganda is itself the projector. Its peculiar potency in the hands of the Communists has a twofold cause: it imposes a clear, integrated image and, at the same time, promotes the disintegration of the underlying reality. While, because of its precision, its hardness of outline, and its inner consistency, it acquires the aspect of authentic truth (especially in our scientific age of diagrammatic perception) while imparting even to the tangible and verifiable truth the aspect of falsehood.

A kind of dream-world is engendered: a dream of future triumph to some, a nightmare of unquenchable pity and of unpurged terror to others. Much fortitude of soul is needed to withstand the seduction and to endure the aggression of this dream, to preserve the integrity of truth, and always to replenish at their divine source those simple loyalties which are above all else the object of an attack made with all

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tangible and intangible weapons, with consummate craft, with a ferocity that does not shrink from massacres, abductions, crucifixions, and disembowelings, an attack sustained with unswerving and unremitting persistence, day after day, year in, year out.

Democratic Socialism is a *contradictio in adjecto*. But contraries can exist in one State. Indeed, a balance of contraries may be a solid foundation for a State. But a State cannot be wholly Socialistic and remain democratic. Because Muscovite Communism is an organic whole it must perish if it be divided or diluted. Its claims are comprehensive and universal. This is its strength—and, perhaps, its ultimate weakness. If it come to terms, the terms are but a concession made for tactical reasons. They will be revoked on the earliest occasion. To non-Communists this constant, ineradicable, doctrinally implanted, organic habit of breaking the pledged word, is treachery. To the Communist it is loyalty, an absolute imperative, that overrides every non-Communist ethic. The Communist does not break his pledged word with compunction, but with pre-determination, and even with pride and with satisfaction. By telling a falsehood, by breaking a promise, or by violating a treaty, he has propitiated the overriding loyalty. The advance, which was arrested by the necessity of temporising with its enemies, can be resumed. To the Communist every compromise, every act of conciliation is but a *reculer pour mieux sauter*.

This has been the record of Communism in Greece for the last five years and more, a record of unmitigated perfidy, but, to the Communists themselves, a record of unswerving devotion to an overriding principle.

Communism is a militant, persecuting, secular religion in

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Greece as elsewhere. But, as I have pointed out in the First Chapter, Communism as such is not persecuted or repressed in Greece. Any Greek can be a Communist under the law. But he cannot, under the law, take part in a sedition. Nowhere does there exist a right to sedition. It is the duty of every State towards its own subjects to suppress crime, including the crime of sedition. The Greeks are given to factious turbulence and were, until the Communist sedition showed itself, inclined to think rather lightly of sedition as a form of quasi-legitimate action, as though there existed some right to practise sedition, as though sedition was part of political freedom. Greece is one of the modern countries that has suffered from an excess of liberty, or from too liberal an interpretation of the word 'liberty'.

The Greek Communist Party is completely and organically identified with the armed Sedition against the Greek State. Throughout the world we are compelled to ask the question: Is Communism to be tolerated or not? The answer is not to be found in the character of Communist doctrine, but in Communist practice, although that practice is determined by doctrine. The truth or untruth of the doctrine is irrelevant. Even truth is not to be propagated seditiously. Communism is to be tolerated only in so far as it is not 'averse to peace', although legislation against it is only justifiable if it is an indubitable threat to peace and one that cannot be overcome by public opinion and by the defensive action of the civil service, trade unions and of other organisations whose own peace may be threatened.

The severity of measures taken by the Greek State is determined, not by the opinions or principles of the Government in power, nor by the nature of Communist doctrine, but by the pragmatic menace to the peace, the laws, the

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liberties, and the national independence of the Greek nation. It is possible to differ with regard to degrees of justifiable severity, but this much is certain: no State, conscious of its responsibilities would, if confronted with a sedition comparable with the sedition that rages in Greece, refrain from measures of comparable severity. A magnanimous ruler—or one aspiring to a reputation for magnanimity—might show clemency towards those who would overthrow him or even conspire against his life. But he is under an absolute obligation to protect the lives of his subjects and has no right to sacrifice them to displays of magnanimity. Men who persist in conspiring against society and achieve an ever-lengthening catalogue of murder and arson have no claim to clemency, least of all when, having, in the past, been the repeated recipients of clemency (as the Greek Communists have been), they have resumed their conspiratorial work with greater ardour and audacity than before.

The widespread liberal protests—widespread, above all, in Great Britain and the United States—against the Greek State in its endeavour to protect its own subjects, are uncritical in the sense that, Members of Parliament, trade unionists, journalists, and so on, who have expressed their indignation have not tried, or, if they have tried, have been unable, to show that the laws under which certain persons have been condemned are unjust laws, or have been unconstitutionally enacted, that there has been any specific miscarriage of justice. The protests are of that generalised nature which makes it impossible to refute them because it is impossible, at least for any one person, to study the records relating to many hundreds of trials or to attend more than a limited number of trials. I do not doubt that there have been miscarriages of justice in Greece as in other countries. But I

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have been unable, even after diligent enquiry, and after attending some trials, to discover any evidence to confute the opinion, expressed by the British Commission which enquired into the administration of justice in Greece at the beginning of the year 1946, that the Greek judiciary is independent and is not amenable to political pressure. And amongst the countless and incessant articles, speeches, and statements made in protest against the sentences passed by the Greek courts, I have discovered none that is founded either on knowledge and experience of the Greek law, or on the conscientious study of even one case. It is improbable that any gross miscarriage of justice could escape observation. Trials, both by civil and military courts, are public. The rights of defence and appeal are unimpaired. A vigilant public and a free and highly critical press make official concealment impossible.

If we recall the well-founded, as well as chivalrous, protests against injustice everywhere that were the peculiar glory of England in a generation which is now passing away and consider the present attitude of English Liberals towards Greece, we cannot but ask: What has happened to English liberalism?

Not long ago—indeed within living memory—there would have been a world-wide movement of sympathy for Greece if what has now befallen her, had befallen her then. What Gladstonian thunders would have descended upon the perpetrators of atrocities, horrible even in a time like ours!

The attitude of the Greek Communist Party to the Greek State is not one of constitutional opposition. It allows no possibility of compromise except in so far as the Communists have been willing, and may again be willing, to accept one

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because by the acquisition of a part they will be the better able to acquire the whole. They are not interested in reforming or improving the Greek State. They identify themselves completely with the Sedition in word and deed. Communists everywhere make much use of the word 'traitor'. It is commonly supposed that they do so merely because this word is a term of abuse and, when coming from them, not to be taken very seriously. This is an error, for the word, as used by them, has a precise meaning. The language of the Communists is notoriously abusive, but not wildly or irresponsibly so. It is the language of hatred, but also of calculation, of hatred with a definite purpose. It is scientific in so far as it is based on a clear conception and inferentially applied to specific categories of situations and persons.

According to this conception the 'people' everywhere are the rightful masters. Every existing government, other than those under Communist control, is a usurpation. When the Communists conspire to overthrow a government, they do so in the exercise both of a moral and a political imperative (according to the Communist conception ethics and politics are one), to vindicate and establish for ever the natural, inalienable rights of 'the people'. When a government, like the Government of the United States, is strong and the Communist Party is weak, the struggle against the government has to assume discreet forms. But when the government is weak and the Party is strong, as in Greece, the struggle takes the form of a general sedition with all the character of implacable and uncompromising warfare. The members of the government, the officials, the police, all political leaders and all publicists who take part in the defence of the State are 'traitors'. They, and not the

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Communists, are 'rebels', for they are in a state of rebellion against the natural order and, in resisting the Communists, they are 'betraying' the people. In every country, the Communist Party alone has a legitimate claim to the exercise of supreme Power. The *Communist International*, with the *Politbureau* at its head, is the *de jure* Government of the world. It establishes *de facto* Governments wherever it is able to overthrow the existing Government and make itself master of the State.

The law of libel forbids Communists in the Western world to call a man 'traitor' because he is loyal to the State in which he serves. But such a man is a 'traitor' in accordance with the principles of Communism, precisely because he is loyal to the State, seeing that this loyalty is disloyalty to 'the people'.

When the Greek Communists bring men of indubitable patriotism and loyal servants of the State to trial as 'traitors' in the 'People's Courts', and pass sentence of death upon them, they are not, as is commonly supposed, concerned only with the physical and moral extermination of their enemies (though this, too, is their purpose), but in vindicating 'popular justice'—as they call it—which has been violated by precisely that patriotism and precisely that loyal service. It is this patriotism and this service that constitute the guilt, not the innocence, of the accused.

Not only has the Greek Communist Party identified itself with the Sedition by many seditious deeds and utterances, but by specific declarations in which it has declared all members of the Party who do not take part in the war against the Greek State to be 'traitors'. Such lukewarm or recalcitrant members are 'collaborators' and are, by their passivity, 'betraying the people'.

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This absolute attitude was clearly expounded in a circular, signed by the Greek *Politbureau*, which was secretly distributed amongst members of the Party in February, 1948. In this circular, the Politbureau condemns all 'defeatist tendencies', it

'denounces as treason every hesitation and ambiguity with regard to the armed struggle which is, today, the unique and decisive means to crush Monarchofascism, to rid the country of Anglo-American imperialists and to save country and people. Any Communist who does not understand this and does not participate in the armed struggle is a traitor and has no place in the Greek Communist Party.'

The circular, which discloses the existence of 'opportunism and hesitation' amongst members of the Party in the towns, orders the urban organisations to expedite 'the mass-exodus of thousands of workers' who are to join the Democratic Army in the mountains. Militant groups, each consisting of five men, are to be formed 'for the struggle'. Every Communist 'who remains in town with his militant group must take part in the armed struggle' and must engage

'in sabotage against all shops, services, communications, and military units. Every Communist and supporter of the popular Democracy is a soldier of the Democratic Army wherever he may be.'

The circular is signed by Zachariadis, Vafiadis [Markos], Ionnidis, Bardzotas, Roussos, Stringas, and Vlandas, and circulated amongst members of the Party in February, 1948.¹

Here we see the Communist method as it is everywhere, only in a more advanced stage than it is in most other European countries. The transition from restricted action, from the discreet but sustained endeavour to promote

¹ It was published in the clandestine *Rizospostis* on the 9th of April, 1948.

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strikes and intensify discontent, and to destroy all opponents by calumny, as in England, to general action, to open sedition, civil war, massacre, incendiarism, and the removal of opponents by murder, is organic, as in Greece. It follows as soon as the circumstances allow. But the principle is the same—in England, as in Greece, and all the world over.

If we have carefully observed the working of Communist propaganda over a period of years, we shall have discovered that it is an attack, whether open or covert, direct or indirect, upon one thing above all others: upon loyalty as such, and upon all the loyalties that make up essential loyalty. Loyalty must be destroyed so that it may be replaced by what is, in a last analysis, universal disloyalty. To this disloyalty Communists are loyal, sometimes even to death, and often more loyal than those who are not Communists are to loyalty. The Communists profess loyalty to 'the people', but when we examine what they do to the people, we shall see that, whereas 'capitalism', 'imperialism', 'superstition' (that is, religion), and so on, are obstacles to be removed, the ultimate Communist purpose is domination over the people, a domination so complete that the people no longer exist, either as individuals with souls and personalities, or even as a fellowship. Nowhere is there so little living contact between rulers and ruled as there is in countries under Communist domination. There were good and bad Tsars, but the Tsar even when he was inhuman was something human, as a Tsar, to the people an object of loyalty, someone who might redress the people's wrongs. The relationship between monarchs and the people is one of love—sometimes not accorded, sometimes not reciprocated, and often abused—but of love nevertheless. Ivan the

Terrible was a popular monarch, and the more so because when he oppressed, which he did abundantly and ruthlessly, he oppressed the oppressors of the people rather than the people themselves. But in the Communist dispensation, love is excluded because it establishes a human relationship which, whether constitutionally or as a matter of custom or tradition or general sentiment, offers a last resource against oppression. Government is not an end, it is a means to an end everywhere except in the Communist dispensation. In that dispensation government is the end, or rather, the abstraction which the government embodies is the end. The Government is not what is understood by that term in the Western world. It is not a collection of human beings with human responsibilities, it is a materialised abstraction. Not the oppressor is oppressed in the Communist dispensation, on the contrary, he is protected so that he may continue to oppress. The State, which, according to the Communist thesis, shall 'wither away', does the opposite—it becomes everything. Under no other dispensation do the people withdraw from their rulers as in the Communist, in none are they so unknown, so remote. In none is their inner life so secret—and in none is it an object of such invigilation. If there could be finality in any State, finality in the Communist State would be the total extinction of the inner life—and, therefore, the extinction of the people. When 'the will of the people' prevails, the people cease to be, for this 'will' is not something which 'the people' impose, but something to which they surrender unconditionally. That is why it will always be challenged by the people. Ferrero, in his *Principles of Power*, says that no revolution lasts for more than a generation. In principle he is right. But in practice, there is one exception. The Russian revolution has already lasted more than thirty

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years because the Communist bureaucracy has succeeded, largely by reason of modern technical progress which places irresistible coercive powers at the disposal of the State, in giving permanence to the state of unconditional surrender. The Russian bureaucracy—the Politbureau, the Communist Party, the secret police, are, to the people, another, a remote, and a hostile world. The people habitually refer to them as ‘they’ as to an enemy, which indeed they are. The ‘will of the people’ is formulated by the Politbureau and imposed upon the people by irresistible coercion. Elections are nothing other than a compulsory affirmation of unconditional surrender by the people. Bad rulers have misused ‘the people’ as a means to an end. But in no dispensation other than the Communist are ‘the people’, as such, a means to an end. All rulers, even the best, are compelled to use fear as an instrument of rule. But to rule by fear to the exclusion of love is an aberration. Under Communism it is the system. Any Commissar, or any manager of a factory in the Communist dispensation, is in immediate danger of becoming a ‘deviationist’, and, therefore, of death or exile, if he becomes the object of love. One electric spark of love, uniting the two poles—the rulers and the ruled—and the whole dispensation will collapse. There are few things more tragic in history than the welcome given by countless Russian peasants to the German invaders and the desertion of countless Russian soldiers. They believed that the Germans would afford some human relationship, some protection of a paternal kind, something that was not an abstract idea. The failure of the Germans to understand was one of the reasons why they lost the war.

The ruler owes loyalty to God and the people. The two loyalties are inseparable, they make one undivided loyalty.

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Under the Communist dispensation both are excluded. But while loyalty to God is excluded in advance (seeing that God, in the words of Engels, is 'the extraneous force of the capitalist mode of production'),¹ loyalty to the people is presumed as a means of acquiring domination over them, of completing and perpetuating the state of total disloyalty.

The success of Communism throughout the world is not relatively, but absolutely, dependent on the existence of disloyalty. It is therefore the unswerving purpose of Communist propaganda to promote disloyalty in all countries. Wherever the Communists have to be cautious, whether by reason of established law or by reason of conventions or traditions that cannot be attacked without incurring excessive popular resentment, the symbols and circumstances of certain loyalties are held up to disrespect in a light or bantering manner. Witticism at the expense of the august is not in itself a sign of disloyalty and is, in fact, a useful corrective both to servility and pomposity. But as an integral component of a sustained, and calculated, and universal campaign it has a corrosive potency which is underestimated by those who, although loyal themselves, are not clearly aware of its purpose and of its ultimate consequences. The House of Lords is hardly an object of great veneration in Great Britain today. Nevertheless, it is still respected. The Socialists wish to reduce its powers, or even to get rid of it, for political reasons and not only because it is respected. The Communists are hostile to it only because it is respected. The Throne commands general loyalty that may, on significant occasions, express itself in an impressive and unambiguous manner. That is the reason why the Communists hate it. No secular religion will readily tolerate an institution that

¹ *Anti-Dühring*.

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still has an *aura* of its own. The Communists will in no circumstances tolerate a King any longer than they are compelled to by political necessity. The following quotation from the *Daily Worker* may seem innocent in itself, but it has a definite purpose. It refers to the opening of Parliament, a ceremony which, because it combines an important function with popular pageantry, and signals, as it were, the loyalty due both to the Throne and to the Palladium of democracy, offers a conspicuous and convenient target for the shafts of overt and covert disloyalty:

“‘Nauseating’ is the only word to describe the State opening of Parliament ... the King, wearing his crown and fancy dress, reads the speech to the landlords, business men and idle spivs who are the peers. ... The utter emptiness of the King’s Speech left Mr Churchill in the embarrassing position ... of having almost nothing to say about it”¹

The Queen of Greece is constantly vilified by the wireless station known as *Eleftheri Ellada* or *Free Greece*, which is the principal organ of the Greek Communist Party. The vilification generally takes the form of hints about her private life which are as indecent as they are untrue. The visit of General Smuts to Greece in the year 1947 offered a favourable opportunity for reinforcing political polemics by malicious scandal. A *liaison* between the aged statesman and the youthful Queen was invented by the Communists and broadcast by *Eleftheri Ellada* so as to discredit two revered persons and two revered institutions, the Greek Monarchy and the British Commonwealth, by propagating a single slander. The Prime Minister, Mr Sophoulis, a life-long liberal whose age approaches that of Mr Bernard Shaw, is habitually referred to as ‘the traitor’, Archbishop Damaskinos, who was

¹ *Daily Worker*, 30th October, 1948.

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Regent during the absence of King George, is qualified as 'the stinking Monk'.¹

In a broadcast on the abduction of Greek children, *Eleftheri Ellada* pretended that the indignation of the Queen, of the Prime Minister, and of the Archbishop was hypocritical and that they were, in fact, mortified because the children were being saved by the chivalrous action of the Communists:

'The bloody man [Sophoulis] pretends to be indignant, and the mistress of Smuts [Queen Friderika] ... is shrieking' while 'the stinking monk' makes a 'slandorous announcement' [a reference to a declaration in which the Archbishop condemned the abductions]. '... It is self-evident that monarchism wants to exterminate the people of Free Greece. ... The transfer of children to the Balkans has thwarted their plans, and that is why Frederika is shrieking and the stinking old man is shouting.'¹

Lies and scurrilities of this kind are, of course, the expression of crooked and obscene minds. But they are more than this. They are standardised political polemics with a calculated purpose, namely moral extermination which, when the time comes, is to be followed by physical extermination. Patriots who are murdered, whether by order of the Communist commanders, or by the assassins of the *Aftoámyna* (the secret organisation which I shall examine in the next chapter), or after sentence passed by the *People's Courts*, are the more readily exterminated as 'less than vermin' because the followers, especially the youthful followers, of the Communist Party have been made to regard them as such

¹ Broadcast transmitted on the 13th of March, 1948 (2.15 p.m.). A whole catalogue of lies and scurrilities could be compiled from the broadcasts of *Eleftheri Ellada*. Those who are interested in this kind of thing can study these broadcasts for themselves—they are monitored by the B.B.C., by the *liaison service* of the Balkan Commission, and by the Athenian wireless.

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by a process of repetitive and cumulative propaganda. Every calumny transmitted by the *Eleftheri Ellada* or printed in the Communist press, no matter in what country, is in the nature of a capital sentence, passed in anticipation of events which are present in countries where the Communists are the masters, imminent in countries, like Greece, where the struggle for immediate mastery is in progress, and remote, but nevertheless inevitable (according to the Communist conception), as in Great Britain. Calumny, by parading as justified condemnation, provides the motive and the justification for murder which receives final sanction when it is carried out by order of a People's Court which has pronounced People's Justice.

Although Lenin spoke of religion in terms of hatred as 'a spiritual intoxicant, in which the slaves of capital drown their humanity',¹ the general attitude of Communists towards religion is one of contempt, rather than hatred, for they assume that it is a 'prejudice' or a 'superstition' which 'scientific progress' will consign to a dead and irrecoverable past. They are sufficiently realistic to refrain from dangerously antagonising many millions of men and women to extirpate a 'prejudice' which will disappear in any event and can be rendered harmless meanwhile. It is only when a religion commands a powerful secular organisation that it becomes an object of hatred. The Communists, today, regard Roman Catholicism as their most formidable enemy, and are always ready to use other Christian Churches as a means of attacking the Church of Rome.

They regard the Church of England as relatively innocuous, and, concealing their contempt, even pretend that

¹ *Lenin on Religion* (Little Lenin Library), p. 11.

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Communism is compatible with Christianity.¹ No orthodox Communist really believes that it is so, but the pretence serves a useful purpose in this country where many people, including some Ministers of the Gospel, are deceived by it. To have a Minister of the Gospel on the Editorial Board of the *Daily Worker* is a minor triumph of the British Communist Party.² This triumph is enhanced by the success with which he has been induced to visit foreign lands as an unconscious missionary of Communism. It is not unreasonable to suppose that this astonishing phenomenon is the cause of much perplexity amongst Christians and some hilarity amongst Communists in the lands that are graced by these visitations.

The Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church is being exterminated wherever the Communists are in control and its places of worship, its organisation, and its clergy and congregations (in so far as they are compliant under pressure which only the most heroic and saintly can withstand) are transferred to the Greek Orthodox Church.³

There are three reasons why the Communist attack on religion in Greece is not directed specifically against the Greek Orthodox Church. The first is the reason already indicated, that this Christian Church can be used against other Christian Churches, especially the Church of Rome, for reasons of high policy. The second reason is that it can be identified with the Slav communities in which it prevails and so seen as a religious cover for the Pan-Slav imperialism

¹ E.g. Mr Gallacher's letter in *The Times*, 17th of Nov., 1948.

² For names of persons on the Editorial Board, v. *The Daily Worker*, 23rd May, 1948, p. 2.

³ '...on October 21 the Rumanian Patriarch Justinian welcomed, with due pomp and ceremony, "the return of the Greek Catholics into the bosom of the Orthodox Church..." this apparently inoffensive information marks the official death of a religious community, 1,750,000 strong' (letter in *The Times*, by Ion Ratiu, 17th of Nov., 1948).

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which is part of Russian foreign policy. The third reason is the popularity of the Greek Orthodox Church in Greece and the impossibility of identifying it in a plausible manner with oppression, wealth, 'privilege', 'reaction', and so on. The attack on religion in Greece is oblique and general, not direct and specific. It takes various forms, especially the form of a 'whispering campaign' amongst young people in the villages. Religion is not represented as hateful, but as contemptible, as contrary to reason, science, and progress, as a medley of old-fashioned prejudice and obsolete superstition, as 'fit for old women' and not for a young, aspiring, and modern generation.

The Communists refrain from incitements to the murder of priests as such. About sixty Greek priests have been murdered by Greek Communists during the last four years,¹ but the available evidence does not reveal the motive in every case. Some priests would seem to have been murdered because they tried to protect their flock from massacre or to intercede on behalf of children assembled for abduction, or because they helped British soldiers or airmen to escape the Germans during the war. Nevertheless, the disrespect inculcated against religion in general and to the priests in particular, and the impunity with which they can be murdered wherever the Greek authorities are unable to

¹ During the years 1940-1947, 128 priests were executed in Greece: 21 by the Germans, 5 by the Italians, 46 by the Bulgarians, 56 by the Communists. Three hundred and twenty-two priests were put to the torture during the same period: 9 by the Germans, 2 by the Italians, 290 by the Bulgarians, 21 by the Communists (Report by the *Holy Synod of Greece*, included in the Report of the *Hellenic Red Cross*, Athens, 1948).

Excesses against the clergy by the Communists began in December, 1944, and continue to the present day (December, 1948).

We must not suppose that all these victims are martyrs to the faith. It has been said, with some truth, that in no country are the priests 'of the people' as they are in Greece. They are usually villagers themselves and may embody what is noble or ignoble in 'the people'. Many, like Father Skreka, are true Christians. But some are capable of considerable rascality.

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protect them, has brought torture or death or both upon many of them. Several priests have been crucified in a spirit of satire on religion, a form of fun which the Communists allow themselves in consequence of the ridicule with which they are taught to regard religion. The martyrdom of Father Skreka will serve as an example of what anti-religious propaganda can achieve.

Early in 1947, the village of Megarkhis, in the district of Trikkala, was raided by Communists. The father and uncle of the village priest, George Skreka, were abducted and his home was pillaged. Soon after, another uncle of his, an attorney, living in Prevesa, received a letter from him, saying that

'The situation here in the village is unbearable, but I am resolved to endure until the end so as to fulfil the task which the Almighty has assigned to me, however perilous it may be.'

On the 27th of March, Father Skreka was seized by a band of Communists, the *Aftoámyna* having informed against him. According to one of his flock, he was a chosen victim 'because of his duty as a servant of the Almighty, and for no other reason. He helped the poor of his parish and gave consolation to the unfortunate.'

His wife and children begged the Communists to spare him, but they replied with curses and threats of murder. As he was being led off, he said:

'God knows what will happen to me. But His will be done. My faith is in Him, for He ordains everything. If through martyrdom, He calls me to Himself, blessed be His name.'

He was taken to Xyloparikon, near Neraïdokhori, in the district of Pindus, where he was put to the torture. On Good

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Friday, they crucified him in mock commemoration of the crucified Saviour.¹

A fir-tree, with branches suitably shaped, served as a cross and he hung there from 9 in the morning until 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when he died. During that time he was tortured, especially by two women who slashed his body with knives and jagged pieces of tin. Afterwards, his dead body was used as a target for rifle practice. It was then thrown into a ravine and covered with stones. He left a wife and six children, the youngest of whom was a year old.

The 'freedom' that is constantly proclaimed by the Communists is not merely a ruse to entrap the unsuspecting, or a device to win the support of people who are oppressed, or believe themselves to be oppressed. The whole of Communist propaganda is pervaded by promises of 'freedom'. The widespread assumption that this promise is wholly insincere and made only to be broken is not altogether correct. Young people, especially, find 'freedom' in Communism. It is possible to see this 'freedom' in their faces. Their eyes shine with a fanatical sense of liberation. The same was true of Fascism and National Socialism.

There is no such thing as freedom in itself. Freedom that is not freedom *from* something and *for* something is not freedom at all. In fact, it is meaningless. Freedom is an active, not a passive principle. The freedom which most people want nowadays is freedom from interference. They want to be left alone—alone to do something. It is good to do nothing sometimes and many people want freedom, and rightly so, to do nothing at all. But in time to do nothing becomes a servitude, as the unemployed know only too well. The young

¹ Every Easter, Judas Iscariot is burnt in effigy in the Greek villages. The crucifixion of a live priest provides a realistic counterblast to a piece of Christian symbolism.

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Communist—or, for that matter, the Fascist or National Socialist—feels truly free when, suddenly, all old restraints and inhibitions burst asunder, and he is free to engage in action that commands his willing allegiance and his enthusiasm. Innumerable Germans found freedom in devotion to Hitler. It was not sheer hypocrisy on the part of National Socialist leaders to call their movement a *Freiheitsbewegung*. To explain, however plausibly, to a Communist that Communism in practice means unfreedom is pointless. It is precisely this unfreedom which to him is freedom.

The freedom which, above all else, makes Communism attractive, is freedom from the moral law. It has been said, in a general way, that the family is the foundation of society. It is strikingly true of Greek rural society. It was the Church and the powerful bonds that unite the Greek family which preserved the Greek people as a nation through centuries of Turkish rule. These bonds are reinforced by a puritanical ethic, especially in matters relating to sex. The marriage bond is not of the strongest, but a betrothal is much more binding in Greece than in Western countries. Relations between parents and children, grandparents, and grandchildren, brothers and sisters are of the closest. The Communists fully understand that the Greek family is an organic whole which must be broken if the Greek nation is to be broken and Communism is to prevail. The 'freedom' they promise to the young is freedom from the bonds of family and, above all, freedom to exercise power. It has been observed¹ that the clamour for freedom has often concealed the lust for power. It is, indeed, one of the invariable characteristics of all great revolutionary movements. In such movements it is to those whose lust for power is most

¹ Notably by Bertrand de Jouvenel, in his great work, *Du Pouvoir* (1947).

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insatiable that the leadership falls. It is they who become the dictators:

Thou'st seen the knave, abusing those in power,
Bawl freedom loud, and then oppress the free.¹

Dreams of power are exceedingly attractive to young people, especially when they are discontented. The dreams may be generous, but if they are translated into reality they seldom remain generous. Those whose own inner life is poor resent the extreme poverty of Greek rural existence and find it intolerably narrow, whereas those whose inner life is rich, find spiritual riches in nature and in religion, and are aware of the infinite. Dull discontent or frustration burns fiercely when kindled by doctrines, precepts, and examples which offer not merely the dream but also the reality of exercising a power which is part of that universal power the future will bring. Young people suffering from such discontent are readily attracted by sedition for which Communist propaganda provides arguments so plausible that it appears not only justified but a duty to mankind. Boys and girls, who dream of power, are led to exercise power by breaking the family bond, by reviling religion in the presence of their parents or of the priest. They will covet a weapon, obtain it and, at first, bear it secretly. They will then, by a series of gradual transitions, become active conspirators on terms of equality with seasoned heroes (as they believe them to be). They will terrorise whole villages, and take part in arson, massacre, and executions of 'traitors'.² To such, the crucifixion of a priest is an act of deep symbolical significance, especially for young women, who are, thereby, boldly

¹ John Clare, *The Fallen Elm*.

² It is a frequent boast of mere boys and girls who serve in the Communist forces that they have 'executed a policeman' or a 'monarchofascist' woman.

defying old traditions, deriding superstition in deed and not in word only, demonstrating the fraudulent character of spiritual forces which are seen to be of no avail to the victim, displaying their equality with men, and doing 'people's justice' on a person who, as a priest, is not only a 'reactionary' but also the living embodiment of prejudice and 'superstition'.

The Communists have had much success in attracting young people by proclaiming freedom from all restraints imposed on the sexual impulse, a restraint that is particularly strong in the villages. In their propaganda they extol 'free love' as 'natural', 'healthy', and 'emancipated'. Continence is condemned as a 'bourgeois prejudice'. Women, under Communist leadership, have demonstrated against continence in the streets of Athens, bearing posters or banners inscribed with devices such as 'Down with Virginity'.

The Communist *Youth Movement*, known as EPON, has been suppressed because it was a school of Communist indoctrination and active sedition. It disseminated seditious propaganda and prepared its members to become agitators, saboteurs, and partisans. It gave boys and girls responsible tasks, such as distributing leaflets, watching persons suspected of being 'traitors', spying in the home and at school, and so on. Such boys and girls acquire a sense of self-importance and of future power. Many went into the mountains and fought in the ranks of the Communists. EPON was a formidable agency for the disintegration of the family and in spreading, both by precept and example, the doctrine of 'free love'. Towards the end of 1947, an *exposé* on this subject was circulated amongst the 'girl comrades of EPON', a document of great significance (though but one of many) in so far as it plainly reveals the attitude of the Communists towards sex. While pronouncing love to be

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'free', they make the unrestrained satisfaction of sexual desire a duty to the Communist cause and, indeed, a deed of political and military importance and a contribution to the final 'victory of the people'. This piece of propaganda illustrates the dexterity with which the Communists make duty a pleasure and pleasure a duty, and, by offering freedom, loosen conventional, traditional, and religious bonds, and bring their youthful readers under the spiritual and physical domination of the Party. The document is also characteristic in so far as it is written in a rather involved and pompous style. The Communists do not make the mistake of treating children as though they are children. They address them in a language which makes them feel the equals of their elders and, while clear enough for its purpose, impresses them with its seriousness by a certain elevation and occasional obscurity of language, and gives them something to think about and to discuss with others. The text of the document is as follows:

'With regard to problems affecting the erotic union of the two sexes, it is, of course, a natural and unavoidable function which cannot be held back by the stupid superstitions of the bourgeoisie and of the hypocritical townfolk. This uncontrollable impulse, like natural happiness, cannot be arrested without causing harm to the general nervous and mental system which is called the human entity. Sexual intercourse is a duty to the human organism and every girl-comrade whose body satisfies it, is happy and goes against the superstitions of the black reactionaries.¹

¹ Precept and practice of this nature are not confined to Greece. *The Tablet* wrote, on the 27th of November, 1948, that it had received information 'not very suitable for recording in print, of the manner in which the Communists in Hungary, having "nationalised" the schools, are using them in furtherance of their vile attempt to demoralise and degrade the children of the coming generation, in order by this means to reduce the country more effectively as time goes on. Readers may remember the article in which Deszo Sulyok, on June 12th, told something of the manner in which promiscuous sexual intercourse among adolescents is encouraged. We have a good deal of information about how this bestial policy is being pursued in Poland also.'

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'To the warrior of ELAS, whose sexual desire grows stronger up in the mountains, who must have a clear head for the fight and gain complete control over his nervous and mental constitution, each girl-comrade and (female) fellow fighter must give herself and allow full physical action to take its course, so that the war can be won and democracy can prevail.

'Forward, therefore, and give all for the struggle. Long live EPON.'

Boys in their teens who are kidnapped and taken to the mountain strongholds so that they may serve in the ranks of the democratic army, are first of all 'emancipated' from 'bourgeois' and 'reactionary' 'prejudices' and 'superstitions'. A part of their training is effected according to the principles contained in this document. They are often made to share the beds of kidnapped women who have already been 'emancipated' by their male captors.

CHAPTER FIVE

MASSACRES AND ABDUCTIONS

FACTIOUS men bent on power will profess to want power not for themselves but for 'the people'. All the tyrannies of our day are ostensibly exercised on behalf of 'the people' and all the oppressors masquerade as liberators. Seditious conspiracies against the liberties of the people call themselves patriotic movements of national liberation. The directors of these conspiracies meet in 'Committees of National Liberation'. In all countries under Communist domination there are but two classes—the oppressors and the oppressed. The Governments of such countries pursue one purpose above all—to exterminate democracy, to keep it exterminated, and to spread the work of extermination to neighbouring countries. Such Governments invariably call themselves 'democratic'. Being universally detested by their unhappy subjects, they call themselves 'popular' or 'people's governments'. Whenever a movement or a faction calls itself 'popular', or 'democratic', or a movement for 'freedom', we shall, more often than not, be right in suspecting a sinister purpose.

There is no Communist occupation of Greece, or of any part of Greece, as there was a German occupation. But there is a Communist infestation. The indeterminate and shifting strongholds from which this infestation radiates, visiting the countryside with massacre, pillage, and arson, are collectively called *Free Greece* by the Communists. The central executive committee, or the *Politbureau* of the Greek Communist Party, which is to be tyrant over all Greece when

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Greek democracy has been destroyed, calls itself the *Democratic Government*. The armed forces which are engaged in the attempt to suppress Greek democracy are called the *Democratic Army*. In Great Britain there is a *League for Greek Democracy*. Its purpose is to gather all the support it can for the would-be destroyers of Greek democracy.

Revolutionary factions will concentrate on certain positions which they mean to capture so that they shall be turned into operational bases for the exercise and perpetration of their own power. The German National Socialists, with sure and simple strategic insight, concentrated their attack on the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and Reichsministerium of War, for, holding these, they would control the Prussian police and the German army. It may be that the positions needed by a revolutionary faction for the exercise of power do not exist as yet. In that case, they must be invented. All free institutions must be turned into positions for the exercise of that power which is to destroy freedom.

To the peasantry, who make up the greater part of the populations between the Baltic and the Aegean, to be free means above all else to own land. If a peasant has a little land of his own, his life may be one of hardest toil and of great insecurity, but he not only *has* something that is his own and his children's, he also *is* something and his children will be something. He is not only something, he is somebody—he is *himself* and, by virtue of owning a little land, an important, even if modest, self.

The land-hunger of the eastern European peasantry is not merely materialistic. It is the craving to be free, free to have something, to do something and to be somebody. Throughout the vast region between the Baltic and the Aegean, land-reform was carried out in degrees that varied from country

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to country. The power of the landed gentry declined as the power of the bureaucracy rose. There was oppression in some of these countries between the two wars, though in none was the oppression comparable with that of the new Communist tyrannies. In none, not even in Hungary, were the landowners the oppressors. Where there was oppression, the bureaucracy was the oppressor. Today, the Communist bureaucracy wields absolute power. It is the legislature and the executive in one, it is unrestrained by natural law. It is exercised by men who owe allegiance to a supra-national idea embodied in an alien and hostile State. Its methods are those of the most terrible coercive system ever known.

If a modern revolutionary faction wants something to which it has no title, it must invent a title. Claiming that it represents the people and that the people have a title to everything, it will take everything, ostensibly on behalf of the people, but in reality for itself.

Those who are in possession are represented as having no 'right' to be so, as exploiters, oppressors, servers of selfish or 'sectional' interests, and, in any case, 'enemies of the people'. They are the 'Kulaks', the 'big landowners', the 'Junkers', or 'Boyars', or, in urban life, the 'big bankers', the 'industrial magnates', the 'steel masters', or the 'capitalists' generally. All 'enemies of the people' can be conveniently classified under the heading of 'reactionaries', or, better still, of 'Fascists'. If they are in any way associated with Powers that are not under Communist domination, they are 'collaborators'. All such Powers are 'imperialistic', 'reactionary' or 'Fascist' Powers. Their leaders or spokesmen are 'warmongers'. It matters little if those categories correspond with any recognisable reality. What matters is that they

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correspond with certain fixed presuppositions. If they do correspond with a recognisable reality, however slight or fleeting, so much the better, for propaganda will be the more effective if it contains a few truths that are capable of verification. Communist propaganda, in particular, lives on the past, on what was once true, or partly true, on the demand for reforms carried out long ago, on wrongs already righted. Relics of what was once true, or at least not wholly untrue, reinforce the concrete that makes up the massive and symmetrical edifice of Communist mythology.

There have been revolutionary factions that righted real wrongs. There have been genuine movements of liberation. Indubitable oppressors have been overthrown and 'the people' have had their periods of relative freedom. These things have happened and may happen again. But every violent revolution contains the menace of violence that persists after the end it was meant to accomplish has been achieved. Political violence has an extraordinary fascination that is readily enhanced by the insignia of romance, heroism, and glory. It is also the simple and direct means to power and ever more power. It will only be relinquished by men of exceptional virtue. It appeals, in particular, to men of narrow and superficial spirit who have nothing to commend them except the crafty determination of the ambitious, for it establishes prerogatives in times of disorder and perplexity, and affords great advantages to men of little scruple and moderate ability, seeing that of all methods of government, tyranny is the easiest and democracy the hardest. It is one of the objections to democracy that it is so hard to sustain and so vulnerable to internal and external enemies. Bismarck is said to have remarked that 'any idiot can be a military dictator'. That is true enough, but to be a tyrant in

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the modern sense and, therefore, to rule through the bureaucracy and the secret police as well as through the army, craft and determination are needed. Depth and width of spirit, a sense of justice and love of the people are not only superfluous but fatal.

When a revolutionary faction aspires to dominate not only its own country, but the world, it must find formulas of universal application, although it may allow slight variations from country to country. As the purpose of the Parties that make up the Communist International is the same throughout the world, namely to dominate the people under the pretence of liberating them and, therefore, to divide mankind as they are dividing the people already under the domination, into oppressors and oppressed, their universal formulas are but two, or variations of two: the 'people' and the 'enemies of the people'.

It may happen that the so-called 'enemies of the people' are in truth the enemies of the people. But in that case, the enemy is but a rival for domination over the people. With him it may be possible to compound, as Stalin compounded with Hitler. But it is not possible to compound with true friends of the people. All popular men must be destroyed, especially if they have been popular as true liberators. None are considered more dangerous by the Communists than those who love the people and are loved in return, like Maniu, the aged leader of the Rumanian peasantry, who perished in a Communist prison. In Greece, it is the true friends of the people who are the specific objects of the massacres and executions.

In countries like Poland and Hungary where big estates survive, it is politic to distribute them amongst the people rather than to transfer them directly to the control of the

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victorious faction, which has, in the meantime, become the Communist State. It is politic, also, to distribute the land in small parcels, so that the holder shall be unable to provide for his own needs from what is his own, and so be dependent on the State. The abolition of large holdings in favour of small, the distribution of the land amongst the people—this act of ostensible liberation and justice is but the means for establishing the complete domination of the State over the most individualistic and intractable of the people, namely the peasants. The big estates are broken up so that one big estate shall be created. Local monopolies in land are abolished, so that all the land becomes the monopoly of the State in the form of 'collectivised' farms under the tyrannical control of the centralised bureaucracy.

It is necessary for a revolutionary faction to be always at war, for to make war is easier than to make peace and to keep the peace. The vocabulary of the Communists abounds in military terms. Although the present Russian State was established thirty years ago, it is still in a state of internal war. Indeed, internal war pervades everything, and we hear not only of war against spies, against the 'agents of imperialism', and against the 'relics of the bourgeoisie', but also of war on the 'scientific front', the 'philosophical front', the 'musical front', and so on. 'Ideological war' is waged the whole time, and the whole time 'ideological war' is translated into violence—into arrests, purges, proscriptions, deportations, and those public denunciations which, more often than not, mean the total, irretrievable ruin and dishonour of the victims.

When one enemy is destroyed, another has to be invented, for in the perfectionist State, something is always amiss because perfection is unattainable in this world. But what is

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amiss cannot be attributed to any error rooted in orthodox doctrine or even in human nature which, according to that doctrine, is intrinsically good. An enemy must, therefore, be found. If he cannot be found, he must be invented together with the appropriate crimes. Hitler and his companions showed great ingenuity in this respect. Apart from the Jews, whom Hitler persecuted with deep conviction and not merely because it served his policy, speculators, degenerates, priests, nuns, Freemasons, homosexuals, and so on, were treated as enemies of the State and credited with various crimes.

Gisevius, in his masterly work, *To the Bitter End*, writes that

'The campaign against the Freemasons was the fact of the moment and the Gestapo men had laid it on by assembling symbols and ritualistic books from the lodges they had raided. Since I have never been a Freemason, I was unable to tell which of the objects on exhibition were plain forgeries and which, if any, were authentic. In any case, no charnel-house could have made a more gruesome impression than this jumble of weird sorcerer's materials. According to Heydrich's interpretation the black arts of the darkest Dark Ages had been nothing but sweetness and light by comparison with present-day Freemasonry.'¹

If it be asked what purpose could the persecution of Freemasons serve, the answer is that every category of alleged evil increases the power of the police because it enlarges the number of real or imaginary suspects. Anyone remotely connected with Freemasonry comes within the scope of the terror.

Homosexuality was construed as a political offence because

'a hunt for homosexuals offered the Gestapo tremendous new possibilities of extending its system of protective custody.

¹ *To the Bitter End*, p. 194.

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Someone who was neither a Jew nor a Marxist nor a Bolshevik, who had not even stolen a silver spoon or been reckless about his telephone conversations, could always be accused of a violation of Paragraph 175.¹

Such methods have the additional value that they open the doors wider to the tribe of spies and informers and offer increased opportunities of blackmail. Because modern tyrannies profess puritanism, they need corruption. They rule by fear, and, by augmenting the categories of offenders, intensify fear, even amongst the completely innocent, for it is necessary that all should be under the terror and that none should be able to escape persecution merely by avoiding breaches of the law. It opens ever new sources both of information and of revenue, for in a well-organised terroristic system, blackmailing spies and agents will not be allowed more than a small share of the sums extorted from their victims. The greater share must help to assuage the exorbitant financial needs of the tyrannical bureaucracy.

For the Communist International, 'permanent revolution' is not only a doctrine, it is also a pragmatic necessity. To condone Communism as some do, on the grounds that the means justify the end, is a sophistry in any case. But it is also irrelevant, for the means are the end. An end in the sense of a final achievement, does not, and cannot exist. That is the reason why the Communist revolution cannot stop. Even if the Kremlin were master of the whole world, there would still be an inexhaustible store of 'fronts' to fight on and of 'traitors' to destroy. Force

'may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 229. Paragraph 175 of the German Penal Code relates to homosexual offences.

necessity of subduing again: and a nation is not governed, which is perpetually to be conquered.’¹

Violent revolution will not stop unless it be stopped. The Russian State, which is but violent revolution organised and perpetuated, cannot desist from war, whether internal or external. At home it must continue to invent new enemies until a genuine enemy strike it down. Abroad it will pursue its conquests whenever and wherever it does not encounter superior strength. If it is checked, it will claim to be a victim of aggression and prepare new conquests on the plan of preparing for self-defence. It is like a stream of lava, flowing in all directions, destroying or overflowing weak or small obstacles, seeping through those that are porous, and halting only at those that are massive, well-constructed and well-defended—but mounting up, so that some day it may overflow these also.

Banks and industries are objects of conquest not because they *are* ‘strongholds’ or ‘citadels’ of exploiters or oppressors, but because they are to *become* such. The ‘capitalists’ are to be overthrown, not so that the people may be liberated but that they may be dominated. The landowners and bankers are to be expropriated, not so that ‘the people’ shall no longer be exploited, but so that they shall be exploited by their new masters.

Even in our own rather mild, but not, therefore, negligible, revolution we can perceive these phenomena. It would seem that all critics with a just claim to objectivity and expert knowledge condemn the nationalisation of steel as prejudicial both to the interests of the nation and of the industry itself. And whoever has read the debates on the Iron and Steel Bill in the House of Commons cannot fail to

¹ Edmund Burke, *Speech on Conciliation with America*.

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be impressed by the inability of its supporters to refute the arguments of the Opposition. But while arguments have their importance, they do not decide wars or revolutions: not even our own revolution. The Socialists do not seriously attempt to meet the arguments of the Opposition, in fact, they do not argue at all, and there is little reason why they should, though some reason why they should appear to do so. They do not argue, but expound doctrine. We are told that they want the nationalisation of iron and steel for 'doctrinal reasons', as indeed they do! They want Socialism—and is not Socialism a doctrine? And they want permanent power, because only through permanent power can the doctrine permanently prevail. They want doctrine to prevail, because only then can they achieve permanent power. Is power the means and doctrine the end, or the reverse? The answer is that the means and end are one and that there is no end, unless those who want neither power nor doctrine, but peace, justice, proportion and balance, combine to bring the fatal organic association of doctrine and power to an end.

No evidence has been disclosed to show that the worker in the nationalised steel mill or foundry will have more freedom, higher pay, less labour than he has today, that the State will be a better manager than the present owners who are even now adequately supervised by the State, and that the industry will produce more and better steel. But if somebody denies something because it will give him power, and has convinced himself and others that it is in the interest of all that he should have power, he cannot be convinced to the contrary if his desire is strong enough and his conviction has been fortified by doctrine.

Those in pursuit of power, and the propagandists working

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with them and for them, must conceal the purpose of their pursuit. They will do so by attributing illicit possession of power to others and by representing the positions held by those others as the strongholds or citadels of an enemy, the enemy of 'the people'.

Sir Stafford Cripps declared, in the debate on the Iron and Steel Bill:

'Is there some particular right in the owner of this class of property to have his property preserved and with it the power of control over the industrial life of the whole country? I answer that question without any hesitation by saying that, this challenge having been put forward by private interests, it is essential that democracy shall assert its rights, as otherwise it must acknowledge for all time that it cannot touch these *citadels of power*, and that it is not the electorate but the owners of industrial property who shall determine the economic policies of the country.'¹

Those professing to abjure violence but wanting what is unattainable without violence, will readily insinuate that, because what they want is just, and for the good of all, violence will be inevitable if what they want is not freely granted.

When the Communists speak of violence, they mean violence under their own leadership. Socialists are, as a rule, less explicit, but the implication is that 'the people' will act of their own accord and take by force what has been denied to them, although it is theirs by right. 'The people', if they act at all, will have been led or incited by the Communists or Socialists or both. But it is a serviceable ruse to threaten action 'by the people'. It helps to conceal the reality of the intended usurpation.

¹ House of Commons, 16th of Nov., 1948 (*italics my own*).

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Sir Stafford Cripps said, in the same debate, that the 'only alternative' to the Iron and Steel Bill

'would be to show that such a change can only be brought about by other and violent means.'

These words were greeted with cheers from the Government benches.

Sir Stafford continued:

'It is because we are preventing that [i.e. "other and violent means"] that Socialism is the true barrier against Communism.'

Our revolution, although ostentatiously peaceful, is nevertheless accompanied by threats of violence. The prospective responsibility for the use of violence is assigned either to the Communists or to 'the people', according to the exigencies of Socialist propaganda.

Many share Sir Stafford's belief that moderate Socialism is a defence against Communism. Experience does not prove so. Although supported by organised urban labour, the Socialist Parties of eastern and central Europe have been less able to withstand the ascendancy of the Communist absolutism than the peasants have. The Christian religion has shown powers of resistance far exceeding those of any political opposition.

Industrial workmen have achieved great power through their trade unions and exercise greater influence on what Sir Stafford Cripps calls 'the economic policies of the country' than the 'steel masters'. But, by the very organisation they have created, they are exposed to destruction by the tyrannical State. The trade unions, as they arose, strengthened democracy because they established a balance of power

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within the democratic order. But they have begun to overturn that balance and are becoming a threat to that order while forfeiting the power to defend it if it is seriously threatened by the despotism. There is nothing so powerful in a democracy as the organised masses—so powerful, that they bring democracy itself to an end. But the masses who choose a master to do their will become the servants of his will.

The German Social Democratic Party and the trade unions, which were amongst the wealthiest and best organised in the world, were helpless once Hitler was in power. And the millions of men and women who voted for him, lost the decisive power which the franchise conferred when their votes had made him the master of them all.

A bureaucratic absolutism need fear no insubordination amongst its bureaucrats. Nothing is so helpless against bureaucracy as bureaucracy. A dictatorship that is sufficiently resolute can close factories, it can stop wages, it can reduce the workers to helpless indigence. No instrument of seduction or of coercion is comparable with the ration card. A new privileged class can be created solely by preferential rationing. Ration cards need only be withdrawn, from individuals or from whole categories of individuals, and there is nothing the victims can do but submit. None will be as helpless as the industrial workers. There is nothing so easy for a modern tyranny as to take over a factory. And the bigger the factory, the more helpless the workers.

Strikes are most successful in democracies, for they affect the community, not the State. Under bureaucratic absolutism, the community is of no account. The middle class may be dispersed, the aristocracy may be submerged. The labouring class will remain, but it will not be the master. The factories will not be 'run by the workers', the estates will

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not be 'owned by the peasants', the government will not be a government of, by, or for the people.

The voice of the peasantry is heard in eastern Europe, and the voice of the churches, and, at times, the voice of some heroic individual. But the voice of organised labour, which for more than a generation has fought for freedom, equality, and well-being, is silent. In the villages there is some resistance still, and of the former landless peasantry some have become smallholders. It is a gain that is meant as a stage on the way to servitude. But it may outlast the Communist domination if deliverance be not long delayed. But organised labour has gained nothing—and has lost almost everything.

Revolution, like war, 'is a matter of positions'. In a peaceful revolution, there is a manœuvring for position, but the opponent, seeing himself out-manœuvred and regarding the consequences of resistance as more injurious than those of retreat or capitulation, will retreat or capitulate, either because he is poor spirited or public spirited or both.

Every revolution will tend—and the more violent the revolution the stronger the tendency—to achieve domination while professing to strive for justice and equality. With every revolutionary success, the internal restraints on this tendency will weaken. The need for external restraints will grow while the possibilities of exercising them will diminish. A revolution that wins initial strategic positions and is able to hold them rarely, if ever, fails.

A revolution must command a following large enough to call itself, with some plausibility, 'the people', though it will never be 'the people'. It must, however, promote a movement amongst 'the people' which by its energy, singleness of purpose, and its vociferation overwhelms, or at least reduces to futility and silence, other movements amongst 'the people'.

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It must not only capture certain strategic positions, it must also destroy its opponents. That is to say, it must deprive them of their ascendancy both in the realm of politics and of economics or, if they hold the balance, of that hold itself. General revolution can only succeed if it can create a general disequilibrium.

Once the revolution has succeeded, it must prepare for defence both against reforms that might restore the balance and against counter-revolution which might either restore the balance or, with greater likelihood (intrinsically revolution and counter-revolution being the same) establish a new domination. The struggle between a revolution and a counter-revolution is but a struggle between an actual and a prospective tyranny.

The revolution must not only perpetuate the terror as an instrument of coercion, it must also continually replenish the ranks of its supporters who, although they will not be 'the people', or even a majority of the people, for terrorism makes enemies of many and general terrorism makes enemies of all except those who exercise it and who owe their domination, or the advantages of that domination, to it. For that reason, it must, by force and by propaganda, be able plausibly to pretend that it is identical with 'the people' or that it represents the 'will of the people'. This it can do successfully if it is the only embodied or organised 'will' in the State and has destroyed or broken all those innumerable and diversified 'wills' that make up 'the will of the people' which, in fact, can never be one 'will'. For this purpose, the revolution must win support amongst the younger generation. Such support is not hard to win in times when traditional beliefs are feeble, when legitimate authority is not respected, when illegitimate authority exercises a particular fascination, when

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God is neither loved nor feared, when the young, unfortified by allegiance to eternal truths, are gullible and, when gulled, inclined to zealotry.

Although revolution may be reduced to a few simple principles, it is not a simple process. The great revolutions of history have been exceedingly complicated. They have had their successes and reverses before they had their final victories. None have developed as they were planned, few have achieved what their originators meant them to achieve. Some have achieved what their originators would have suppressed with all the power at their disposal. Even the Russian revolution, which is still in progress and doctrinally the most consistent of all, is not promoting the social order conceived by its originators. Violent revolution sets a general current in rapid and turbulent motion, a current in which the principles not only of the existing social order, but of the revolution itself, are shifted or reversed.

A Sedition, however, does not set a general current in motion, it does not affect the structure of society. It is not a revolution, though it may become one if it is successful, whether its original purpose was revolutionary or not.

The original and present purpose of the Greek Sedition is revolution. It became a revolution in December 1944. The massacres perpetrated in that month were its most comprehensive revolutionary action. The revolution was defeated in the Battle of Athens when it was about to achieve final success. Thereupon it ceased to be a revolution and split into a constitutional opposition and a treasonable conspiracy. It ceased to be constitutional as the conspiracy gathered force and scope. It endeavoured to become a revolution once again, but failed to be more than a Sedition.

It remains a Sedition, but one that has revolutionary

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aspects and uses revolutionary methods. Revolutionary in purpose and impulse, it has failed to revolutionise. Greek society is not being transformed in characteristic revolutionary fashion. There does not exist in Greece what Lenin called a 'revolutionary' situation. The supporters of the Sedition are limited to the Communist Party and to those it has pressed into its service. The 'masses' are not in a state of upheaval. Industrial labour, although many workmen are Communistic in their sympathies, has undertaken no organised actions comparable with those undertaken by industrial labour under the leadership of the French Communist Party. The condition of Greece is far less 'revolutionary' than the condition of France, as I have pointed out in the first chapter.

Between the Communists and the nation, there is, today, nothing left. There is no middle way, no possibility of reconciliation. If the State were to attempt appeasement, it would be clear to all that the way to capitulation had been taken. In some villages visited by massacre and destruction there is such despair that any change would be welcome if only it would bring peace, no matter under what manner of government. But the nation as a whole is aware that peace with the Communists, whether by immediate capitulation or gradual capitulation through compromise, will once more bring upon Greece what she endured in December 1944, will extend the massacres from the afflicted villages to the towns and to the villages not afflicted hitherto, that it will drive her to direr penury, for, even if Russia and the northern neighbours were willing, they could not replace the aid Greece receives from America, and that it will terminate more than a hundred years of national independence.

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The Greek situation is, therefore, static, despite the varying fortunes of the war. What the Communists call the 'war of liberation' or the 'people's revolution' is known for what it is—a treasonable Sedition sustained by the external enemy, not an indigenous revolution, a foreign war (even if waged by Greeks against Greeks) and not a domestic or social conflict. The question is not: Shall Greece be progressive or unprogressive, royalist or republican, conservative, liberal, or socialist? It is not: Shall there be any radical, political, constitutional, or economic reforms, or any alteration in the social order? The question is: Shall Greece survive?

The challenge of authentic revolution is never to the country of that revolution. Revolution did not challenge France in 1789, Russia in 1917, Germany in 1933, but the order existing in each country. The challenge to Greece is not to the Greek order but to Greece. The Communists, it is true, strike at that order—because, in doing so, they strike at Greece. If it were sure that Greece will survive as an independent country, the Sedition would be pointless and would at once be abandoned by its foreign supporters. Even the prospect of a Communist Greece would make it pointless if a Communist Greece could be an independent Greece as, under Muscovite Communism, it could not be. Because Russia and her associates have established a complete monopoly of Communism, no country, today, can be both Communist and independent.

But although the Greek Sedition is not revolutionary, we must study it in the light of revolutionary principles. It employs revolutionary methods, though without achieving a revolutionary effect. It has created a simulacrum, as it were, of revolution. This simulacrum is so close to the

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realities of the purge and the terror, that it has a kind of super-reality, as of some nightmare that pursues the sleeper even when he has been long awake. This nightmare is hardly distinguishable from the reality. It is sustained and perpetuated by propaganda.

Every authentic revolution is constructive as well as destructive—constructive of the new, which may be but the old in a new form, and destructive of the old, which may be new and condemned as old only because it is an obstacle in the way of the revolution. There is something reactionary in every revolution. It will in its progress look backward as well as forward and attack wrongs that have been righted, or abuses that were long ago removed by reform but rankle in the memory of men (past abuses are often felt more acutely, or can be made to feel so by propaganda, than present abuses).

The Greek Sedition is purely destructive. If it is successful that is to say, if it breaks the will of the Greek people, it will, of course, become constructive. It will complete the destruction of the existing order and of all the loyalties upon which the Greek order is founded, and construct the Communist State. In that sense it will become a revolution, although not an indigenous revolution, a revolution imposed 'from above' and 'from outside' by foreign Powers and their Greek agents, not a revolution of the Greek people, not a revolution 'from below' and 'from within'.

The Sedition has failed to 'rouse the masses'. It has failed to capture and hold one town. It has failed to occupy any Greek territory, however small, that would enable it to set up an administration exercising authority even in a restricted area. It has redoubts and strongholds in the mountains. From these it infests the country. It is an infestation,

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not an occupation. The *Democratic Government*, as it calls itself, is the central executive committee, the *Politbureau*, of the Greek Communist Party and no more. It has no capital, no seat. It is a fugitive in the country it professes to rule and represent.

Every successful revolution will, in a brief space of time, destroy the ruling class by massacres, executions, purges, or by expropriation, and replace it by a new ruling class. This is the essential, though not always the avowed, purpose of revolution. The work of destruction and of construction (or replacement) go hand in hand. In Greece there is no revolutionary construction, but only destruction. And the chief destructive agency is massacre.

The massacres were most extensive in December 1944. They were resumed in November 1946 when the Communists raided the village of Mandalo and exterminated 23 persons, of whom twelve were children aged from 3 to 15. One family of eleven persons was exterminated with the exception of the father of the younger children. His pregnant wife, Despina Vassiliadou, was disembowelled. Some of the victims were shot down. Others were killed with knives and hatchets.

Between the massacres in December 1944 and the massacre at Mandalo, there were many murders by Communists and retaliatory murders by Loyalists. Retaliatory murders ceased in 1947 as the action against the Communists came wholly within the competence of the State. There was but one notable exception, the massacre perpetrated by Loyalists in the spring of 1948. A motorised column of Constabulary struck a mine between Tripoli and Sparta. The commanding officer was wounded so severely that he was left for dead. Four constables were also wounded.

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The mines are generally laid at night by the *Aftodmyna* or its agents who are sometimes women or even children. This minelaying has aroused greater hatred of the Communists in the Greek army and Constabulary than the fighting.

In 1947, the gaol in Sparta was raided by armed Communists who liberated all the Communist prisoners. The men of the motorised column decided to avenge their commander. They mutinied and, entering Sparta, overpowered the prison guards, and massacred fifty-nine Communist prisoners. The governor of the prison, a major of the regular army, was killed while defending the prisoners. One of the guards was wounded. Reinforcements arrived and the mutineers were arrested and committed for trial by court-martial.

Massacres by the Communists were frequent during that same year and have grown more frequent still. They are characterised by the same savagery as the earlier massacres. Neither women nor children are spared. In February 1948, the Communists raided a camp of refugees in the region of Melitaia and abducted forty-five persons of whom eight were women and six children. The victims were deprived of their footwear, they were tied together with pieces of wire, and marched through the snow to a spot between Neokhorion and Anavra. The Communists accused them of belonging to 'nationalist' families, members of which were serving in the Greek regular army. Two of the prisoners succeeded in escaping. The others were massacred. The bodies were left in a mutilated condition, but whether the mutilations had been inflicted before death or after is uncertain. This incident was not reported in the Greek press. Most of the massacres perpetrated in Greece remain unknown to the outside world. Even in Greece there are many

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that never come to be known more than locally. On the other hand, the mutiny on the road to Sparta and the raid on the prison were fully reported in a statement issued by the Ministry of the Interior and published in all Greek newspapers.

Murders and massacres by Communists have become such a commonplace of Greek life that they arouse little attention. They are accepted with a kind of fatalism. In every village the peasants know that if there are Communist bands in the mountains a few miles away, and no garrison is near, a massacre can be expected at any time. And every villager knows who the principal victims will be—that is to say, those, above all, who have shown outstanding loyalty and strength of character, including those who risked their lives in saving British sailors, soldiers, and airmen from the Germans during the occupation.

The primary purpose of the massacres is the extermination of the *élite*. Their secondary purpose is economic. It is not the fighting so much as the massacres which are emptying the villages, leaving the fields desolate, and creating a vast multitude of refugees who, themselves completely destitute, are so heavy a financial burden on the impoverished State.

Evidence of the massacres is abundant, but not always obtainable, save by diligent personal enquiry. Some tragedy, perpetrated in a village, which before the war would have resounded through the civilised world, will, today, receive only brief mention in the Athenian press, or perhaps no mention at all. The evidence collected by the Greek authorities is inevitably incomplete. Whoever makes an independent enquiry in remote regions, or has occasion to converse with reliable informants, will learn of terrible deeds which have never been officially recorded. In December, 1948, the

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Greek Ministry of the Interior issued a statement that 147 persons had been murdered by the Communists during the first half of that year. This figure represents the number notified, after official enquiry, to the Ministry. But the real total is unknown. I was myself able to gather the names of 56 women who had been murdered by the Communists during the first three months of that year. Evidence gathered over a period of four years would show that the number of men who have been murdered is many times the number of women. Many massacres are only heard of from the mouths of eyewitnesses by chance and long after the event. The figure 147 is, therefore, far from indicating the total number of victims during that period.

The peasants talk little about the massacres, though when they do, they speak with sobriety, and with a kind of fatalism, as of something quite usual—as indeed it has become. They are often vague about dates, for in the poorer villages few, if any, have calendars. The enquirer will often hear of a massacre because it has been mentioned casually. He will have to find out the details for himself. If he can! For the difficulties of transport over wretched roads, or mule-tracks upon the mountain-slopes, and amid such insecurity that extensive regions can be reached only with an armed escort, if at all, will, more often than not, make his task impossible. And in the regions thickly infested by the Communists, no one, except an occasional fugitive, can judge the extent of the massacres which, in such regions, usually take the form of executions ordered by the ‘People’s Courts’.

Beyond the accessible field of accurate research, there is a realm of twilight merging in darkness that defies enquiry, whether private or official. The number of persons known to have been murdered between the beginning of October,

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1944, and the end of April, 1946, is 48,766. The majority of these were murdered in December, 1944. Unofficial estimates of the number of those murdered during the last four years differ widely. A total of one hundred thousand does not seem an improbable figure.

Of the many thousands of men, women, and children who have been abducted, only the few who have escaped or have been rescued have ever been heard of again. Many have been murdered—but how many, none, not even their captors, can tell.

A record of the massacres based on available evidence would fill a large volume. It would offer a most painful and wearisome succession of much the same horrors to readers who have heard so much these last ten or fifteen years that they cannot hear any more; 'the heart is sick because of murderers'.

The massacres are often accompanied by mutilations. It is a common practice of the Communists to gouge out one of the victim's eyes. Disembowelings are fairly frequent. Men and children have been tied to trees and have then been slashed with knives. A method of torture practised upon young women is ^{to} to make them kneel before the wooden chest in which the Greek peasant keeps the linen and to crush their breasts between the edge of the chest and the heavy lid. A slow death by gradual mutilation, followed by the excision and exposure of vital organs such as the heart or liver, is sometimes practised upon men who, because of their courage and resolution in rallying terrorised villagers, have incurred the special enmity of the Communists.¹ It

¹ A peasant from a village near Kalamata gave me an account of a deed of this kind. The victim was his own son, who, at the approach of a Communist band, was urged to escape or hide. But he refused, although he knew that a quick death was the best he could hope for.

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would seem that regular soldiers of non-commissioned rank captured by the *Democratic Army* are not ill-treated unless there is a special reason. They are often released in the hope that they will tell of fair treatment and induce fellow-soldiers to desert when they have rejoined their units. Captured officers are retained, sometimes as hostages, sometimes for execution. It is unlikely that any have survived.¹ Constables captured by Communists are, it would seem, habitually done to death. Many have been found with eyes gouged out.

News of capital sentences passed by Greek courts is more frequent in the British and American press than news of massacres perpetrated by the Communists, for the trials are public and the sentences are published in the Greek press. The Communists and their supporters promote the maximum publicity for these trials, with abundant falsification of detail, in Great Britain, the United States, France, and other countries, so that readers everywhere who are but rarely and scantily informed of lawless atrocities perpetrated on men, women and children, are constantly reminded of sentences passed upon men who are the perpetrators, or accomplices. During the months of November

¹ The *Eleftheri Ellada* sometimes broadcasts the names of captured Greek officers who have been tried and sentenced to death, but are to be reprieved if the Greek Government will reprieve men sentenced to death by the Greek courts. On the 4th April, 1948, for example, *Eleftheri Ellada* transmitted the following announcement:

'GHQ of the Greek Democratic Army announces that the Peloponnesian Court Martial has sentenced to death the following officers of the reserve of the Monarchofascist Army: Aristotle Lambridis, Alexander Dimopoulos, and Pater Kouzounis, for rendering military assistance to the imperialists [i.e. Great Britain and the United States] who are the enemies of the country and of peace, assistance directed against our national independence and punishable under art. 10, act. 9, 1948. The President of the Provisional Democratic Government has ordered the provisional suspension of the sentences of execution and will set the condemned men free, provided the Athens Government reprieves three fighters of the *Democratic Army* who have been captured and sentenced to death.'

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and December, 1948, the *Daily Worker* hardly let a day pass without referring to the same capital sentences passed by Greek courts and publicising protests by various individuals and organisations. The *Daily Worker* cannot be expected to publicise the massacres. Nor can it be expected of journals like *The New Statesman and Nation*. But when journals like *The Times*, *Daily Telegraph*, and others are compelled, not through any fault of their own, but by circumstance, to publicise all the more important trials that are held, but only a fraction of the massacres that are perpetrated, it is natural that even a dispassionate public should receive a distorted impression of the Greek reality.

It is part of the astute practice of the Communists and the *Fellow Travellers* to pretend that they are but endeavouring to promote peace and reconciliation in Greece. The British and American public has, by now, learnt enough about the nature of Communism from events in Malaya, eastern Europe, Germany, and elsewhere, to have become sceptical about the possibility, or, for that matter, the desirability, of compounding with the Communists. But the long, implacable and ill-understood civil war in Greece, and the success with which a world-wide propaganda has represented the Greek State as *reactionary*, the paucity of information about the massacres together with comprehensive information about the sentences passed by the Greek courts, and the cumulative effect of terms like 'democratic', 'popular' and 'the people'—all these give plausibility to the case for reconciliation between two 'extremes', as they appear to be. The truth, however, is that there is only one 'extreme', namely the Communist Party.

Because of the disequilibrium (increased by propaganda) between the publicity given to the massacres on the one hand

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and on the proceedings against Communists in the Greek courts on the other, and because of the constant protests and petitions emanating from Great Britain and the United States and conferring a halo, as it were, on the Sedition, many innocent men, women, and children have had to suffer death or worse than death. For if the massacres are not even 'bad propaganda', if even the decent and more critical Western world does not turn against them, but only against those who would suppress them, if the perpetrators and their connivers are not condemned by Western opinion but receive sympathetic support when they are committed for trial, the massacres and all the other abominations can be perpetrated with the greater impunity. If the murderer of an entire family, knowing that his chances of being caught are small in any case, also knows that a dozen British and American politicians and publicists (whose importance he is, of course, led to overrate) will intercede on his behalf if he is caught, so that even if he is condemned, he will be adorned with a martyr's crown, how feeble are the reasons why he should desist? And if he wishes to add disembowelling and mutilation to massacre, what should induce him to refrain?¹ The volume of support accorded to murderers and incendiaries in Greece by a well-meaning public on both sides of the Atlantic, has greatly reduced the deterrent force of the law. The Greek peasantry have had to pay the price.

Although indiscriminate massacre helps to empty the

¹ A resolution sponsored by the *Union of Democratic Control* was signed by more than sixty Members of Parliament in November, 1948. It was addressed to Mr Attlee and urged mediation in Greece, and negotiation with those 'able and willing to reconcile the forces in conflict'. Amongst the signatories were: Sir Richard Acland, Mr R. H. S. Crossman, Mr Tom Driberg, Mr Maurice Edelman, Mrs Elizabeth Braddock, Dr L. Haden Guest and Mr T. L. Horabin, Mr H. N. Brailsford, Sir Montagu Burton, Mr Ritchie Calder, Lord Calverley of Bradford, Professor E. R. Dodds, Lord and Lady Marley, and Sir Charles Trevelyan (*Daily Worker*, 1st of December, 1948).

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villages, to increase the multitude of refugees, and to ruin the agriculture of whole regions, it has some disadvantages from the Communist point of view. The *Democratic Army* lives 'on the land' and agriculture and farming must be allowed to survive so that the men can be fed. It is in the interest of the Communists to have at least some willing supporters, especially amongst the younger generation.

All countries under Communist domination are ruled by fear and Communists everywhere are much more concerned with inspiring fear than with inspiring love, and rightly so, from their point of view. Before they have the power to inspire fear, they will solicit popularity. But once they are in power, they become indifferent to popularity, which they cannot in any case retain, and govern by fear. Popularity creates a certain dependence on public opinion. But the more a modern tyranny is hated and feared, the greater its independence. It need not fear public opinion as the medieval despotisms feared it, because with the wireless, the press, and other media of propaganda and with the instruments of irresistible coercion which science has placed at the disposal of tyranny, it can *make* public opinion, that is to say, it can convert what, in free societies, is a fiction, namely the 'will of the people', into a reality. The 'will of the people' under a modern tyranny is nothing other than what the people are made to think, or rather to profess (for their inward thoughts are of little account as long as they remain inward), by a process of intimidation, invigilation, indoctrination, and standardisation. The 'will of the people' is, in fact, the will of the Communist Party, a will imposed upon the people and accepted by them under irresistible duress.

Communists, when they are in power, must beware lest

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they become popular. It is unlikely but not inconceivable that they may become so, upon occasion, for in a world so stricken by fear, conflict, suffering and perplexity as our own, the people may respond warm-heartedly to some seemingly generous reform or rally round the most execrable administration against an external enemy. A wave of popularity may be of some use even to a Communist dictatorship, especially in time of war. But it is not to be tolerated for long, because it tends to promote the dependence of the rulers and ruled. Absolute domination through extreme fear must be reasserted if the dictatorship is to endure. All popular men must be exterminated, lest the people, in their disillusionment and frustration, turn to them for help and comfort. Every man who is loved by the people is a potential friend of the people—and, therefore, a potential foe of the Party.

A Communist dispensation needs the support of no more than a few persons devoted to itself. These must be numerous enough to be effective media of tyrannic power—they must inspire fear amongst the workers in a factory, the employees in an office, the peasants on a collective farm. The more they are feared, the more dependent they are on their masters. But as they are a governing class, they demand certain privileges. If they have been indoctrinated since their youth, they will show a devotion to the Communist idea, and, if the State is the ostensible embodiment of that idea, they will show devotion to that State. In this way the tyrant can rely upon men who will support him in all situations, especially that situation (most dangerous to tyranny) which will arise when love, or at least, some regard or respect, begins to supplant fear in the hearts of the people. It will then be the duty of these men to re-establish the domination of fear.

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Although terrorism, to be effective, must present at least some appearance of indiscrimination, for it is necessary that even those who have no thought of opposition be kept in a state of fear (indeed, none can be allowed to feel safe), there must be some selection. The *élite* must be exterminated systematically while persons who combine adequate servility with ruthlessness and determination must be preserved so that they can become supporters of the present or future State. Besides, if the work of extermination is insufficiently selective, some of the *élite* are bound to escape.

The Greek Communist Party has shown some concern over the excessively unselective character of the massacres which are essential to the execution of its own policy. Communist propaganda itself has destroyed all moral restraints. The voice of conscience has been abolished as a relic of a superstitious age. The great authority of Russia and of the northern neighbours confers unqualified moral support upon the perpetrators of such deeds, while a strong body of opinion in Great Britain and the United States confers implied support by expressing disapproval only when such deeds are punished. It has, therefore, been necessary for the Party itself to impose a certain discrimination. It does not appear to have been very successful in limiting the massacres in the villages to indubitable loyalists and their families. But by the murder of specified persons or of persons belonging to specified categories, a process of selection has been maintained. It is not, of course, admitted that any murders have been, or will be, perpetrated. According to the Communist conception every Communist has been *murdered* who has been tried and executed according to the law, whereas every 'reactionary' or 'Fascist' who is murdered without a trial by Communists, is, according to that same

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conception, rightfully *executed*, either as 'an enemy of the people' or by way of reprisal as a hostage taken from amongst the 'enemies of the people'.

One of the principal Commands of the *Democratic Army* is known under the name of *Rumeli*, an extensive region in central Greece. On the 10th of November, 1947, the Commandant of Rumeli issued an order against indiscriminate murder and theft. But it does not appear to have been obeyed, for on the 12th of December, 1948, the Commandant of Parnassus reissued this order with a special warning:¹

'The chief of Rumeli has often told you not to destroy everything and to kill everyone in the village. You must not take all the funds. But you do the opposite in every case.'

The order gives examples of the kind of thing the men of the *Democratic Army* are asked not to do. These examples, in the form of reports from various units, contain statements in the manner of the 'self-criticism' and of the 'confessions' made by Communists in Russia when they have been reprimanded for deviating from the *Party Line*. Thus, in the village of Kastriotisa, the Communists broke into all the houses and left everything in a state of disorder:

'This spectacle is the opposite of what we ought to do. We respected nothing, neither property, nor lives, nor houses.'

Not that property in the villages belongs to the rightful owners. There is no suggestion that it be respected as such, but only that it be respected as belonging to the *Democratic Army*. While according to the Communist thesis, the massacres and murders are executions, looting and pillage are expropriations.

¹ The original of this document is in my possession.

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According to the order issued by the Commandant of Rumeli, the men of the *Democratic Army*

'are fighting for the people. What we are doing shows that we do not respect the people. You must know that all we find in the villages belongs to the Democratic Army. With what right do our soldiers steal property when it belongs to the Democratic Army?'

Finally, there is an order

'that all combatants and the Political Commissars of the army understand the chief of Rumeli's thesis and carry out our instructions.

Intelligence officers must do all that can be done to secure respect for these instructions.'¹

On the 30th of August, 1947, a secret order was issued by the *Second Bureau* of the General Staff of the *Democratic Army* from headquarters in Parnassus specifying by categories those persons who are to be taken as hostages or to be murdered.

The *Democratic Army* is represented as having displayed exemplary patience and restraint. But these virtues have only 'emboldened the criminals'—that is to say, the Loyalists—to arrest, banish, and execute the true representatives of 'the people'. The *Democratic Army* is reluctantly compelled to take reprisals for 'this orgy of extermination' and this 'criminal mania of the Monarchofascist murderers'. This, indeed, is its duty to 'the people':

'That is why we have decided to assume the policy of reprisals as from today. Perhaps this new policy will induce these scoundrels to change their terroristic methods when they know that whenever they strike they will be held wholly responsible for their action.'

¹ The document is signed: Nikos Triantaphyllou, 10. xi. 47.

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Battalion commanders of the *Democratic Army* are then ordered to superintend the capture of hostages according to the following categories (in order of preference):

1. Members of Parliament, politicians, and other important elements in Monarchofascism.
2. High ranking officers in the army and the security services.
3. Members of the civil and military judiciary.
4. Royalists from the higher ranks of the civil service.
5. Royalist plutocrats (wholesale dealers, landowners, industrialists, etc.).
6. Royalist pressmen.
7. Near relatives of all who belong to the above categories.
8. Persons of secondary rank in the Parties of the Right, including their near relatives.
9. Energetic members of organisations like X,¹ EDES, and so on, as well as their near relatives.'

Orders are then given 'to execute a corresponding number of hostages for every left-wing official, or member of a left-wing party, or officer of the *Democratic Army*' who is 'arrested or executed by Monarchofascism'.

Special orders are given under the heading of 'immediate sanctions':

'(a) Local Monarchofascists' who are 'the natural authors and inspirers of every crime that has been committed will be executed (politicians, higher civil servants, etc.). If the arrest and execution of the responsible criminals is not possible, (b) their near rightist relatives will be executed in their places, or (c) a certain number of members of X, EDES, or of energetic members of rightist organisations in general.'

¹ X (the Greek *Khi*), symbolising the unknown quantity, was the name assumed by Royalist armed bands. EDES was the loyalist organisation led by General Zervas during the war.

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Two 'guerilla bands' are to be formed, each 'band' being composed of '8-10 courageous and resolute men'. They are to be equipped with 'light rifles, light machine-guns, pistols, and revolvers', they are to accomplish their 'mission' within ten days, they are to 'infiltrate into villages, small towns, and cities (whether under the enemy's control or not) and carry out their orders strictly and promptly'. They may wear 'civilian clothes, according to the requirements of their mission'.

Apart from the 'special action' of these bands, units of the *Democratic Army* must, in the course of their 'usual operations, sudden assaults, ambushes, etc.', always endeavour to execute as many of the traitors as possible and as many hostages as possible. ... We shall not tolerate any display of inefficiency and narrowmindedness'.¹

A further order, dated the 1st of September, 1947, and signed by General Markos himself, and issued from General Headquarters,² gives special instructions in view of the fact that the Greek Parliament is about to assemble. It runs:

'The monarchofascist Members of Parliament who are in their constituencies will be moving to Athens as the session of the House is beginning. Intensify the efforts to capture them as hostages by special ambushes and by the strict control of cars. The same applies when they return after the session of the House.'

The People's Courts or Tribunals maintained by the Communists are of three kinds, the *People's Courts* proper (Δαϊκα Δικαστηρία), the *Partisan Courts* ('Ανταρτοδικία), and the *Supreme Court* ('Αναθέωρητικο).

¹ This document is signed: Diamandis, 30. 8. 47.

² It is not stated where these General Headquarters are. This order is marked 'secret No. 260'. It is accompanied by a covering order from the Parnassus H.Q. (Rumeli), and is also signed: Diamandis.

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The *People's Courts* proper deal with cases of theft, with reluctance on the part of the peasants to pay contributions to the funds of the *Democratic Army*, or to supply its commissariat. Peasants will be summoned before these courts and be ordered to pay or supply specified amounts.

The *Partisan Courts* recall the *Volksgerichte* of the Third Reich. They try all cases of 'treason' or 'collaboration'. The term 'traitor' covers all who are actively engaged in the service and, especially, in the defence, of the Greek State, in fact, every patriot. The term 'collaborator' is synonymous with 'traitor', for whoever serves the Greek State is, according to the Communist conception, 'collaborating' with British and American 'imperialism'. Every Greek who concealed a British sailor, soldier, or airman from the Germans during the war, or helped him to escape, is liable, if captured by the Communists, to be executed for 'collaboration'. The *Partisan Courts* are generally composed of four or five Communists under a President. The public which is admitted consists of men from the *Democratic Army* and local Communist supporters. This public is but a *claque* or a mob which shouts at the prisoner and demands 'people's justice'.¹ Acquittals are rare and even when a prisoner is acquitted—possibly because he is popular amongst the local peasantry—he is usually murdered in secret afterwards. As a rule sentence of death is passed and carried out immediately, though sometimes a prisoner is sentenced to mutilation, in which case he is deprived of an eye or a limb.

The Communist *Supreme Court* is the highest judicial authority under the *Politbureau* which sets great store on maintaining the simulacrum of an organised State and

¹ Political trials in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and other countries under Communist domination are of this type.

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issues decrees, laws, and orders, as though it were a representative, elected legislature.

The abductions of children aged from 3 to 13 or 14 began at the beginning of the year 1948. Abductions of young women and youths have been going on for more than four years.

The abductions of young women are particularly tragic because of the severe traditional ethic of the Greek village. A young woman will be made to serve the pleasure of the *Democratic Army*. If she is beautiful, she will probably be assigned to the commander. Or she may, as I have pointed out in the fourth chapter, be compelled to lie with an abducted lad, so that both may be 'emancipated'. She will be compelled to do the hard work of the camp in the day-time. If she is accessible to propaganda, she will be indoctrinated and, in time, become a fighter in the *Democratic Army*. Such young women are sometimes to be seen amongst the prisoners who are being tried by the Greek Military Courts. They often have a fanatical aspect and are amongst the cruellest of the cruel.

Abducted persons who try to escape are, of course, executed if caught. A powerful deterrent against flight are the reprisals which their captors threaten against their families. A person who has been abducted from a village which is accessible to the Communists knows that if he escapes his family may be exterminated.

A young woman who has been abducted can never go back to her village, for the traditional attitude towards virginity renders her unmarriageable thereafter. Many of those who escape from the Communists are pregnant. Many have venereal disease. Some are mentally deranged. They are treated with humanity by the Greek State and are

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helped by charitable organisations. They usually receive some employment in the towns where they may, in time, find husbands.

The following statements were made by abducted women who succeeded in escaping their captors:¹

M.R.,² a tall, brown-haired girl, attracted the notice of a Communist *Capetan*³ in a village of Evritania. He decided to send her as a present to his commander on Mount Grammos. When she reached her destination she realised, in her own words, that

'I had been selected for the harem which the bandit-chiefs are running at Grammos. All the girls there were good-looking and some, as I learnt afterwards, were of old and well-known families in the country districts. One evening I was taken to a hut where I was set upon by a man with a red moustache and blue eyes. I resisted and dug my nails into his eyes, whereupon he screamed and cursed. He talked a language I did not understand.⁴ There are many like him in Grammos. All the girls are freely placed at their disposal. At night, the men laugh, get drunk, and sing, while the girls are being beaten. The tears of these women could move stones ... I saw more than ten very young girls. ... Some of them were mere children. ... Two of them were expectant mothers, but the bandits do not want children.'

The Communists sometimes release women who are pregnant. Sometimes they send them over the border into Albania, Yugoslavia, or Bulgaria.

A girl who was released gives the following account:

'One evening, a few days after our abduction from

¹ These statements were taken down by Mr G. Lydias and published in the weekly *Vradyni* in March, 1948. The names of the women cannot be given.

² The names of these women cannot be published.

³ *Capetan* or *Capetanos* is a general and traditional title of rank amongst Greek irregular forces.

⁴ He was probably a Bulgarian or a Slavophone.

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Vrakha, the bandits killed some sheep and began a feast. ... There were fifteen of us. They forced wine down our throats until we lost consciousness of what was going on around us. We were all maltreated that night. The next day they started to tell us that we were to be sent to the Slav countries to study in the universities and to be employed in the workshops. One of their political "enlighteners" told us bluntly that if any of us became a mother, she would have greater value over there. ... I feel too ashamed to relate all the other things they told us. ... "

Caterina S. relates the following of a fellow-captive:

'She cannot have been from a village. Her complexion was very clear, and her hands were not those of a village woman. ... The "capetan" used to beat her. ... One night some Slavs and bandit-chiefs came to the village [where the women were held captive]. Some said it was Markos and different Ministers [i.e. members of the *Politbureau*]. I sat near her that night. She was crying all the time. I tried to talk to her and comfort her. I told her we were all sharing the same fate, but she gave me a wild look and turned her head away. Perhaps she thought I was a Communist and was trying to talk her over. She was then taken away to the place where the "high ups" were eating. Then she was brought back. Her clothes were splashed with wine. This time she did not cry, strangely enough. She was just pale and her eyes had a wild fire in them. Hours passed. Then, suddenly, a door opened, and two bandits appeared with a man who spoke a foreign language. She did not even look up at them. Only when the foreigner took her in his arms did her hands close in a firm grip on his throat. Her nails entered his flesh and his eyes bulged with the pressure. She would have strangled him. I would never have expected her to show such strength. The two bandits rushed in, but she did not release her hands from the foreigner's throat. Then I saw one of them raise his knife and drive it into her neck. The poor woman opened her mouth and suddenly crumpled

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to the ground. The other bandit kicked her in the face with his boots. The mud and warm blood became one caked mess. Then the three men left. Soon after, others came in and dragged her out by her lifeless hands. I and the other girls were made drunk that night. Feasting went on until the morning hours, when the "Ministers" left.'

Young women dread abduction more than death: On the 26th of January, 1948, the Communists raided the village of Agia Marina, in the *Nomos* of Thesprotia, and abducted fifteen women. Seven girls who feared that they too would be abducted, decided on flight. Their names were Sophia Bitou, Katerina Lastuka, Elena Phrangou, Maria Petraki, Penelope and Helena Skaltsa, and Vasso, the daughter of the school teacher, Hadjiyanni (Vasso was in her thirteenth year). They followed rocky paths and tracks and, climbing the mountain-slope, reached the top of a precipice overlooking the village. They hid amongst the boulders, but were perceived by the Communists who had set out in pursuit. The girls began to roll stones and boulders down the precipice upon the approaching Communists, several of whom were injured. The Communists, thereupon, started shooting. Vasso was wounded in the leg by a bullet. When the girls realised that they were lost, they stood on the edge of the precipice and sang the Greek song that begins with the words: '*Farewell, O world... .*'

Just before the Communists reached them they threw themselves into the abyss. Vasso was left behind, but she dragged herself to the edge and rolled over. The bodies of the girls were found some time after by a detachment of Greek troops.

Boys of fifteen or sixteen are frequently pressed into the service of the *Democratic Army*. If amenable to indoctrination, they are turned into Communists. Large numbers of peasants

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are rounded up by Communist press-gangs, but as a rule they do not make reliable soldiers from the Communist point of view. They display no ardour in battle, expend quantities of ammunition without hitting anyone, and surrender at the first opportunity. Nevertheless, they have their use, for while they engage the regulars, however ineffectively, the Communist *corps d'élite* pursue their purpose with skill, discipline, and resolution. For diversionary actions even the most unwilling and undisciplined troops may be useful.

Towards the end of 1947, the Communists began a census of children in a number of villages. The abductions began soon after. In some villages, the Communists held meetings which were addressed by special propagandists (known as 'enlighteners') who by promises and threats tried to persuade parents that their children must be surrendered. In the village of Fatiria, near Filiatis, for example, several propagandists¹ called a meeting on the 28th of February, 1948, and said that all children aged from 4 to 14 should be handed over so that they could be sent to orphanages in Albania. There was much weeping and lamentation amongst the mothers, but they were told that General Markos' orders must be obeyed, and that the children would be taken away whether the parents liked it or not. One mother asked if she would ever see her children again. When she was told that she would not, she began to lament, saying that she would rather die than hand her children over to rebels and Albanians. The parents were then told that the children would be taken away the day the Greek army arrived—that is to say, before that army could save them.

Occasionally, in villages where there are supporters of

¹ One of them was a Communist named Ionnis Kondis, from the village of Foiniki.

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Communism or where there is a Slavophone population, mothers do not appear unwilling to surrender the children. They are told that the children will join their fathers in the mountains and will be well cared for.¹ But the general picture is one of terrible grief. When the children are assembled and led away, they scream and the mothers weep and protest. Any attempt to hold the children back is brutally repelled. The villagers are terrorised and know that resistance is useless. Many children take to the forests or mountains at the approach of the Communists and make their way to the nearest town. In March, 1948, six little boys arrived at Yannina, having trekked across the mountains for more than twenty hours, carrying their school-books. They reported to the authorities, saying that they did not intend to be brought up as Communists but wanted 'a Greek education'. On the roads between Yannina and the Albanian border, many families with numerous children were moving, usually on foot, sometimes with a donkey to carry the belongings, towards the town, in flight from the Communists. The fear of losing their children has certainly induced many thousands of families to take flight who else would have accepted the risk of staying in their villages. Many villages are completely deserted. In some, only a few old women remain. At Kastoria I was present when the Balkan Commission interrogated a boy aged nine. He was asked to tell his story. He did so with appropriate gestures and an easy command of language like an experienced orator. He had

¹ This happened at Levki, a Slavophone village near Kastoria. I was present when members of the Balkan Commission made an enquiry. The villagers were obviously terrified lest the Communists should return so that it was extremely difficult to discover what they really felt. But they did seem to believe that the children would be better off with their fathers 'in the mountains'. There was no priest in the village, and the 'nationalist' villagers had disappeared. None cared to say what had happened to them.

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concealed himself in the family chest when 'the bandits' (*katsapliádes*) arrived and escaped into the forest at nightfall. He was extremely proud of his exploit and finished his narration with the words, 'so in the end, the wolves didn't catch the sheep'.

The extent of the abductions was at first unknown to the Greek authorities, for the reports they received from remote villages were at first scanty and allowed no general conclusion, although the census taken in some villages seemed to show that the Communists were engaged in carrying out a well-prepared and comprehensive plan. It was even suspected—and this suspicion was shared by some experienced British observers—that the Communists, by taking a census and abducting a few children, were but trying to spread fear and despondency and to increase the number of refugees. These suspicions were not wholly removed by broadcasts from stations in countries under Communist control which gave publicity in several languages to the abductions. For example, on the 27th of February, at 8.30 p.m., the Sofia Station announced in Bulgarian that

'six hundred Greek children, from 4 to 10 years old, are being awaited in Budapest these days. The children will be placed under Hungarian protection.'

On the 2nd of March, 1948, at 8.30 a.m., the Sofia Station announced in Bulgarian that

'The Hungarian people joyfully salute the arrival of Greek children in Hungary. The representative of General Markos' Provisional Government has thanked the Hungarian people for their interest and for their help to the Greek refugees.'

On the 3rd of March, the Yugoslav Telegraphic Agency (TANYUG) announced that

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'The Balkan States Youth Congress has taken the decision according to which 12,000 Greek children coming from the regions controlled by Markos' army are to be accommodated and to pursue their education in different Balkan States until the end of hostilities in Greece.'

On the same day, *Eleftheri Ellada* announced the names of certain villages and the number of children abducted from each. As it was known to the Greek authorities that there had been abductions in some of these villages, and as the numbers announced had some appearance of precision, this broadcast, which was as follows, engendered deep anxiety:

<i>Name of village</i>	<i>Number of children abducted</i>
Andartikó	4
Roúlia	170
Tsoúka	24
Glykonéri	6
Platý	81
Agios Germanós	480
Yiannokhóri	24

Broadcasts transmitted by stations in countries under Communist control and monitored in Athens give the following figures from the beginning of February to the middle of June, 1948:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number of abducted children received</i>
Hungary	3,000
Czechoslovakia	2,000
Yugoslavia	5,000
Bulgaria	1,800
Rumania	600
Albania	800

13,200

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Some Greek children seem to have arrived in Poland. This has been denied by the Polish Government, although that Government was thanked in a broadcast transmitted by the *Eleftheri Ellada* for the hospitality it extended to the children. It is hard to tell where the truth lies, but it may be that *Eleftheri Ellada*, which is always striving to create the impression that the 'Free Greek Government' enjoys the support of all the 'democratic' countries, invented this item so that Poland be included.

The Balkans Commission began to investigate the abductions in February, 1948. It visited several villages, it interrogated refugees, it established the fact that abductions had occurred, and reported to the Security Council accordingly. But the Commission works under great difficulties, for not only are many villages inaccessible, the peasants in some of the more inaccessible villages are afraid to speak or, if they do speak, give misleading information, having been previously instructed, under threats of massacre and arson, by the Communists.

Although the Commission is acting on behalf of the Security Council and was appointed by a vote in which the Russian delegate concurred, the Greek Communist Party regards it as an enemy in war-time. On the 27th of December, 1947, the command of the *Democratic Army* issued an order from Headquarters in Rumeli stating that the *Commission* consists of 'the Anglo-Saxons and their satellites', that 'they will try to contest our struggle because that is their aim'. Consequently,

'every individual or group from the above-mentioned Commission, or any of its foreign or domestic agents, who try to enter regions controlled by our units are to be arrested immediately.' If any members of the Commission are

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captured by the *Democratic Army*, they are to be 'treated as prisoners of war'. If the Commission makes a request to visit any area controlled by the *Democratic Army*, the request is to be 'rejected immediately and without discussion'.

It is clear that the Commission cannot conduct an exhaustive enquiry into the abductions of children.

In November, 1948, the abductions were discussed by the *Political Committee* of the *United Nations*. The Belgian delegate moved the following resolution which was adopted unanimously:

'The General Assembly recommends the return to Greece of Greek children at present away from their homes when the children, their father or mother or, in his or her absence, their closest relative, express a wish to that effect;

'Invites all the Members of the United Nations and other States on whose territory these children are to be found, to take the necessary measures for implementation of the present recommendation;

Instructs the Secretary-General to request the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to organise and ensure liaison with the National Red Cross organisations of the states concerned with a view to empowering the national Red Cross organisations to adopt measures in the respective countries for implementing the present recommendation.'

According to information gathered by the League of *Red Cross Societies* and communicated to the *Balkans Commission*, 23,696 Greek children are being retained in countries which are 'satellites of Russia'.¹

It is impossible to tell with any certainty how many children have been abducted in all. Some, perhaps many, must have perished on the way, for the transport of these

¹ *The Times*, 3rd of December, 1948. By the spring of 1949, the estimated total was approaching 30,000.

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children across the mountains on foot, or on the backs of mules, is hazardous, especially in winter.

To the parents in the village, the abduction of a child by the Communists is worse than the death of the child.

Life in a Greek village is hard. It is hardest for the women, who do the work of men. Only during the last year or two have the ravages of malaria abated, thanks to the anti-malarial work done by Americans in Greece. Consumption still abounds and leprosy is not unknown. Greece had hardly recovered from the war in Asia Minor when the Second World War came. The Germans shot, hanged, and tortured. Their economic policy was the cause of such starvation that children were dying in the streets of Athens. The Bulgarians massacred. What the Communists did and are still doing, we have seen. That children should die is in the nature of things. Their loss is mourned in Greece as deeply as it is elsewhere, but it is accepted with a certain ultimate resignation or fatalism. Besides there is hope of reunion in the world to come. But that a little boy or girl should be taken away by brutish men, sometimes amid scenes of massacre and destruction, from weeping parents, home, country, and religion; that this child should be brought up in a hostile foreign land, be educated in atheism and treason, be taught to hate and despise all that should be loved and revered, and be trained to become the agent and spy of an evil foe—these are the things that immeasurably afflict the parents and spread grief and horror amongst a people more inured to grief and horror than most other people. These things cause greater anguish to supposedly 'primitive' peasants of simple piety and patriotism than they would to more sophisticated persons who imagine that it does not matter very much what

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country or religion children are brought up in, and that Communism is just an opinion and no more.

In death a child is lost, and the parents will never see it again in this world. The Turks kidnapped Greek boys, turned them into Moslems, and brought them up as Janissaries. They were lost for ever to their parents, their country and their religion. But a child taken by the Communists may return. If it were lost for ever, the tragedy would be less appalling. If it return to its village, it will return as an agent, a spy, a propagandist, a traitor. It will look upon its parents as 'Monarchofascists', the mayor as an 'enemy of the people', and the priest as a 'reactionary' and a purveyor of a 'foul superstition'. Its duty will be to convert and intimidate, or to denounce, or even to kill.

A Greek village, completely deserted after the Communists have massacred and destroyed, is a desolation such as could be seen in many countries during the last ten years. But a village from which the children have been taken away across the mountains by the *Democratic Army* is a desolation even more desolate—even if there has been no massacre, even if nothing has been destroyed. A village empty of everything is not so empty as a village empty of children who are lost for ever.

Those who have visited the abducted children in Hungary and elsewhere report that they are well cared for. Of course they are! At least in a material sense, for the Communists naturally want them to believe that Communism is a Heaven and the country they have left behind a Hell by comparison! But we are not told what happens to the children who are recalcitrant, who persist in affirming their loyalties. There must be many such, for Greek children mature at an early age. The inner tragedy of these children will never be recorded, for they have no one they can talk to,

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they have no chance of escape, and there is no sign of an early end to their exile.

That the rapid downfall of the Communist tyrannies will be a blessing to the nations that suffer under them, to Europe, and to the world, is sufficiently evident. But if there were no other reasons to pray that they may be brought down and utterly uprooted and destroyed for ever, the early deliverance of the children would be a conclusive reason.

Amongst the wretched excuses made for the abductions, there is one that calls for special attention because it is widely accepted: the excuse that the children are removed from the villages so that they can be cared for and be safe from the dangers of war.

It is abduction by the Communists which is itself the greatest danger that threatens the children. The war afflicts the villages in so far as the Communists arrive to massacre, burn, and pillage. The military operations affect the villages little, for the Communists, if they are near or in possession, leave and make for the mountains as soon as the approach of troops is signalled. Where the children are in danger, they are removed by the Greek authorities whenever possible. They are kept together, village by village, and are sent to safe places where they are objects of affectionate care.

If we examine the broadcasts of the *Eleftheri Ellada*, which is commonly called the *Markos Station* (Ραδιοσταθμός Μάρκου) in Greece, we shall be left in no doubt that the abduction of the children is an organic part of the Communist plan for the conquest of Greece. Just as young women are abducted so that they can be 'emancipated' from 'prejudice' and 'superstition', so the children are 'liberated' from 'Fascism' or 'Monarchofascism', from 'reaction', from 'Anglo-American imperialism', from the terrorism of the

'imperialists'. The Communists, not being in control of the Greek State or even of one Greek town, cannot indoctrinate the young as they can in countries that are satellites of the Soviet Union. That is why they kidnap Greek children, transfer them to such countries, and indoctrinate and train them for subversion, sedition, conspiracy against their fellow Greeks and to become the docile instruments of a future Communist tyranny.

The broadcasting stations of all the countries under Communist control, the *Eleftheri Ellada* in particular, and the Communist press throughout the world, present so black a picture of Greece under the domination of 'Anglo-American imperialism' and its 'Monarchofascist lackeys', that the abduction of the children is made to appear a work of 'liberation' indeed, a work of mercy inspired by an impulse so generous and humane that its purpose is not to be questioned. There is a certain inconsistency in this presentation, for whereas *Free Greece*, that is to say, the regions infested by the *Democratic Army*, regions therefore of massacre, pillage, arson, and abduction, are represented as rejoicing in the freedom, justice, prosperity and even the 'culture' conferred upon them by the 'liberators', it is nevertheless from precisely these regions that the children are abducted. It follows that *Free Greece* is neither the happy land, nor so extensive, nor so securely held as the Communists pretend. That the children are kidnapped and taken across the border is, in fact, an admission that the Greek Communist Party is nowhere in effective control.

It is a familiar device of Communists everywhere to accuse their opponents of what they themselves are guilty of. According to them, it is not the *Democratic Army*, but the Greek army, which is kidnapping the children; in countries

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under Communist control the children are happy, in Greece, their own country, they are terrorised, except when they are protected by the *Democratic Army*; the parents rejoice when the *Democratic Army* arrives and the children are taken away, and they cannot sufficiently express their gratitude to Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, and the other 'democratic' countries where the children are detained.

Eleftheri Ellada constantly and consistently falsifies the truth that children menaced by abduction are rescued by the Greek army and are sent to places of safety. The following bulletin is typical of this falsification: '

'... the monarchofascists make incursions into villages and by force and deceit take the children from their mothers' arms. Amid dreadful scenes of weeping and wailing on the part of the distracted mothers, the children are carried off with no explanation or indication of their destination. The monarchofascist authorities ordered the abduction of the children from Flambouron, Leptokaria, Aghios, and Vartholomeos, and they are extending their child-snatching operations to the villages of Kambos. We denounce to all the Greek people and to all the civilised world this bestial crime which is being perpetrated by monarchofascism under the direction of the United States imperialists ... no libel, however devilish, can distort the fact that the children of Free Greece are saved from destruction by the care of the democratic countries.

This fact is made clear by the countless expressions of relief and gratitude of parents. It was verified by the members of the Balkans Commission who visited the village of Levki near Kastoria the other day where there were no detachments of the *Democratic Army*.¹

¹ As I have explained, Levki is a Slavophone village. The Communists had taken away a number of children about a fortnight before the Balkans Commission arrived. I was myself able to observe that the villagers were miserable and frightened. Some of the mothers said that the children would be better off with their fathers in the mountains. But there was no sign of 'relief and gratitude'.

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Greek parents! Do not give your children to the blood-thirsty monarchofascists. ... The barracks in Rhodes, where these children are, are under the absolute rule of United States gangsters who will one day be compelled to leave Greece. Greek mother, tear with your teeth the monarchofascist who attempts to snatch your child from your arms.¹

The regions not infested by the Communists are referred to as *Enslaved Greece* in contrast to *Free Greece* in Communist propaganda. It is represented as the counterpart of Germany under Hitler by *Eleftheri Ellada*. For example:

‘While in Enslaved Greece the books which were enlightening the people are burnt, in Free Greece scores of newspapers, magazines, and news-bulletins are published which circulate amongst the people throughout the country.’²

Parents are overjoyed if their children are saved from the combined forces of imperialism and monarchofascism. When the Communists arrive to take the children away, ‘the enthusiasm and relief is such that even mothers of babies one or two years old are begging to have their children taken away too.’³

The truth is, that except for literature that falls under the law against treasonable sedition, there is complete freedom of publication in Greece. There is no political censorship. On the other hand, all literature that is not Communist is suppressed, as far as the Communists are able to suppress it, in the regions infested by them. No men of the *Democratic Army* dare be seen reading a non-Communist newspaper. The publications circulated by the Communists are printed in Yugoslavia (one of them, the largest of all, is printed in

¹ Bulletin broadcast on the 20th March, 1948 (7 a.m.). A speech by Mr Ziliacus was transmitted in the same bulletin.

² Bulletin of the 3rd March, 1948 (6 a.m.).

³ Bulletin of the 4th March, 1948.

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Bulkes and is called *Phoni Bulkes*, i.e. *Voice of Bulkes*) or roneoed or typed in the mountain strongholds of the *Democratic Army*. They are, without exception, vehicles of the coarsest and most mendacious propaganda.

The broadcasts transmitted by *Eleftheri Ellada* abound in attacks on America:

'The Americans have established a régime of unprecedented violence, of terrorism, of slaughter, and of the extermination of the Greek people. They have filled the country with Hitlerite camps, with prisons and graves. More than 10,000 Greek Democratic citizens have been murdered by Truman's agents in the most inhuman way during the last twelve months.'¹

'General van Fleet's ferocity surpasses that of the Nazi invaders ... he ordered the execution of 1,500 fighters of the First Resistance who were sentenced to death by monarchofascist tribunals.'²

Eleftheri Ellada does all it can to demonstrate the solidarity of the 'Democratic Countries', and of 'Democrats' all over the world, with the cause of *Free Greece*. For example:

'...in response to the appeal of the People's Councils of Free Greece, the People's organisations of the People's Democracies of Europe replied that they would undertake the care and upbringing of the children ...'³

There is a complete concordance between *Eleftheri Ellada*

¹ Bulletin of the 9th March, 1948 (6.30 p.m.).

² Bulletin of the 7th March, 1948 (12.15 p.m.). General van Fleet is the head of the American Mission in Greece. The 'First Resistance' was the insurrectionary movement of the Communists during the German occupation found guilty of murdering fellow Greeks who were sentenced to death even if they had fought against the Germans. General van Fleet had nothing to do with these sentences.

³ Bulletin of the 4th March, 1948. In the same bulletin, *Eleftheri Ellada* announces that in 59 villages 'the parents have given 4,684 children aged 3 to 13, who will be transferred to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia'.

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and the broadcasting stations at Belgrade, Skoplje, Tirana, Sofia, and so on with regard to events in Greece. Meetings of trade unions, committees, 'leagues of youth', and so on in these countries, and speeches by prominent persons, in support of *Free Greece* are publicised by *Eleftheri Ellada* and all these stations. Money is collected, resolutions are passed and cabled to General Markos, and an extensive propaganda is disseminated. In January, 1948, Rosa Dimitrova, the wife of the Bulgarian Premier, spoke in support of *Free Greece*. This event was publicised in Bulgarian, and Greek.¹

In the same month, Petros Roussos, the 'Foreign Minister' in the 'Free Greek Government' gave an interview to the *Eleftheri Ellada*, stating that the creation of so many committees in so many countries and the many congratulatory cables, constituted 'a *de facto* recognition of the just struggle of the Greek people'. This interview was broadcast in Slavomacedonian, Serbian, and Greek.²

On the 11th of January, the Yugoslav press stated that 'a committee to aid the Greek people had been established on the initiative of the Central Committee of the Trade Union Federation of Yugoslavia. The Committee was composed of representatives of the Trade Union Federation, of the *People's Youth*, the *Women's Antifascist Front*, and of leading *intellectuals*. A resolution was passed to initiate collections 'in aid of the Greek people, who, in exceptionally difficult circumstances, are carrying on an heroic struggle against the monarchofascist terrorists and their accomplices'. Sub-committees were to be formed in different towns of

¹ Belgrade Station (in Greek), 18th Jan., 7.15 p.m.; Sofia Station (in Bulgarian), 23rd, 10.30 p.m.

² Skoplje, 30th (in Slavomacedonian), 9.30 p.m.; Belgrade, 30th (Serbian), 11 p.m.; 31st (Greek), 7.45 a.m.

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Yugoslavia. The statement was broadcast by the Belgrade Station in Greek.¹

During the rest of the month, the Belgrade Station and Skoplje Stations were broadcasting news relating to the formation of sub-committees, to meetings and collections, the presence of prominent officials, writers, artists, and so on, in Serbian, Slavomacedonian, and Greek. *Eleftheri Ellada* broadcast news of a similar nature.²

The *Second Congress of Antifascist Women* was held in Belgrade towards the end of January, 1948. Mrs Xoxha, representing Albania, said that despite the daily provocations of the monarchofascists on the Albanian border, the Albanian people were on the side of 'the fighting Greek people'. Mrs Dragoitcheva, representing Bulgaria, said that Bulgarian women would never allow their Greek sisters to live in servitude. A representative of Trieste said that the women of Greece, Spain, and China were an example to women all over the world. Mrs Mitsa Petseva, who represented 'Democratic Greece', was constantly interrupted by cheering as she spoke—she said that the 'American imperialists' wanted to defeat the Greek 'Democratic Army' because they were trying to convert Greece into a bridge-head against the northern neighbours of Greece and the Soviet Union. The *Congress* addressed appeals to women all over the world, inviting support against 'imperialists and warmongers' and help for the 'heroic fighters of Greece'.

The *Congress* was reported at length in the Yugoslav press and reports were broadcast in Serbian and Greek.

Similar meetings and demonstrations were held in

¹ 18th of Jan., 1.45 p.m.

² E.g. 29th Jan., 2.45 p.m.; 24th Jan., 2.30 p.m.

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Bulgaria and were similarly publicised in the press and wireless. Collections in aid of the 'Democratic Army' were made in Sofia and in the provinces. At some of the meetings, portraits of Dimitrov and of General Markos decorated the walls. 'Voluntary' deductions from wages were made to help the 'Democratic Army' and several organisations declared that members would give 10 per cent of their incomes.¹ Mr Kolarov, the Bulgarian Vice-Premier, made a statement that

'the Bulgarian people need not conceal their friendly feelings toward the struggle of the Greek people and declare openly and clearly that they give help to the victims of monarchofascism who take refuge in Bulgaria.'²

The Third Balkan Youth Congress held in Budapest passed a resolution that telegrams be sent to the Governments of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, and to the 'Provisional Democratic Government of Greece'. At a dinner party in honour of the Balkan delegations, the Hungarian Foreign Minister declared that the 'democratic youth' of Greece were an inspiring example to the youth of all countries.³

Resolutions passed at meetings in Poland and in Czechoslovakia are constantly broadcast in Serbian, Slavomacedonian, and Greek.

On the 2nd of February, 1948, the Belgrade Station transmitted, in Greek, an announcement by the Albanian News Agency that there was no need for the Balkans Commission to investigate the Albanian border, for 'the Balkan peoples are on the side of the fighting Greeks.'⁴

¹ Sofia Station, 24th and 26th Jan., 1948, 10.30 p.m. (in Bulgarian).

² *Ibid.*, 27th Jan., 1.30 p.m. (in Bulgarian).

³ Belgrade Station, 22nd Jan., 1948, 7.30 a.m. and 1.45 p.m. (in Greek).

⁴ Seven-fifteen p.m.

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These are but a few examples of an organised campaign sustained by seven countries—Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland—in aid of the Greek Seditious. The campaign is least conspicuous in Albania, for to her is assigned the principal part in giving military aid to the *Democratic Army*. Russia is not represented at meetings in aid of 'Democratic Greece', at least not publicly. Her task is the general political patronage over the whole support given to the Greek Communist Party and the diplomatic attack on the Greek State in the Security Council and the Assembly.

The meetings, speeches, resolutions, telegrams, articles, broadcasts that are generated day after day, year in, year out, by the generating plant, as it were, of the Powers under Communist domination are like a miasma that pours into Greece through the northern mountain passes, and spreads and percolates through the country as far as the extreme south. This miasma creates a kind of delusion, a dream-world, or living nightmare. The dream is organically related to the appalling reality of the infested villages, a reality which is but the extension into Greece of that world which has triumphed from the Elbe to the China Sea.

When the Communists have the power, they impose that world to the exclusion of the Hellenic and European world. In November, 1948, the Communists kidnapped an American engineer, Mr McShane. They led him, for twelve days, on foot or mule through thirty-two villages in the Peloponnese. He was constantly subjected to 'a flood of abuse against Mr Truman, Mr Marshall, and other American officials'. Although he was told that he would see 'the glories of Free Greece', he saw a sequence of mountain villages, one poorer than the other, and filled with country folk. Only

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amongst members of the rebel band and in some of the younger villagers did he see any enthusiasm for the Communist rebellion. The villagers were completely dependent on news given by the rebels, and consequently they had no knowledge of the American reconstruction and recovery programme in Greece.¹

Free Greece is the region in which men, women, and children are massacred and abducted, where villages are burnt and pillaged. According to the Communist conception, those who perpetrate these infamies are 'liberators' and 'democrats'. Fiendish murderers, abominable liars, and vile traitors are extolled as heroes, patriots, and 'friends of the people'. Every perspective is distorted, every value begins to change, every loyalty is shaken, truth itself grows uncertain, for the miasma is over the land, year in, year out, and there is no end in sight.

The authority of the Greek State prevails in every town and in most of the villages. But hundreds of villages in northern, central and southern Greece are enmeshed in the miasma which is constantly replenished from across the northern border. Few villages have receiving sets, but false news is spread by the *Aftóamyna*, by the men of the *Democratic Army*, and the leaflets, news-sheets, and bulletins issued by the Communist Party:

'The writers of these papers, indeed, for the greater part, are either unknown or in contempt, but they are like a battery in which the stroke of one bell produces no great effect, but the amount of continual repetition is decisive. Let us only suffer any person to tell us his story, morning and evening, but for one twelvemonth, and he will become our master.'²

¹ *The Times*, 9th Dec., 1948.

² Edmund Burke, *Thoughts on French Affairs* (1791).

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The Communists cannot command enthusiasm (except amongst a few of the young) or even willing support, by their 'batteries'. But will they not, as the years go by and there is no deliverance, engender despair and the submission that follows despair?

Should not the Greek State engage in counter-propaganda? Any systematic lying would at once call forth refutation, contempt, and ridicule from Greek public opinion. It cannot be said that there is a particular cult of truth in Greece, but there are too many truthful and outspoken men and women to make it possible for the Greek State, as long as it is not armed with tyrannic power, to engage in propaganda resembling the propaganda of the Communists, even if it wished to. The correctives to falsehood which exist in all free countries under the rule of law exist in Greece. They make effective propaganda impossible. As long as the 'principal means of action' against the Communists is liberty, effective propaganda is excluded. As long as the 'principal means of action' against the Greek nation is servitude, the Communists must engage in propaganda.

If the Greek State were to engage in propaganda resembling that of the Communists it would but serve the Communists, because it would falsify the national spirit, corrupt the simple loyalties, engender perplexity, and strike at the patriotism and piety without which the Greek people could not have endured for so long.

The spirit of truth can only be kept alive if the truth is told. Without the spirit of truth there can be no patriotism and no piety. There is nothing the Greek State and the Greek people can do, except to tell the truth, to cherish their loyalties, to endure, and to fight.

CHAPTER SIX

PIETY AND PATRIOTISM

NOTHING gave the Greek Communist Party more concern than its own failure to convert the Sedition into a revolution. It complained constantly and vehemently that 'the masses' were not responding. The circulars and appeals addressed by the *Politbureau* of the Party to the urban branches are full of these complaints. Without extensive political strikes in the towns, without active unrest amongst the urban workers, no revolution was possible. Had the *Politbureau* and the *Democratic Army* received half as much support from organised labour as the Communist Parties received in France and Italy, it is probable that Greece would, today, be under Communist domination.

Failure in the towns made success in the mountains the more necessary. The ever-growing effort of the Communist Party as a military force is the measure of their failure as a revolutionary force. But it was impossible for the Communists to forgo revolution altogether. A Party with revolutionary principles and professing to represent 'the people' must show that it has the support, if not of 'the people', at least of many people, of a something that can be plausibly called a 'mass'. It must, somehow and somewhere, engender an organised popular movement. The strength of such a Party cannot be based only upon armed *guerrilleros* aided by foreign Powers, at least not if that aid falls short of open, armed, intervention, as it must do in Greece as long as those Powers are afraid to precipitate an international crisis.

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The Communist plan, which matured during the year 1947, was to seize a region near the border, a region with at least one town, to establish a 'government' there, a 'People's Government' or the 'Government of Free Greece', and to secure international recognition with the diplomatic assistance of Russia and other 'friendly' Powers. Such a region, if taken and held by armed force, could be permanently defended if it could conclude an open alliance with the neighbouring 'friendly' Powers and receive all the support it needed under the terms of that alliance and under an appearance of legality. If support need no longer be clandestine, it need no longer be limited. 'Free Greece' would become an extension of the Balkan 'People's Democracies' into Greece. It would have a capital and a 'Government' which would no longer be an elusive committee hiding in the mountains. There would be political and military administration. Elections would be held which, as in all countries under Communist domination, would, by terrorism, falsification, and other familiar devices, produce an overwhelming majority for the 'Government'.

'Free Greece' would become an operational base for the conquest of neighbouring Greek territories and, little by little, for the conquest of all Greece. It would even be possible to maintain a 'Free Greek Air Force', for an aerodrome could be built on 'Free Greek' territory. 'Friendly' Powers would supply aeroplanes, instructors, fuel, and so on—if to Israel, why not to 'Free Greece'?

On the 25th of June, 1947, two delegates of the Greek Communist Party, Zachariadis and Porphyrogennis, attended the congress of the French Communist Party at Strasbourg. They announced that a 'Free Greek Government' would be established. From that moment onwards,

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Russia and the countries under Communist control made international recognition of the prospective 'Free Greek Government' an immediate object of their foreign policies.

On the 5th of August, the wireless station, *Eleftheri Ellada*, denounced the Greek political leaders, Zervas, Gonatas, and Papandreou, and urged the Communists in Athens to execute them as 'traitors' and 'enemies of the people'. In September, 1947 the Central Committee of the Party held its third plenary session. Following a proposal by Zachariadis it endorsed the policy of the *Politbureau* and the declarations made at Strasbourg.¹

During the autumn of 1947, the general action of the Party and of all its subsidiary organisations, including the *Democratic Army* and the *Aftódmyna*, was rigorously subordinated to a clear policy and strategy with the object of achieving a decision by the end of the year—the decision to establish a 'Free Greek Government' on 'Free Greek' territory. The town chosen to be the capital of this 'Government' was Konitsa, near the Yugoslav border. This town became the principal strategic objective of the *Democratic Army*.

On the 2nd of August, 1947, a military convention between the Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian General Staffs was concluded at Bled in Yugoslavia. The terms of this convention have never been revealed, but they can be inferred from a declaration made by representatives of the same Staffs in a meeting held at Belgrade and attended by a Russian delegate. This declaration is dated the 9th of December, 1947. It is a document which almost defies translation. Like the National Socialists, the Communists

¹ This plenary session was reported in *Rizospostis*, the chief organ of the Greek Communist Party, on the 8th of October, 1947.

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are not only bureaucrats, but super-bureaucrats (it may be, that this will, in the end, be their undoing). They suffer from *papyromania*, as Ferrero called it. They issue secret orders, circulars, memoranda, and so on in such profusion that their plans are, as a rule, easy to discern. The future historian of contemporary Greece will find an abundance of unclassified and unknown documentary material, if he will take the time and the trouble, display the pertinacity and good temper without which he can undertake no useful research into Greek archives (some of them official, some semi-official, some private), and endure the exasperation caused by the lack of any system, and by odd Hellenic conceptions of what is important and what is not. A further difficulty is that the official language employed by the Communists is what Rabelais would have called *superlificoconcieuse*. It has become so involved, so rhetorical and formalistic, and so replete with groups of capital letters indicating obscure organisations, that it is often extremely hard to disentangle the meaning.

Nevertheless, the general meaning of the declaration (which refers back explicitly to the convention signed at Bled) is sufficiently evident. It can be summarised as follows:¹

(a) The Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian General Staffs undertake to assist the Greek *Democratic Army* with stores and other supplies, with technical equipment and instructors.

(b) These same General Staffs undertake to organise the rear defences of the *Democratic Army* and to provide infantry, artillery, and aviation for the purpose. They are prepared to take part in the military operations if to do so will be decisive in promoting the advance of the *Democratic Army*.

¹ For a literal, and, therefore, not very intelligible, translation of this document, see Appendix I.

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(c) The Hungarian and Rumanian Governments will be asked to take part in giving assistance to the Greek Communists.

(d) The Albanian Government undertakes to place a naval base at the disposal of the Greek Communist Party and to assist in creating a Greek *Democratic Fleet*.

(e) Representatives of the Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian General Staffs will proceed to the headquarters of the Greek *Democratic Government* as soon as it is formed.

The attack on Konitsa began shortly before Christmas, 1947. It was the heaviest offensive undertaken by the armed forces of the Greek Communist Party since the Battle of Athens in December, 1944. It is significant that since those forces came into existence some time in 1942, they have fought only two major actions, the one against the British and the other against the Greeks—not one against the Germans, Italians, or Bulgarians.

The attack on Konitsa was well prepared and well led. The Communists fought with great skill and resolution. It was the first time they gave battle to the Greek regular army on equal terms. They were totally defeated, whereupon the whole Communist plan collapsed.

Great Britain and the United States had made a *démarche* in Belgrade, warning the Yugoslav Government, and, by implication, other Governments, against recognition of the prospective *Free Greek Government*. The *démarche* was worded in terms of some severity. Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were not prepared for a rupture that might lead to a general conflict. It is probable that the Russian Government advised caution. Whether the three northern Powers would have recognised the *Free Greek Government*, if it had been established

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at Konitsa, is hard to say. But as this Government could not be established anywhere on Greek soil after the defeat of the *Democratic Army*, and therefore had no seat or capital, to have recognised it would have been as futile as it would have been impolitic.

The impression made by the defeat at Konitsa on the Greek Communist Party is vividly reflected in a letter which General Markos wrote to Zachariadis, the Secretary-General of the Party, who was in Moscow at the time. The letter is undated, but it must have been written in January, 1948. It shows that General Markos, who had given the order for the capture of Konitsa 'as the seat of Government', expected the *Foreign Legion* to make a diversionary attack on the Macedonian town of Florina during the Battle of Konitsa. This attack had been promised by General Popovitch, the chief of the combined Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian General Staffs. The *Foreign Legion* is not a military unit, but a world-wide organisation with agents in many countries, including the United States. It is the descendant of the *International Column* which fought in the Spanish civil war. It is, of course, under exclusively Communist leadership, whereas the *International Column* was not exclusively so. There are, however, sufficient members of the *Foreign Legion* to form a small force on Balkan soil. The *cadre* exists under trained officers of several nationalities. Its appearance on Greek soil would symbolise the active participation of all States under Communist domination in the Greek conflict. If a *Free Greek Government* had been established at Konitsa, and if the northern neighbours of Greece, and possibly Russia, had recognised that Government, the *Foreign Legion* would, no doubt, have taken part in the military operations. And there would, no doubt, have

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been a world-wide appeal for volunteers. Intervention in Greece would thereby have taken on an open, active, international character—as it did in Spain.

General Markos complains with some bitterness that supplies which had been promised failed to arrive and that this was the reason why the battle was lost. He also complains that the 'Free Greek Government' was not recognised, as had been promised, and that the conduct of the military operations is being taken over more and more by General Popovitch and that the command of the *Democratic Army* is no longer allowed any initiative. The letter ends in expressions that are almost those of despair. If

'Tirana, Belgrade, Sofia, and Moscow do not carry out their promises, I am determined to repudiate every agreement and follow the path of a soldier who has fought and lost a battle.'

This, presumably, is a threat to commit suicide. It is evident that the plan of General Popovitch, and, therefore of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria (no doubt with the approval of Russia) towards Greece after the defeat at Konitsa, was to fight no more battles but to resume *Partisan* warfare in an intensified form. This, indeed, is what has happened. And it threatens to bring about what General Markos feared, namely the total ruin of Greece, so that she will be in far greater need of economic and financial help than she is today—help she will, in that case, never receive, for, if she comes under Communist domination, the United States will decline and Russia will be unable to give it. The plan of General Popovitch according to General Markos, will

'break every stone in Greece and we shall be submerged in debt ten times as deeply as before if we are to re-

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build Greece, so that our struggle will have been without a purpose for it will have brought greater disaster than ever.’¹

Throughout the year 1947, the Greek Communist Party was perfecting its revolutionary organisation. Although it had become evident that a genuine Greek revolution was unattainable, nevertheless, terrorism, the murder of respected loyalist leaders, and seditious violence perpetrated by small groups (the ‘masses’ having remained unresponsive) would intensify the general effect of the massacres and of the economic war, and would remove many of the most determined leaders of the national resistance. Victory in the mountains, massacre in the villages, terrorism in the towns, deserted farms and fields, and ever-growing multitudes of refugees—all these together might bring about that general collapse which alone could ensure the victory of Communism in Greece. In the event of such a collapse, a political cadre such as the *Aftódmyna* could provide, a ‘Government’, and a capital (which would be transferred first to Salonica, and then, after the cession of Macedonia, to Athens) would complete the work of conquest.

The conspiratorial organisation of the Party has not changed in its essentials since the German occupation. It is of the same type as the Communist organisations in all countries. It differs only in so far as the circumstances differ. Given similar circumstances, any Communist Party in any country will be as the Greek Communist Party is, and will do what it is doing. Even if Communism is defeated in Greece, or if there is a period of ‘appeasement’ in which the

¹ For the complete text of General Markos’ letter, see Appendix II. The offensive which began with the raids in Karditsa, Náoussa, and Karpenísi in the past winter was evidently an application of what we know as the ‘Popovitch Plan’.

Communists will once more take part in elections and perhaps even in the Government, or even if the Greek State is victorious and rejects every compromise (as it must, if victory is to be complete), the secret conspiratorial organisation of the Party will remain in some form, unless its extirpation is radical and final.

The total membership of the Greek Communist Party can only be conjectured. At the head of its organisation is the *Politbureau* (Πολιτικόν Γραφείον) of seven members. Under the *Politbureau* is the *Central Committee* of thirty-five members. The hostility of the peasant to Communism has compelled the Party to conceal its true character in the rural areas. It therefore maintains, under the secret control of the *Politbureau*, but independently of the *Central Committee*, an organisation called the *Greek Agrarian Party*, which tries to promote disaffection without using Communist slogans or disclosing Communist doctrine.

The urban organisations are under the *Central Committee*. As these are all of the same type, it will suffice to describe the Athenian organisation. It has its own *Central Committee* which controls sixteen branches of 'rays' (Ἀχτίδες) of which eight are organised according to trades and professions (industrial workers, civil servants, bank clerks, reservists, and so on), and eight according to the quarters of the city (Plaka, Kolonaki, Glyphada, Peristeri, and so on). Under every 'ray' there are several 'cells' (the 'cell' is the basic unit of the Party).

In Athens and in all the larger towns there is a special organisation under the local *Central Committee*, but independent of the rest of the Party, known as the *Vigilance* (Ἐπαγρύπνησης). Its chief task is to spy on fellow Communists and to report all 'deviations' from the 'Party line', or any

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acts of indiscretion, carelessness, cowardice, or treachery perpetrated by fellow members.

The rules relating to secrecy make up twenty-eight paragraphs in a special booklet of sixteen pages—entitled ‘Basic Principles of Vigilance’ (Βασικοί Κανόνες Επαγρύπνησης)—which was secretly issued in 1947. A few examples will suffice to show the character of these ‘principles’ (the numbers refer to the paragraphs in the booklet):

1. It is a crime against the Party and against the nation to discuss the Party with anyone, including wife, husband, or friend.

2. It is forbidden to question any comrade about the Party and, in particular, about the Committees of the Party.

7. Never make a note of anything you can commit to memory. You must know all addresses or pass-words by heart. If you must make a note, write it so that no one else can read it, but do not forget that there is no code that cannot be de-coded. Keep notes on your person and on pieces of paper so small that they can be swallowed.

8. Do not keep any documents in your room, or, if you must do so for the work of the Party, hide them somewhere out of doors at night.

9. Do not give any sign of recognition when you meet a comrade in the street unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Do not differ from others in your clothing or in your manner. Every member must know buildings, restaurants, and taverns which have more than one exit so that he may escape from traitors the more easily.

11. Four or five days before an organised action, clear your room of any incriminating evidence. To be taken prisoner through carelessness while one of these actions is being prepared constitutes front-line desertion.

It is to be observed that the Party identifies itself with the interests of the nation (rule 1) and that it regards its opponents as ‘traitors’—‘traitors’ to the ‘nation’.

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The most important and formidable secret organisation of the Party is the *Self-Defence* or *Aftoámyna* (Ἀυτοάμυνα). It was originally formed to train the *cadres* for revolutionary action in the towns. The *cadres* were organised in 1946. They were composed of convinced Communists as well as non-Communists who were fugitives from justice, including many who had taken part in the massacres in 1944 and were liable to prosecution under the Common law. The *Aftoámyna* was reorganised in October, 1946, to perform the following tasks:

1. To spy on all officers of the Greek army, navy, air force, police, and constabulary, and to make a particular study of their habits, their friends, and their value as officers.
2. To spy on all political persons, especially members of Parliament, and on all leading 'traitors'.
3. To draw up lists, with details, of all buildings used by the armed forces, the police, and the constabulary, by the larger firms, as well as of power stations, telephone exchanges and so on.
4. To commit acts of terrorism and sabotage, to blow up buildings and bridges, to damage and destroy rolling stock.
5. To murder such politicians and such officers of the armed forces, police, and constabulary, and such members of the various nationalist organisations who may be considered particularly dangerous.
6. To collect information of every kind about movements of troops, military transports, defensive positions, and so on.

The members of the *Aftoámyna* are chosen from amongst the most fanatical members of the Party, preference being given to those who have a criminal record and have distinguished themselves by their daring and by their capacity for secret conspiratorial work—a man with such a record is likely to be 'safe' from the Communist point of view because he is *ipso facto* at war with society).

Under the German occupation, the Party maintained a

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secret organisation known as OPLA, the counterpart of the Yugoslav OZNA, the Russian NKVD (now the MVD), and the German *Gestapo*. Its chief duty was to track down and execute recalcitrant or 'deviationary' Communists as well as Loyalists who were considered dangerous to the Communist cause. These duties were taken over by the *Aftodmyna*. Men who had shown proficiency as executioners in OPLA became the principal executioners in the *Aftodmyna*.

Members of the *Aftodmyna* are placed in all the organisations of the Party from the 'cell' upwards but are not known to their fellow members. The *Aftodmyna* is, therefore, a secret organisation within a secret organisation. Except that it takes its orders from the Central Committee, it is self-contained. It is accountable to no one for the money it spends.

When it receives an order to commit murder or arson, a group, or *Synergeia*, of at least three persons is formed to carry out the deed. These three persons will be introduced to one another under assumed names by an agent of the Central Committee. Their number may be increased if any technical personnel, such as drivers, electricians and so on, is required. If a murder has been ordered, a detailed study is made of the designated victim—his habits, the places he frequents, his means of defence, and how he is likely to act when assaulted. When the deed is done, the members of the group disperse, change their addresses, habits, and clothes, and concoct *alibis*.

In October, 1946, the Athenian *Aftodmyna* received orders from the Central Committee to commit a series of murders. The Party is less concerned with the murder of well-known politicians than of those unknown local patriots who are the main strength of popular resistance to Communism in Greece.

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There is not a quarter in any Greek city, there is hardly a village, without men such as these. It is to these, above all, that the Party owes its failure to raise even a riot, for it is around these obscure and natural leaders that the people rally in the hour of extreme danger. Policemen or Constables who have distinguished themselves by their devotion to duty are also exposed to 'execution' as 'traitors' by the Communists. Both the police and the Constabulary have had heavy losses by assassination. As a result of the order issued in October, 1946, Variti, a lecturer at Makroyanni; Mesolora, a confectioner in Plaka; Panolisskou, a restaurant-keeper at Metaxourgion; Roussos, a second-hand dealer at Peristeri; and Papgeorgiu, a corporal living in Pankrati, were murdered.

Thanks to the great efficiency of the Athenian police and the support it received from the public, the number of murders fell far short of Communist expectation. When the *Eleftheri Ellada* had broadcast its incitement to murder Zervas, Gonatas, and Papandreou, and nothing happened, the Athenian Communist leaders were severely reprimanded by the *Politbureau* and goaded into action. An abortive attempt was made on the life of Gonatas, but it failed, on the 9th of December, 1947. A policeman, named Douvis, was killed. Machinery and installations were wrecked in the Yeka motor-works in the Piraeus and on the air-field at Elefsis. Murder and wrecking were also perpetrated in Salonica. Some of the most efficient of the Communist murderers and wreckers were recruited from amongst those who were released from prison towards the end of 1947 under the amnesty proclaimed by the Greek Government when Mr Sophoulis became Prime Minister. Whether the Government acted on its own initiative or on Anglo-American

advice is not clear. In any case, there was a general determination to show the world that the Government would, under the leadership of the aged liberal politician, follow a liberal policy.

Although Greek prisons tend to be overcrowded and insanitary, the inmates are allowed considerable latitude. They can engage in unlimited political discussion. The Communist prisoners are able to prepare their plans for the future, hold classes, spread their doctrine and make, from amongst the prisoners, a selection of men who, by their intelligence, cunning, and resourcefulness (not to speak of their criminal records), promise to serve the Party well if they are released under an amnesty, if they are rescued, or if they escape. The Greek prisons are, in fact, in the nature of political training schools for the theory and practice of Communism. That is the reason why the Greek people must pay so heavy a price in killed and wounded, in abducted women and children, in burnt villages, and so on, for every amnesty.

On the 1st of May, Dr Ladas, the Greek Minister of Justice, was murdered. The murderers and their accomplices were caught, whereupon the police were able to track down the greater part of the Athenian *Aftodmyna*. In the following month, Mr Polk, the correspondent of the Columbia Broadcasting Company, was murdered in Salonika. Like several other American or British broadcasters or journalists, he had consistently favoured the cause of the Party. The Communists calculated that by murdering him and attributing the crime to the Greek police (those 'Fascists' and 'lack-eyes of American imperialism') public opinion would be stirred up against Greece in the United States. The murder would, in other words, be 'good propaganda'. It received

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considerable publicity, but whereas the Communist press asserted or insinuated that Mr Polk had indeed been murdered by the Greek police, the non-Communist press rightly refrained from expressing an opinion as long as the facts were in doubt. When the facts were no longer in doubt, the murderer having been arrested, the Communist press was silent.¹

The *Aftodmyna* in Athens, Salonica, Volos, Patras, Lamia, Tripoli, and other towns, was the *cadre* of an insurrectionary force which was to have acted in conjunction with the *Aftodmyna* in the villages and with the *Democratic Army*. Although it failed to 'revolutionise' the towns, it was of great use to the *Democratic Army*. It organised the secret traffic in arms, supplies, money, and recruits and provided information about the movements of troops, the plans of the Greek General Staff and the intentions of the Government. Its espionage in the army appears to have been very efficient.

The 'basic unit' in the village is a committee of three persons. These units are 'the eyes and ears of the *Democratic Army*'. In an order signed by General Markos and dated the 27th of December, 1946, it is stated that the *Aftodmyna*

'watch the movements of the enemy and his agents ... they help us by securing cattle, housing, food, etc. They help us by calling up *Andartes*² [i.e. recruits for the *Democratic Army*] and by sending us reliable and suitable men.'

Until the heavy fighting which began in the summer of 1948, more Greek soldiers were killed and wounded by exploding mines than were killed and wounded in battle. Most of the mines are laid by the rural *Aftodmyna*. Throughout Greece

¹ The facts were established at the trial of Stakhtopoulos, the accomplice of the murderer of Mr Polk, Mouzenidis, who escaped to the mountains after the deed (v. 'Murder for Propaganda' in *Time and Tide*, 30th April, 1949).

² *Andartes* is the customary and traditional term for insurgents.

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the groups of the *Aftodmyna* communicate with one another by morse and the whole organisation is in direct or indirect wireless communication with the headquarters of the *Democratic Army*.

The Greek regular army and Constabulary have been engaged against the Communists without intermission since the end of the summer of 1946. Even the smallest band of armed Communists always has one or more of many attainable objectives—a village and its inhabitants, an isolated farm, a few men and women working in the fields, a flock of sheep, a bridge, road, or railway line, an outpost, a detachment of Constabulary, and so on. The Communists are not committed to the defence of any region, for whatever they hold is a part of Greece and, therefore, a desirable object of destruction, whether by themselves or by the Greek army. There is no position which they cannot afford to abandon, with the possible exception of Mount Grammos.

The Greek army, Constabulary, and police are committed to the defence of Greece, and, therefore, of everything—villages, men and women working in the fields, and so on. It has but one objective—the concentrations of the *Democratic Army*. But these concentrations dissolve or move elsewhere, unless they can be contained. The task of containing them demands far more troops than are needed for any attack. A thousand men, or more, are needed to dislodge, say, a hundred Communists holding some mountain stronghold. And even when these have been dislodged, they may disperse and reassemble elsewhere and resume their task of massacre, arson and pillage. Even so, an army and a Constabulary numbering some hundred and fifty thousand in all could, in a year or two, destroy and disperse Communist forces numbering, say, twenty-five thousand. But the

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existence of a border across which the Partisans can take flight, and of a friendly soil on which they can replenish their spirits, their numbers, their arms and ammunition, make it impossible for Greece to be other than a besieged garrison, as it were, which can foil attacks (although rarely knowing from which quarter they come) and make vigorous sorties, but cannot stop the recurrence of these attacks, and cannot, by any sortie, however well prepared and executed, compel the enemy to raise the siege.

In the spring of 1948, the Greek army undertook a well-prepared and comprehensive campaign against the Communists. It had a series of successes. It was able to free extensive rural areas from infestation and the peasants were able to re-populate their deserted villages and cultivate the fields from which they had been driven. The principal Communist stronghold was Mount Grammos, a forbidding, precipitous mountain-mass abutting the Albanian border. The operations against this stronghold went well at first. A force of Communists, numbering about ten thousand, was dislodged and dispersed. Many were killed, wounded and taken prisoner. But some 3,000 escaped across the Albanian border. A new stronghold was prepared and held by them with reinforcements from wandering and scattered bands in the region of Vitsi and Prespa. But the Greek troops, who were sent to capture the heights commanding this region, showed a certain weariness for the first time, for they had been battling with little intermission for some eighteen months. The region of Vitsi and Prespa became 'a second Grammos' and the year 1948 ended inconclusively.

Considerable Greek forces were immobilised in the north. This gave the Communists their opportunity to make destructive raids in Epirus, Thessaly and the Peloponnese.

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One of the main supply-routes of the *Democratic Army* runs from Argyrocastro, in Albania, to the Greek border. Outside the village of Kastányani, in Greece, there is a sandbagged emplacement from where the Communist supply-columns can be seen, without field-glasses, moving along the Albanian road and disappearing among the forests on the border. At night, the headlights of the lorries are visible in clear weather.

There is frequent firing from the Albanian side, though seldom more than a few bursts of machine-gun fire and an occasional shot from a trench-mortar. Whoever cares to visit Kastányani can see and hear these things for himself. No difficulty is placed in his way, though it will take him the greater part of a day to reach Kastányani from Yannina by jeep, as far as the roads will allow, and then up and down the mountain tracks on foot or on mule-back.

What has happened in Kastányani itself has happened in hundreds of Greek villages. Before the German-Italian invasion, there were 160 houses. The Germans destroyed most of these. None have been rebuilt and the rubble and masonry still lie heaped and scattered. In January, 1948, the Communists arrived. They executed the priest, his sister, and seven other villagers who, by word or deed, had shown their loyalty to Greece. The Communists destroyed the houses of their victims and cut down the vines. They abducted ten young women and gave orders that all children aged from three to fourteen should be ready to leave for Albania on the 10th of March. They drove off all the live-stock and took all the food except for a few sheep and goats and some sacks of grain which the villagers had been able to drive afield or hide when they saw the Communists coming. Early on the 9th of March, a detachment of Greek troops

occupied the village. They found it almost deserted, for men of military age had been called up for service in the Royal Hellenic Army. The younger women had gone, for fear lest the Communists might return. Only a few old women and some children were left. The Greek authorities decided that the children be taken to Yannina. One morning, the children were placed on mules and, amid the bleating of lambs and goats, the occasional report of a rifle or trench mortar, and the sound of weeping, they took the road, or rather track, escorted by a platoon. It was the old women who were weeping, for, although they were glad at heart that the children would be safe, they themselves would be all alone, probably for the rest of their days. There was no telling how long the soldiers would stay. If these were to go, the Communists would surely return. They sat together, in a large, bare room, in front of a fire (for it is cold in March), moaning their *ekh-ekh-ekh*. There was nothing left for them to live for.

And yet, to the stranger they show all the proud courtesy of the peasant. With backs bent by years of labour in the fields, they stump along to fetch water. With gnarled hands they gather twigs to replenish the fire, so that the stranger may have some tea before he leaves. As they deem it ungracious not to smile upon him, a sudden radiance lights up the bleary eyes and the features that are as dark and furrowed as the black sunburnt earth. To offer them money for service done would be resented. Even a small present causes embarrassment. But the embarrassment is eased when from a great wooden chest, primitively but beautifully carved and painted, one of them draws a bottle of *tsípouro*, the strong, home-distilled liquor of the mountains, and gives it to the stranger 'for the road'.

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Observers sent by the *Balkans Commission* spent several days at Kastányani in March, 1948. They watched the supply columns, heard the firing, and saw trench-mortar shells burst in the village. To make sure where the firing came from, they descended the mountain-slope and watched from amongst the trees on the frontier-line. They were themselves fired at by marksmen concealed on Albanian territory. They duly reported the fact to the *Commission*.

This is a small example of what is officially termed the 'fact-finding' which is the whole duty of the *Commission*. The 'facts', when 'found', are embodied in a general report to the *Security Council*.

If the Greek troops at Kastányani were to return the fire from across the border, they, or rather the Greek State, would be committing a breach of international law by violating the Albanian frontier in time of peace. The Communists can, therefore, shoot with complete impunity as long as they are on Albanian soil. They can also, with impunity, cross the border under cover or after dark, and, hiding amongst the trees and undergrowth, open fire and withdraw to the security of Albanian soil as soon as they are discovered and draw the fire of the Greeks who, having exposed their own positions, or having left them to pursue the enemy, become targets for the marksmen who are once more sheltered by the frontier.

What is happening in one small position on the Albanian border is happening in varying degrees of frequency and intensity in other positions along those six hundred miles of mountain frontier that separate Greece from these neighbours. For the most part, it happens without being recorded, in regions so remote, desolate, and hard of access that they defy the vigilance of the press and of the *Commission*.

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There are, along those six hundred miles of frontier, about thirty passes through which armed bands or units could cross into Greek territory. To observe and record such crossings, the *Balkans Commission* would have to maintain about thirty *observer corps* permanently on the passes. Each *corps* would have to comprise 50-100 *observers*, according to the size of the pass. It would then be possible to inform the *Security Council* of the major incursions into Greece as they occur. Minor incursions, by small bands of men avoiding the passes, would hardly be observed. But, in any case, incursions, such as those near Skra in November, 1946, and near Konitsa in December, 1947, could be speedily signalled.

Border incursions could, in this manner, be restricted if the *Security Council*, or the Powers authorised by the *Security Council*, were able to restrain the responsible States. But in what respect are they to act? What are they to do? Remonstrate? Protest? Address an ultimatum to one or other of the northern Powers, or to all three? And what if the ultimatum is rejected?

Great Britain and America are bound by abstract principles embodied in the *Charter*. They must limit their defence of a vital interest, the preservation of Greek independence, to help which just enables Greece to live and even to strike at her internal enemy, but does not enable her to return the blows of her external enemies, although her internal and external enemies are, in a last analysis, one.

Russia and her associates are able to act with complete impunity at little or no cost. American aid to Greece is considerable. In financial terms it came to \$350,000,000 in the fiscal year 1948. A larger sum, probably \$400,000,000, will be needed for the year 1949. Great Britain maintains a

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small force in Greece,¹ although her armed forces are perilously inadequate for home and imperial defence. But these two items are trivial compared with the demands which the threat to Greek independence places upon Anglo-American strategy in the Mediterranean. The defence of Turkey would be much easier if Greece were secure, if her armed forces, instead of being engaged by the Communists, were free to take part in the general defence of the eastern Mediterranean. The threat to the Straits would hardly exist if Greece had been able to recover in normal fashion after the war.

* * * * *

Without American aid, the Greek State could not continue to maintain the army and pay the civil servants. Without this aid, the war would probably become a struggle between two forces composed of partisan bands—Loyalist and Communist—to the advantage of the latter, seeing that they would have the continued support of the northern neighbours. Probably this support would be decisive, for any lack of interest in Greek independence on the part of Great Britain and the United States would convince the northern Powers, and rightly so, that there need be no limit to their intervention in Greece. Today, nothing prevents those Powers from invading Greece in force, except the justified fear that Great Britain and the United States would regard the invasion as a *casus belli*. It is true that the small British force in Greece would probably be overwhelmed by the invaders if they were to advance on Salonica. But the mere fact that British troops were engaged would at once transform the international situation. This, of course, is the reason

¹ About 5,000 men at the beginning of 1948. Its present strength is not disclosed.

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why the Communists and the *Fellow Travellers* have never ceased to demand the withdrawal of the British troops.

Great Britain and the United States are protecting Greece against open invasion and conquest and assisting her in her struggle against the internal enemy. But they are unable or unwilling to restrain the Powers which maintain that enemy. Greece herself is obviously unable to restrain them. The Russian coalition can, therefore, continue to operate on Greek soil through the Greek Communist Party for the purpose of converting Greece into a Communist State, of securing Salonica as a port for Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, of outflanking the Straits, and of establishing a political and strategic position of the highest importance on the eastern Mediterranean. While the Russian coalition operates on Greek soil, the Western Powers refrain from operating on the soil of that coalition. The war is waged offensively by one coalition against another but only on the soil of that other.

The United States and Great Britain have to bear a mounting cost. The cost to Greece is beyond computation. No country in the world could continue many years longer what she has been enduring for more than eight years. The costs Russia and her associates have to bear are trivial. No Russian, Yugoslav, Bulgarian, or Albanian troops have to be kept in the field. These Powers suffer no casualties. Their men, women and children are not massacred and abducted. Their villages are not destroyed. They are not afflicted by vast flights of population. The arms, ammunition, and other supplies with which they provide the Greek Communist Party are enough to sustain the Sedition and, in time, to promote the final ruin and collapse of Greece, and yet so small in quantity that to give them imposes no appreciable sacrifice.

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The *Democratic Army* has had considerable losses, but these are easily replaced, for the numbers demanded for the *guerrilla* are not large. None of the Communist leaders are sacrificed. Not one of the better known amongst the Greek Communists has fallen in battle during the last two years. The Party is able to keep its *cadre* intact. The number of men it has in the field is probably between 20,000 and 25,000. Despite heavy casualties, it is able to maintain this number by enrolling the younger members of the Party, some of whom receive training at Bulkes in Yugoslavia, and by extensive use of the press-gang.

Nevertheless, the life of the militant Communist in Greece is hard and dangerous. From a military point of view, the achievement of the Greek Communist Party is considerable. To perpetuate a condition of ruinous and bloody warfare and to defy the Western Powers, year after year, demands skill, resolution, and endurance, however effective the assistance of the Russian coalition may be. But the great sufferers are the Greek people, the peasantry above all.

Even if it were possible to seal the northern border, intervention by the northern Powers could continue, but it could do no more than sustain a sporadic *guerrilla*. Gun-running along the coast from Albanian bases offers no difficulty. On two occasions in the year 1948, the Greek navy intercepted and sank a merchantman carrying arms and ammunition for the Communists. The Gulf of Corinth is successfully patrolled by the navy, but for the control of the entire immensely long and deeply indented Greek coast and of the numerous islands a large blockading force would be needed.

It may seem a little grotesque to speak of Albania as a naval Power, yet such is her function, not only under the

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terms of the agreement between the Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian General Staffs referred to in the last chapter, but in the general scheme of Russia's Mediterranean policy. The increased importance of submarine warfare has been fully recognised by the United States.

In February, 1948, Admiral Danfield, Chief of Naval Operations, stated that

'A surface-to-surface battle is not much in our thoughts these days and we are left free to concentrate on surface-to-air and surface-to-under-sea probabilities as far as combat at sea is concerned.'¹

J. L. Sullivan, Secretary of the United States Navy, said, with reference to Russia:

'Other nations are not oblivious to the offensive power of the submarine in challenging our control of the seas, particularly by operation of large numbers of underwater high-speed submarines comparable to the latest-type German designs, perfected at the end of the last war and fortunately never used against the Allies. ... When War II started, Hitler had fifty submarines and he very nearly won the Battle of the Atlantic. There is a nation which has to our certain knowledge, more than 250 submarines today. ...'

The *New York Herald Tribune*, commenting on Mr Sullivan's statement, wrote:

'It is an open secret that Russia has such a large number of undersea craft, including some of the latest Nazi vessels. ... Secretary Sullivan's modern definition of the traditional mission of the Navy is that it should be so constituted that in the event of war it can "play its part in assuring that the war will be fought, as in the past, in foreign waters, in foreign skies, and in foreign lands, rather than around, above, and on American soil—the people of Poland,

¹ *New York Herald Tribune*, 2nd Sept., 1948.

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Germany, Italy and Japan appreciate the importance of that requirement.”¹

So do the people of Greece!

In Russian strategy, whether it be offensive, as it is today, or defensive, as it may be some day, Albania is a position of some importance. Great Britain, by giving help to the Albanian Communists and denying help to the Nationalists during the Second World War, established Russia on the Adriatic and gave her access to the Mediterranean. The deep, extensive, and defensible harbours of Valona and Durazzo are ideal bases for offensive submarine warfare. If Greece were to fall, she would provide Russia with such bases, stations, and places of concealment and refuge for submarines. The Straits could not be closed, if Russia were to command the western shores, as she would, if Greece were under her domination, and the eastern Mediterranean could be made untenable by a submarine fleet—not to speak of the air-force which, based on Greek soil, could assist a submarine offensive.

If Greece were to fall, she would have to be reconquered by Great Britain and the United States at a sacrifice immeasurably greater than the sacrifice imposed by the present defence of her security.

Except for the magnitude of the human tragedy and the immediacy of the peril, Greece resembles the other positions that are being contested in what is known as the ‘cold war’, a war more merciless than many a ‘hot’ war of old. The defence of each position imposes a sacrifice upon the Western Powers. Upon the afflicted populations, it imposes immeasurable suffering. Upon Russia and her associates it imposes no sacrifice at all.

¹ *New York Herald Tribune*, 2nd Sept., 1948.

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The Balance of Power in China was destroyed when the First World War eliminated the Germans in the Far East. Only this Balance could curb the Chinese anarchy and prop the administrative and fiscal authority of the Chinese State. That triumph of pacifism, the Washington Conference on Disarmament in 1921 and 1922, made war between Japan and the United States impossible for many years. The result was that Japan acquired freedom of action in China. She was able to gain control of Manchuria because neither the United States nor Great Britain, nor both Powers together, nor the League of Nations were capable of effective intervention. The preponderance which Japan was achieving was brought to an end by her overthrow in the Second World War. When the United States abandoned nationalist China for reasons which were largely irrelevant, such as the corrupt nature of the Nationalist Government and its failure to attain an unattainable democracy, they ensured the victory of the Communists. Russia did no more than allow the Communists to take the war-material abandoned by Japan. This was her whole sacrifice!

It is said, today, that the Chinese character is averse from Communism—so is the Polish, the Rumanian, the German, the French, the Greek—and that China will never be a Communist State. That may or may not be so, but Russia has already become the preponderant Power. It is the first time in modern history that any foreign Power has achieved an unchallenged preponderance in China. And this prodigious achievement has cost Russia nothing.

The Turks, by their great patriotism, the dourness and the sobriety of their character, their great knowledge of the Russians (a knowledge which made them uncompromising with regard to all Russian overtures), and their refusal to

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tolerate any internal Communist movement, have been spared the fate of China and of Greece. But the Russian menace imposes a heavy sacrifice upon them, in so far as they must be permanently mobilised and must assign about half their national expenditure to the maintenance of their armed forces. In course of time, the burden cannot but become intolerable. But to impose it costs Russia nothing.

The threat to Greek independence is a challenge to the Anglo-American command of the sea. The part played by Albania in the execution of that threat is primary. She, rather than Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, is the main supporter of the Greek Communist Party, because she maintains the principal supply-columns in the border country, because she affords the *Democratic Army* its principal base both for offensive operations and for rest and re-organisation, and because, with *caïques* and other craft, she is able to supply the *Democratic Army* even in the Peloponnese.

If the northern Powers were to abstain entirely from intervention in Greece, the Greek State would still have a costly and arduous task, for, in a mountainous country with few communications, bands of *guerrilleros* can subsist for a long time. The *Democratic Army* would be reduced little by little, its main strongholds would be taken. In any case the threat to the Greek State would no longer exist the moment foreign intervention were to cease.

The deadliest weapon against armed bands, namely reprisal, is denied to the Greek army. During the Second World War, the Germans used this weapon effectively. They were not much concerned with the total suppression of these bands. All they were concerned with was to guard their own lines of communication and their own garrisons, stores, depots, and so on. In this they were, on the whole, successful.

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Except for rare acts of *sabotage*, like the destruction by British agents, assisted by Greek *guerrilleros*, both Loyalist and Communist, of the bridge at Gorgopotami, irregular warfare, as waged in Greece, was of little value against the enemy. What little value it had was far outweighed by the sacrifice it imposed and by the disastrous political consequences, for the present attack on Greek independence, that is to say on Great Britain and the United States, would not be possible if it had not been prepared under the German occupation, in connivance first with the Bulgarians and then with the Germans themselves. The same is true in varying degree of irregular and so-called 'political' warfare wherever it was waged by the western Powers. Only Russia waged it successfully—not against the Germans (except in her own country), but against the Western Powers, through the agency of Communist Parties and their armed forces who, while fighting the Germans upon occasion, always subordinated that fight to the war of extermination against the loyalists in their own countries and to the seizure of political power designed to place those countries under Communist dictatorship hostile to Great Britain and the United States and, of course, under subjection to Russia.

The Germans, if attacked by *Partisans*, would retaliate by burning the nearest village and executing hostages. The result was that the peasantry dreaded the *Partisans* more than they dreaded the Germans. The German occupation was ruthless, but unless the Germans were themselves attacked, they did not, as a rule, destroy and kill. They exterminated Jews, and they crushed all opposition cruelly, but something like normal life could go on under military commanders who were interested in the prosecution of the war and not in the internal politics of the countries they

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occupied. A Russian or a Communist occupation is a different matter. The Germans regarded National Socialism as the faith of an *élite*, whereas the Communists regard Communism as the true faith which all must accept for salvation in this world. Under National Socialism other faiths can subsist—Judaism excepted—as long as they do not oppose National Socialism or aspire to become rival faiths. Even in Poland, which suffered as much as Greece under the German occupation, a specifically Polish existence, in terms of religion, tradition, art and letters, could go on. The National Socialist domination of conquered countries was, as it were, horizontal. Communist domination is vertical. National Socialism will tolerate or ignore subject *élites*. Communism means the suppression of every *élite*.

It is for these reasons that the Communist infestation of Greece is more grievous than the German occupation was. Those who did not resist the Germans were generally left in peace. The Germans did not make war on the Greek social and political order, on the family, on religion and custom. Their purpose was strategic. They needed Greece because she was a base and a place of transit for their operations in the eastern Mediterranean and, had they won the war, they would have converted her into a strategic position. The Greeks would have lost their national independence, but the Greek national spirit would not have perished. The Greeks would have been in bondage, as they were under the Turks, but their beliefs and loyalties would have been preserved for the future day of liberation. The continuity of centuries would not have been broken.

Under the Communists that continuity would be broken. The Greek national spirit and all that renders the Greeks different from other people would be extinguished. This

work of extinction is being undertaken by the Greek Communist Party to-day. It is against the extinction of the Greek spirit that the Greek people are fighting today, against a menace more terrible than any they have experienced during their three thousand years of history. If they fall, the extinction will be radical, for, with the exception of Greek communities in Egypt, the United States, and elsewhere, the Greeks are today confined to one small area, to Greece and the Islands. Once the Communists are the masters, there will be no escape. And if it is said that in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and so on, something of the national character subsists, despite the Communist domination, the answer is that this domination has only just begun. What it has already achieved in reducing patriotic and civilised communities to a state of mental and physical bondage, has surely no parallel in European history.

Bands of *guerrilleros* subsisted in Yugoslavia under the name of *Crusaders* until the end of 1947. They were crushed by terrorism directed not so much against themselves as against the peasants. Any village supplying them with food or harbouring one of their men would be treated just as the Germans treated a village selected for reprisal. Such methods are possible in a State which, like Yugoslavia today, is terroristically governed. Marshal Tito is a terrorist. King Paul of Greece is not. The Greek Communists terrorise the villages *into* supplying the *Democratic Army* and *out* of assisting the Royal Hellenic Army and Constabulary. Every visitation of the *Democratic Army* is terroristic. The arrival of regular troops is a liberation. But if these troops withdraw, all who have helped them, or even welcomed them, will suffer if the Communists return. The joy, felt by all except the few who

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favour the Communists, is marred by dread lest the troops depart again.

The weapon of reprisal, therefore, is denied to the forces of the Greek Crown. They cannot terrorise whole populations as the Communists do, they cannot burn a village and execute hostages, as the Germans did. It is in the interest of the Communists to avoid battle with the Greek army as it was in the interest of Partisans and other *guerrilleros* to avoid battle with the Germans. It was not in the interest of the Germans to seek battle with the *Partisans*, because to do so would have meant undertaking prolonged and arduous expeditions into difficult and mountainous country against an elusive enemy with small hope of achieving a decisive result. Generally speaking, the strategy of regular armies is dominated by the necessity of decisive concentration, the strategy of *guerrilleros* is dominated by indecisive dispersion.

The Greek army must constantly seek out the enemy. It must always be concentrating. But it always has to concentrate against several positions at the same time. It has one objective: the concentrations of the *Democratic Army*. But these concentrations are rare, and, when attacked, elusive.

As long as the losses of the *Democratic Army* can be made good, thanks to help received from abroad, and as long as it has the security of foreign lands to recuperate and re-organise, it is beyond the power of the Greek State to bring the war to a successful conclusion. Of course Russia and her confederates, and the Greek Communist Party, want victory in Greece—victory, final, decisive and complete. But they have time. They can wait for years, for ten years, or twenty—seeing that it costs them little or nothing to perpetuate the present state of Greece.

The greatest, the most heroic, and the most skilful effort on

the part of the Greek people cannot decide the issue with unchallengeable finality. Even if Greece had none of the defects commonly attributed to her, even if the attacks on her Government, on her military leaders, on her political system were wholly unjustified, and she were in every respect a model of efficiency—even then, a final decision would be beyond her power.

Nothing is to be expected of the United Nations. There are no substitutes for national policy, which is applied power. Conferences, Councils, Assemblies, Charters, treaties, conventions are results or expressions of policy, but they are not policy. The challenge to Anglo-American sea-power can only be met by sea-power. If Great Britain and the United States are unwilling to sacrifice Greece, if they are unwilling to have her converted into a hostile strategic position, if they are unwilling to witness the extinction of Turkish independence, if they do not wish to see the Straits pass under the domination of a potential enemy, if they do not wish the security, not only of the eastern Mediterranean itself, but of the whole region between the Libyan Desert and the frontiers of Afghanistan, to be imperilled they must be prepared to subject Albania to the pressure of sea-power.

To save Greece, it is not enough to keep her alive. It may become necessary to curb the small but significant Power that is playing so decisive a part. It would probably be impolitic to allow Greece freedom of action in operating across the Albanian border, although Greece has a *casus belli* many times over against Albania. But Albania is on the sea, she is more accessible to Anglo-American pressure than to Russian. She is strategically nearer to the Western Powers by virtue of their naval supremacy. The exercise of that pressure would be attended by certain risks.

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There would certainly be some counterstroke on the part of Russia and her confederates, a counterstroke which might be felt in some other region—in Berlin, perhaps, or in Trieste or Salonica. But there is nothing the Atlantic Powers can do to advance their vital interests that can be done without risks—and, as time (which works against them and for Russia) passes, to do nothing at all is to run the greatest risk of all.

It would be beyond the scope of the present study to discuss the manner in which sea-power should be applied. But this much must be said: If the two Great Powers that command the Mediterranean are unable to exercise pressure upon a country which has a coast and two considerable ports, a country which, even today, threatens their vital interests by conniving in the effort to extinguish Greek independence, a country which has a significant part to play in the larger scheme for the overthrow of Anglo-American supremacy—if the two Great Powers are unable to do anything whatever, if they remain passive, hoping for the best, and fearing to give offence or provocation, they are but storing up disaster for themselves. They will find that the sacrifices which they would now avoid will have to be made notwithstanding, that these sacrifices will be all the greater as time passes, and that whereas they can, for some time to come, use their power without precipitating a general war, though not, it is true, without some risks, they will, if they refrain, be compelled to use their power later on, with far greater risks and, if war came, with a diminished chance of victory. For, if Russia is master of Greece, the strategic situation of Great Britain and the United States in the Mediterranean, that region of great decisions in the past, present, and future, will have been so transformed to their disadvantage, that they

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will have to execute decisions in many places, and not only in Greece—decisions that will be the more difficult in a war that will be the more probable.¹

Sooner or later events will force the Western Powers out of their attitude of purely passive defence, though whether they will respond by a general change of policy or will resort to limited action as the necessity arises (whether in Greece, or elsewhere) cannot be foreseen as yet. There are many reasons why the existing European situation cannot endure, and amongst these reasons two are especially plain and compelling, the one relating to Germany, the other to Greece:

The Germans are recovering their national will and are the more formidable because they are, to-day, animated by sober patriotism rather than by zealotry. The Germans will not remain divided indefinitely, and it is impossible either for Russia or for the Western Powers to go on declaring for German national unity while withholding national unity from the Germans. Germany will either associate herself with Russia or with the Western Powers as a semi-independent Power, or she will achieve independence, in which case she will choose her associates, in accordance with her own interests and wishes, as an independent Power.

In any case, the Germans will transform the European situation. That Russia will act, perhaps drastically, in

¹ Power, applied to Albania, taking the form, perhaps, of control over Valona and Durazzo, would, indirectly be power applied to Yugoslavia. Yugoslav—and perhaps even Bulgarian—intervention in Greece would almost certainly cease (and could, in any case, be made to cease) if it were made clear that the purpose of Anglo-American action in Albania was to put an end to all extraneous support to the Greek Communist Party and the *Democratic Army*. If established in Albania, Great Britain and the United States would hold a position that would enable them to exercise a decisive influence in Balkan affairs. The available evidence would seem to show that the vast majority of the population would welcome that influence as offering a prospect of liberation from intolerable tyranny.

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accordance with her interests is sure enough. The Western Powers will then be unable to preserve their negative attitude.

Deferred decisions have accumulated. In Greece, Great Britain and the United States will be compelled to decide whether they can accept the extinction of Greek independence and its consequences or remove the threat to that independence. Hitherto, events have made their policy, whereas Russian policy has made events. Until they make a decision, or until further events force them into a decision, there is nothing the Greek people can do but fight on uncompromisingly.

The fight of the Greek people is surely one of the most astonishing in our time. None other is more replete with pity, horror, and glory. To judge the character of this fight we must consider that Greece is in the ninth year of a war in which she has fought the Italians, the Germans, the Bulgarians and the Communists; that she has no outstanding statesman or national leader today; that, although her Government does not deserve the detraction cast upon it, it is, at best and worst, a very ordinary Government; that the Greek army has capable commanders but none of outstanding ability (although it may be that political control has made it impossible for outstanding ability to show itself);¹ that the Greek economy is almost ruined; that the *élite* is being exterminated; that no other country has so great a proportion of men, women, and children who have been

¹ This judgment must be modified, now that the Greek army is under the command of a great soldier, General Papagos. With regard to the other commanders, it is hard for the layman to judge whether commanders of indubitable ability like Vendiris and Kitrilakis had a fair chance. The master of partisan warfare in Greece was Zervas. He began to direct operations in the Peloponnese in 1947, but was removed under pressure exercised by the United States. It is evident that the political campaign organised against him by Communists and *Fellow Travellers* on both sides of the Atlantic was successful. Because he

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rendered homeless and destitute by war; that the Greek social and political order, one of the most loosely organised in Europe, has been subjected to a sustained assault that has employed all the means of violence, coercion, disruption and persuasion habitually employed in war, revolution, and sedition, that the enemy is resolute, crafty, and merciless; that the help and protection of powerful allies afford him immunity from decisive defeat in battle; that the plenitude of affliction has been brought to overflowing by the abduction of thousands of children; that Great Britain and the United States, both of them objects of gratitude and respect, make it possible to continue but not to finish the fight; and that even in the ninth year, a year of deep disillusionment, there is no sign of an end.

If we bear all these things in mind, we must ask ourselves: What is the secret of this resistance? What fortitude of soul has made it possible?

Amongst the Communists piety has been extinguished, but some shreds of patriotism remain. Even General Markos, in his letter to Zachariadis, shows some concern over the future of the country upon which he has brought such misery. If we attend one of the military courts in which the prisoners are charged under the law relating to sedition, we shall hear many words and observe many personalities of the kind that are familiar in western Europe. There is the hardened, mature, indoctrinated Communist who is often a *Political Commissar* in the *Democratic Army*. He may know little was made to appear a 'reactionary', which he never was, his presence in the Government and in command of operations was deemed 'inadvisable'. Towards the end of 1947, Greek troops captured a document in which a military expert in the service of the *Politbureau* of the Greek Communist Party analysed the strategy of the Royal Hellenic Army. He criticised it as too orthodox and as unsuited to *partisan* warfare. He stated that General Zervas alone amongst Greek Loyalists understood this type of warfare, and expressed satisfaction that he was no longer in command (I have seen the original of this document).

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or nothing, but has a theory for everything. In him, patriotism is extinct, for to him the word *Greece* is but the name of the future Soviet Republic in a universal union of Soviet Republics. To him, the Greek people are but the imperfect embodiments of the theory, which will prevail when they have been made perfect by the excision of corrupt and extraneous matter which 'Fascists', 'capitalists' and 'imperialists' have implanted; by the purifying effect of doctrine; and by the purging and excoriating action of war, revolution, sedition, and terrorism. Such men are hardly even fanatical. They do not even hate. They have no love—and certainly no love for the people. Their conviction is unalterable. They do not accept the competence of the court because it is not a 'People's Court', or the validity of the law, because it is a 'class law'. The murders they themselves have committed are not murders, but executions in the name of 'the people'. The President, the Public Prosecutor, and the other members of the Court—these are the murderers. The law itself, and the whole proceedings, are but agencies for murdering 'democrats', who are the only true representatives of 'the people' and the only qualified dispensers of justice—of 'People's Justice' (for there is no other). Such men do not expect mercy and do not ask for it. They take the capital sentence for granted. They die bravely.

Such men are to be found in the Communist Parties of all countries. They are the *élite* of the international Communist movement, they make up the hard nuclei that give, what would otherwise be an amorphous disintegrating body, form, compactness, solidity, direction and purpose. Without such men, the Kremlin would be impotent—even in Russia.

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We shall, at one of these trials, observe many prisoners—a few of them women, and some of them mere boys and girls—who have been caught up by the fascination of the Communist idea, who have found in that idea the simple solution for every problem and the assurance of a clearly intelligible function in life and of a personal position of power, responsibility, and authority. *Intellectuals* commonly think themselves superior to other people, but only in the Communist movement is that superiority recognised, and only in that movement can the *intellectual* hope to exercise power of life and death over his fellow men. No other movement offers him such expectations of translating his rancours into action and of becoming at the same time accuser, judge, and executioner. To have a doctrine that removes all mental perplexities and makes it not only a right but a duty to use a tommy-gun, is immensely attractive to young people whose simple loyalties have been complicated, diffused, and misdirected by studies and education of a certain kind. The responsibility of countless school-teachers and of writers with a sense of personal superiority reinforced by a shallow and sophisticated rationalism for the sufferings of the Greek people is immense. It is possible, at these trials, to follow, stage by stage, the progress that begins in spiritual disorientation and apparently innocent, though not unpretentious, precocity and sophistication, that persists through membership of *Youth Movements* in which youthfulness is sacrificed to a spurious maturity, to *The Party*, and finds its consummation in the doctrinal obduracy, to the deed that is the logical application of the theory, in the position of authority for which the deed is the essential qualification—a position that may be humble, but is not humbly exercised, for the authority, even if subordinate, is,

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within its limits, absolute, seeing that it confers power of life and death. The deed does not only emancipate, it also binds, for the boy or girl who has taken part in the cruxifixion of a priest, or has committed murder or arson, is bound for life to the Communist Party because he has perpetrated the final and irrevocable act of severance from the world that was once his own. That is why the Party insists that no one can be trusted, no one can hold a position of responsibility, no one can be regarded as a true 'friend of the people', unless he has committed some crime that will irrevocably condemn him in the eyes of the society to which he once belonged. In western countries, where no seditious organisations and no mountain strongholds offer a refuge, the law places a curb upon the consequences of Communist indoctrination. What these consequences would be, even in England, if the curb were to be loosened by an extensive disruption of the social, political, and juridical order, can readily be inferred from a perusal of Communist literature. The inference becomes certainty, when we see these consequences operating in a country like Greece where the established order, although tenaciously defended, has been perilously impaired. And certainty becomes more certain when we see what sympathy the Greek Sedition enjoys in the western world—and not amongst Communists only.

Many youthful prisoners do not apprehend the reality until they face the judge. They never knew it would be like that! They are suddenly made aware that this reality is but the consequence of what they themselves have done, that it cannot be explained away in terms of dialectical materialism or of theories relating to class-warfare. The crisis of their lives is upon them. They are in terrible perplexity. The anguish of doubt, a doubt very different from the facile,

titillating scepticism of former days, shakes them to the depths of their being, if any depths remain. They will, sometimes, break down in court and weep, not so much because of punishment to come but because something they wholly believed in has been proved terribly wrong. Such young people are not beyond redemption and, even if they have fought in the ranks of the *Democratic Army*, they receive a relatively light sentence (a year or two of imprisonment, perhaps) provided they have committed no crime under the common law.

Some of the prisoners are young women who have a passionate zealotry which is distinct from the dour fanaticism of the mature, indoctrinated Communist. They are sometimes good-looking, but without softness or charm. To have murdered a 'monarchofascist' is to them a proud memory. To have taken part in an execution is an event of symbolical importance in their lives, a kind of initiation and confirmation. They are responsible for some of the most fiendish cruelties.

Many of the prisoners are peasants of a brutish and primitive nature who have been pressed into the service of the *Democratic Army* by terrorism often reinforced by destitution and despair. They are generally in a state of ignorance and perplexity. Fear has prevented them from trying to escape their captors. They are told that if they try to escape, they will be executed and, if they succeed, their families will be made to suffer—a threat that has often been carried out. And, to give such warnings a reality, they are made to witness executions of hostages and of so-called 'traitors'. As a rule, they are men who have not ventured to desert from the *Democratic Army*, but have allowed themselves to be taken prisoner without attempting resistance. They are usually acquitted.

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With the exception of the fanatical few, who are not a Hellenic, but an international, type, the prisoners generally have the rudiments of a national consciousness. The Communists of eastern Europe, especially those of Greece, are less corrupted by that disloyalty which makes the Communists of western Europe and of Germany think, talk, and act on the assumption 'my country, therefore wrong'. They are less obsequious towards Russia. The Greek Communist is less inclined than the British, French, or German Communist to deride and belittle his own country upon every occasion. To him, Russia is an ideal, but a distant ideal, a land that has been 'liberated'. But he holds that when Greece has been 'liberated' she will be better than Russia. It is necessary for the Greek Communist leaders to conceal from their followers the foreign aid which has sustained the *Democratic Army* and to denounce as a falsehood any suggestion that the victory of the Party will mean the dismemberment of Greece. No Greek Communist would venture publicly to countenance the loss of Macedonia. The agreement with the Germans, signed on the 1st of September, 1944, and that between the Albanian, Yugoslav and Bulgarian General Staffs on the 2nd of August, 1947—those and similar instruments are concealed from all except the leading members of the Party. To call an English or a German Communist a 'patriot' would be an absurdity. But it has been necessary for the Communist Parties in Greece and other eastern European countries to adopt the style of patriotism, so that patriotism, which is ineradicable in those countries, can be perverted from its true purpose. Just as the style of liberty is adopted to destroy liberty, the style of democracy to destroy democracy, so the style of patriotism is adopted to destroy the *patria*.

The combined force of events—terrible, unprecedented,

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and satanic—and of false doctrines propagated with unsurpassed cunning and determination, has, in Greece, had an impact such as can hardly be imagined in the western world. Nevertheless, the simple loyalties have stood the test. Only amongst the Communists—and not more than one Greek in ten is a Communist—has the vital link between patriotism and piety been broken. Those two loyalties in conjunction have an inner power, a solidity and a depth, and, upon occasion, a fierce intensity that induces even benevolent western observers to dismiss them as primitive or as relics of a dead past which can have no significance in the modern world. The truth is the reverse. These two loyalties embrace all that is significant and it is for lack of them that the modern world itself is losing its significance. As long as they exist, and the link between them is unbroken, the *Kingdom of Darkness* cannot prevail.

In some Greek villages where massacre and the extremes of cruelty have done their work, despair is the master. There have been occasions when the troops have failed. The Greeks would be inhuman if they were not sometimes weak. But there is no popular demand for compromise with the enemy, there is no pressure upon the politicians in favour of appeasement. If the Greek people, by a majority, or even by a considerable minority, desired capitulation (for every compromise would, in the end, mean capitulation), there is nothing that could stand in their way, for they are a free people. If a unit of the *Democratic Army* fails, it can be decimated by the internal terrorist organisation. Only a minority amongst the men of that army would continue to endure the hard campaign if their fear of the foe were not surpassed by their fear of their own masters. But a unit of the Royal Hellenic Army, if it fails, cannot be decimated.

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Neither the army itself nor the Greek people would tolerate coercion so inhuman and unjust. If patriotism and piety fail under the test that has grown severer every month, nothing can save Greece.

It is by their piety and their patriotism that the Greeks have endured for so long. It is not enough to understand the extremity of the affliction that has been endured, although if this is not understood, nothing has been understood. To understand the piety and patriotism of the Greeks it is necessary to witness the nation at worship. It is necessary to be in Greece at Easter.

The festival is far more than a celebration to commemorate the events of nearly two thousand years ago. Those events are not merely commemorated or symbolised, they actually happen, they live and are experienced. The Christian faith has a terrible and yet ravishing realism. The Crucifixion and the Resurrection happen in every village. The crucifixion of a priest by the Communists is an unintended tribute, an involuntary, though mock recognition of this actuality. The rites on Good Friday *are* the Passion, the Death and the Burial. Good Friday is a day of mourning. The people mourn indeed, though to unbelieving spectators the rites are but pageantry. When the coffin of the crucified Saviour is carried through the streets of Athens, the people *feel* the great bereavement. When the city becomes a city of fireflies, as it were, when each man, woman, and child carries a lighted candle, these lights are indeed 'the light that shineth in darkness'.

When the day of the Resurrection has come, the church-bells ring out, the sanctuaries are opened, and the mourning is transformed into rejoicing. Gladness irradiates the faces of the people and they greet one another with the words

Khristos anésti—Christ is risen. The *Kingdom of Darkness* has been overcome.

They know the reality and the actuality of the event with surer knowledge than science can give, the one past event that is ever-present. They participate in that event with an absorption that makes the transitory world seem unreal.

It is the inexhaustible piety and patriotism of the Greeks that have made their world's darkness endurable. Unless we can understand this, we cannot understand the fortitude with which they have saved their souls, their country, and much more.

APPENDIX I

DECLARATION RELATING TO THE MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE ALBANIAN, YUGOSLAV AND BULGARIAN GENERAL STAFFS WHICH WAS SIGNED AT BLED IN YUGOSLAVIA ON THE 2ND OF AUGUST, 1947.

The Military advisory representatives of the General Staffs of the People's Governments of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria; and the plenipotentiary representative of the Balkan Military Office of the National Defence Ministry of the Russian Soviet Democratic Pan-Union League, decide the following, bearing in mind the political and military background of the agreements concluded 2.8.47 at Bled, especially for the fighting Greek Democratic Army, as well as the situation created after the undisguised intervention of American Imperialism in Greece to create an offensive base against the People's Democratic Countries bordering on Greece.

1. The Staffs of the People's Democratic Governments of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria undertake to supply the means (technical stores) for military assistance to the fighting Greek Democratic Army, as well as practical measures for training, supply, and support of the Greek people who are fighting for their honour and their integrity.

2. The aforementioned Staffs undertake to organise the rear defences of the Greek Democratic Army with artillery, aviation, and infantry. These forces must be able, in many cases, to intervene decisively to assist the advance of the troops of the Greek Democratic Army.

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3. The co-signatories will take special care of the training and supply of the soldiers of the Greek Democratic Army who are fighting for democracy. To do so, they will organise training schools and hospitals on their own territory for general assistance to the Greek anti-Fascist people's revolution.

4. The People's Governments of Rumania and Hungary, in consequence of the comprehensive character of what may result from these agreements, will be asked to take an active part in assisting the fighting Greek people and take practical measures for effective intervention in this cause, regardless whether these countries have common boundaries with Greece.

5. The Government of the People's Democracy of Albania undertakes the obligation to place a naval base at the disposal of ships flying the flag of the Greek Democratic Navy. The signatory Governments should give substantial assistance and material for the formation of a Greek Democratic Navy.

6. The co-signatory Staffs will send representatives for the precise execution of the protocol to G.H.Q. of the Greek Democratic Army. If a Free Greek Democratic Government is formed, this Government will be asked to sign the protocol aforementioned.

7. For any operations, the Greek Democratic Army is obliged to refer to the Joint Military Council so that co-ordinated measures can be taken by the Council in the rear areas to meet the demands created by the operations.

8. The participation of the allied Governments in the information centres of the Greek Democratic Army with military or non-military representatives and the exchange of relevant information is obligatory on all co-signatories.

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9. Leading members of the Greek Democratic Army cannot be changed without the consent of the Military Co-ordination office. Military intervention must not be undertaken without first informing the Greek Democratic Army who is responsible for the operation on the enemy's territory.

10. This agreement has been concluded in consequence of the relevant military convention following upon the dynamic liberating movement for striking at American Imperialism and for frustrating the plan to create an anti-Soviet bridgehead in Greece.

APPENDIX II

LETTER FROM MARKOS TO ZACHARIADIS

Comrade,

As chief of the Greek Democratic Army, I am compelled to repeat to you in writing what I told you before your journey to Moscow with regard to the consequences of the military tactics pursued by Military Headquarters and the Moscow Government.

You are familiar with Comrade Stalin's historic message of December, 1944, which induced us to launch the popular uprising which had its well-known and tragic results leading to Varkiza, results due to the fact that when we appealed for help to Moscow, Comrade Stalin forgot all his promises and spoke of his diplomatic commitments.

When Germany fell at last, Comrade Stalin saw that his hands were free and that he could turn to this corner of the earth called Greece, seeing that she was indispensable to him for the completion of his ambitious plans, a fact we exploited to achieve our policy, the establishment of a People's Democracy in our country, thus realising the dream that made us turn out on the pavements [i.e. demonstrate and, perhaps, riot, in the streets] for twenty-eight years. For this reason, we met at the historic congress at Petritsch in December, 1945, a whole year after the December events, and resolved that the people [i.e. Greek Communists and sympathisers who fled to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria after the defeat in December, 1944] who for a year and more had been living in the friendly States so as to escape justice as a

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result of Stalin's diplomatic commitments, were the only people who could with certainty bring about the reforms we sought. A struggle was necessary, and in this struggle there had to be a leader to direct it. You selected me as such a leader because you knew of my struggle for democracy and for the people.

From that moment, the first group of the Greek Democratic Army was formed. Its headquarters were established at Bulkes in Yugoslavia. On orders from Comrade Stalin to our northern neighbours, our supplies of arms and ammunition began to arrive so that we could march on Athens, causing the villages to rise one by one till we got there. But after we crossed the frontier, we realised that with [only] 4,000 men who were at that time in Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, it was impossible to win the fight. For this reason, we signed a series of agreements with the Governments of the above countries by which we received fresh aid, and new training centres for additional men whom we had to collect and recruit for the Democratic Army, some by force and some voluntarily.

From that moment we began to make the villages and hamlets of Greece rise as part of a single Staff plan of our allies, so that we could bring about the economic collapse of the country and force the Athens Government to include us in its ranks, which would be our first step towards seizing power. But when we saw that the Athens Government was determined to settle its differences with us once and for all, we decided to create a regular army of 50,000 so that we could seize the Government by armed force. The price of all this was the re-adjustment of our frontier in favour of our neighbours and acceptance in advance of the unfavourable clauses of the Peace Treaties. In this way, Comrade Stalin

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achieved his aims with regard to Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, giving them what they wanted at our expense so that we might get what we wanted to achieve power by trying to crush the Greek fighter, that model of courage. But when we realised that we needed an army, a big army (because behind that courage there was also the money of the British and the Americans), and sought a new conciliation, we again had Stalin, through Molotov, saying to us: Carry on! We shall arm the friends of democracy so that they can help you. This was because Russia's aim of setting foot in Greece was failing.

We believed, and we carried on. Thus the Foreign Legions were formed in 1947 and we established the first Committee of the Democratic Government. But since then, Comrade Molotov, always for the sake of diplomacy, postponed their entry into the struggle until at last we came to December, 1947, when he told us: Establish an official Government and announce to the Greek people your determination to continue the struggle for victory, and we shall immediately recognise you as the official Government of the country. We did this. We announced the formation of the Government and I assumed the Premiership so that the people could see that it was in the hands of a man determined to win. I gave orders for the capture of Konitsa as the seat of Government, bearing in mind General Popovitch's declaration that an attack on Florina would be launched simultaneously by the Foreign Legions. But, after all this, the attack was postponed by Moscow until fresh orders, and so was the announcement that the Government would be recognised, until Moscow could see what the reaction on the British and on the Americans would be.

On top of everything, at the critical stage of the Battle of

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Konitsa, the ammunition did not arrive in time, and, despite our superiority, our best strategic positions were turned, and we lost the battle.

You may tell me: At no time were you left without ammunition! I reply: Yes! But the soldier of the Democratic Army, as you know, only fights as long as he sees that there are reserves. When he feels that this is no longer so, he takes matters into his own hands. And then we get what we have seen: reprimand upon reprimand that the commanders did not perform their tasks as they should have done. That is why the prestige of the Democratic Army has fallen so low.

You are summoned by Moscow so that Comrade Molotov may again tell you that he realises the situation of the General's [i.e. Markos'] Government but is obliged to wait for others to make the first move for the sake of diplomacy. And the others say that if the satellites give recognition, they will take suitable steps. The result for us is nil.

Meanwhile the leadership of the army has been gradually transferred to the General Staff of the G.P.B. [?] and we have reached the stage of carrying out orders without being allowed any initiative and of being tricked by one and the other while the one and the other have already received what they needed through the Agreement which was signed. We have received nothing up to the present.

After telling you all this in its naked truth, believe me, Comrade Zachariadis, I am resolved, if Tirana and Belgrade and Sofia and Moscow do not carry out their promises, to repudiate every agreement and follow the path of a soldier who has fought a battle and lost. For you must know that the Popovitch Staff Plan is one that will smash every stone in Greece and we shall be compelled to get into debt ten times more deeply than before to rebuild Greece. Our struggle,

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consequently, is without purpose if it is to bring us greater disaster.

You may communicate the present letter to the Political Bureau of the Greek Communist Party so that it may be apprised of what I set out, and may take decisions with regard to the future.

With Comradely greetings,

ARKOS.